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Foreword 
 
Stuart Fraser 
Chairman, Policy and Resources Committee 
City of London 
 
Support for small and medium-sized enterprises and an acknowledgement of the 
role they play in the wider economy is something of a political catchphrase. All of us 
believe in SMEs and support measures to encourage them.  
 
Those expressions, however, are too often as far as it goes. This study, commissioned 
by the City of London and undertaken by URS Corporation Ltd, has many useful 
recommendations and conclusions.  It highlights how vital SMEs are in terms of job 
creation and growth, their geographical spread across the UK, their flexibility and 
capacity for innovation.  Most massive national and international businesses were 
once SMEs: a modern economy needs therefore to have in place mechanisms to 
support SMEs of many different types and sizes with different financing needs 
throughout their life cycles which encourage those with growth potential to enlarge 
and evolve, while accepting that for others the target should be the maintenance 
of an economic size. 
 
This study is timely as an election approaches and politicians face the challenge of 
encouraging business growth. Whatever the differences in approach between the 
parties, there is agreement on the central role of business in recovering from the 
recession – by creating new jobs, by taking on and training new entrants to the 
workplace, by innovating, by exporting and of course by generating profits on 
which taxes are paid.     
 
Whilst it has long been recognised that seeking equity capital will be more 
appropriate for some SMEs than others, the difficulties in obtaining bank finance – 
whether real or perceived – highlight the need for other structures, including family 
and other informal sources, business angels and venture capital. Equity capital is 
perhaps regarded too often as a route for the large company rather than for those 
on the ‘escalator’ from small to medium, and medium to large. Equity investors differ 
from bank lenders in their expectations of return and their view of risk. Both forms of 
finance have an essential role, but equity can be better suited to a business 
environment which itself is more fluid and challenging than ever before. Public 
equity also provides the reassurance of an ‘exit route’ for venture capital funds.  
 
This study identifies challenges as well as successes. It examines in detail the many 
sources of SME funding and particularly the role of AIM and PLUS Markets at the 
public equity end of the spectrum. There is much to applaud but equally much for 
policy-makers, regulators and the markets themselves to note, especially liquidity 
issues, flotation costs and the impact of EU Prospectus, Transparency and Market 
Abuse directives.   
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It underlines too the role of City institutions in supporting and developing SMEs and 
demonstrates again that the wholesale financial services sector – for which ‘the City’ 
is convenient shorthand – is an essential part of the real economy. 
 
A healthy and growing smaller business sector is not a luxury but a necessity in a 
challenging national and global economy. I believe that this study and its 
recommendations will be the basis of a much-needed and urgent debate. 
 
         Stuart Fraser 
         London 
         March 2010 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
 
The City of London recognises the important contribution made by small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to the UK economy and the critical role played by 
UK financial services in providing equity finance to facilitate their growth. As a result 
the City of London has commissioned research to assess the role and contribution 
made by UK financial services in terms of supporting the provision of and access to 
equity finance for UK SMEs. This commission is timely given the Government’s 
concerns over gaps in the SME funding escalator and the recent economic 
downturn, which has led to a withdrawal of venture capital funds and a loss of 
investor confidence. 
 
The primary objective of this research is to assess the role and contribution of public 
equity markets in providing for the equity finance needs of UK SMEs. The UK’s two 
main growth markets - the London Stock Exchange’s AIM and PLUS Markets’ PLUS-
quoted (PLUS) - act as platforms for SMEs to raise equity finance for business growth. 
This research study investigates the benefits, shortcomings and efficacy of these 
markets in supporting SMEs access to equity finance. This includes an assessment of 
the characteristics and recent performance of the markets, and an understanding 
of how regulatory regimes, operation and taxation impact on the provision of and 
access to equity finance through public markets.  
 
We also consider whether issues impacting on the provision of and access to equity 
finance along the funding escalator and via public equity markets are the result of 
the economic downturn or are longer term issues that reflect structural change.  
 
The report recommends actions to support and build on the potential of the UK’s 
public equity markets that will help SMEs access equity finance in both the short and 
longer term.  
 
Key Findings 
 
Key messages and conclusions arising from the research are: 
 
1. Entrepreneurship and small firm formation are important drivers of the UK’s 
economy. SMEs contribute significantly to UK employment, prosperity, innovation, 
productivity and provide a number of other benefits to society. 
 
2. High growth SMEs have the potential to generate substantial economic benefits. 
Though they represent a small minority of all SMEs, it is these high growth SMEs, 
which deserve the greatest access to appropriate forms and levels of equity 
finance. 
 
3. The funding escalator model is supported which suggests high growth SMEs need 
different sources of finance at different stages in their development. The 
escalator as an inter-dependent system of funding supply and release means  
that any gaps in the provision of finance have knock-on effects, forward and 
backward, on other parts of the escalator. The demand for public market listings 
is therefore dependent on the provision of and access to equity finance lower 
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down the escalator, in particular from public sector venture capital, business 
angels and venture capital investors. 
 
4. At present, the operation of the SME funding escalator could be improved. 
Several parts of the escalator appear to be operating sub-optimally due to: 
 
• The reduction in the supply of early stage venture capital funds (£2m to 
£10m), which means that SMEs are becoming more reliant on business 
angels to meet their equity finance needs.  
• An investment relationship disconnection between business angels and 
venture capital firms, which means that business angels are now tending 
to fund SMEs for an exit, as opposed to seek ongoing investment or a 
market listing. 
• A depressed Initial public offering (IPO) market, which means that business 
angels and venture capital funds are unable to exit from investments to 
raise funds. 
 
5. The economic downturn has made it harder for SMEs to raise external finance. 
Rejection rates have risen, with term loans more affected than overdrafts but the 
banks have not stopped lending. Firms most affected are those with low assets 
(lack of collateral), high credit demands, poor credit ratings and low business 
experience (start-ups).  
 
6. AIM is the largest small caps public equity market in the world. The operation of 
AIM has enhanced the position of the London Stock Exchange among the 
world’s principal stock exchanges. Success factors include the favourable 
regulatory rules; comparatively low costs for admission, fundraising and 
transactions; access to the wider UK financial and business community; and its 
positioning as an aspirational brand that SMEs would actively seek to list on. 
 
7. AIM and PLUS have together substantially increased the variety of capital-raising 
and investing opportunities for UK financial services in SMEs. These opportunities 
have reinforced the value of the cluster of experience, resources and 
management skills which are concentrated in the City. 
 
8. AIM and PLUS provide the platform for SMEs to raise equity to finance growth. 
Though a substantial proportion of the UK’s financial services are based in 
London, the markets support SMEs from all regions of the UK. Both AIM and PLUS 
have also been successful in attracting foreign based SMEs. 
 
9. Levels of daily liquidity are a major and recurrent issue for markets with large 
volumes of small capitalisation stocks. This is true for both AIM and PLUS. Low daily 
liquidity can act as a deterrent to investment in small cap stocks, making it 
harder for investors to access funds. 
 
10. Though AIM tends to attract early-stage businesses and businesses from high-risk 
sectors, the risk profile of the overall market is not considered to be too high.  
 
11. 2010 brings new opportunities for both AIM and PLUS to support high growth SMEs 
in accessing equity finance. Mergers and acquisitions are expected to pick up in 
early 2010, which could lead to consolidation of small cap stock and enhanced 
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levels of liquidity among smaller stock bands. In particular, the trends in 
fundraising on AIM through rights issues are rebounding following the effects of 
the global economic downturn. 
 
Recommendations 
 
We make the following recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the SME 
funding escalator and role of the public equity markets in meeting the equity 
financing needs of UK SMEs 
 
• Investigation into the financial requirements of technology firms, particularly at 
the commercialisation, start-up and early growth stages 
 
• Enhanced Government support for the business angel market through increasing 
financial input and tax incentives, supporting business angel networks, retaining 
the Enterprise Investment Scheme and amending investment rules 
 
• Enterprise Investment Scheme rules are amended to address the investment 
disconnect between business angels and venture capital firms  
 
• Research to be undertaken to examine why the UK venture capital industry is 
segmented by stage and how funds investing through the whole cycle from start-
up to IPO might be encouraged 
 
• Research into the economic cost/benefit to the UK economy of SMEs 
undertaking trade sales 
 
• Raising awareness amongst SMES and their advisors of good practice/methods in 
operating as a publicly quoted company on AIM/PLUS 
 
• Research to be undertaken that considers how issues around low levels of 
liquidity should be tackled 
 
• AIM continues to monitor Nomads and an annual survey to be conducted to 
assess the performance of Nomads operating on AIM 
 
• The City of London, AIM and PLUS to ensure that they remain central to the 
debates on changes to EU legislation which may affect the ability of SMEs to 
raise capital cost-effectively. 
 
• To bring together a consortium of interested partners to make the case for or 
commission an annual ‘state of SME finance’ report. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Brief 
 
The City of London recognises the important contribution made by SMEs to the UK 
economy and the critical role played by UK Financial Services in providing equity 
finance to facilitate their growth. As a result the City of London has commissioned 
research to assess the role and contribution made by UK financial services in terms of 
supporting the provision of and access to equity finance for UK SMEs. This 
commission is timely given the Government’s concerns about gaps in the SME 
funding escalator and the recent economic downturn, which has led to a 
withdrawal of venture capital funds and a loss of investor confidence. 
 
The primary objective of this research is to assess the role and contribution of public 
equity markets in providing for the equity finance needs of UK SMEs. The UK’s two 
main growth markets – the London Stock Exchange’s AIM and PLUS Markets’ PLUS-
quoted (PLUS) - act as platforms for SMEs to raise equity finance for business growth. 
This research study investigates the benefits, shortcomings and efficacy of these 
markets in supporting SMEs’ access to equity finance. This includes an assessment of 
the characteristics and recent performance of the markets, and an understanding 
of how regulation regimes, operation and taxation impact on the provision of and 
access to equity finance through public markets.  
 
We also consider whether issues impacting on the provision of and access to equity 
finance along the funding escalator and via public equity markets are the result of 
the economic downturn or are longer term issues that require structural change.  
 
In this context, the report recommendations provide action-focused solutions to 
support and build on the potential of the UK’s public equity markets that will help 
SMEs access equity finance in both the short and longer term.  
 
1.2. Background 
 
Entrepreneurship and the growth of small firms are recognised to be essential drivers 
for the UK’s economic prosperity and quality of life. Indeed, high growth SMEs 
represent a small proportion of all SMEs but make a significant contribution to the UK 
economy particularly in terms of job creation and increasing employment. This 
contribution will be highlighted as part of this study.  
 
High growth SMEs however usually require access to external finance in order to 
realise their growth potential. Access to finance is often a critical factor in the 
growth of an SME. Finance for business growth is generally acquired through a 
number of different sources (reviewed as part of this study), the primary source 
being bank finance. However banks tend to place restrictions on the amount of 
finance and the types of businesses they lend finance to. SMEs with the potential to 
generate high levels of growth and return are often considered by banks as too risky 
and not viable investment propositions.  
 
Equity finance provides both a viable and important alternative to bank finance for 
SMEs at different stages of business development. High growth SMEs may seek equity 
investment from public sector funds, business angels, venture capital firms and 
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ultimately the public equity markets. Given that demand for admission to the public 
market by SMEs is dependent on an ‘escalator of pre-market finance’, this study 
assesses its effectiveness and the relationship between business angels, venture 
capital firms and the public equity markets. A key part of this assessment determines 
whether there is an adequate supply of equity finance for high growth SMEs or 
whether gaps exist in this supply chain. This is a particularly relevant subject to 
investigate given the recent shift in private equity supply from venture capital 
investments to increasing leveraged buy-out activity to facilitate ownership change 
and restructuring of companies. Also, this is further emphasised by recent 
Government commissioned reports, such as the Rowland’s Review, The Provision of 
Growth Capital to UK Small and Medium Sized Enterprises which have highlighted 
Government concerns regarding the impact of economic downturn on the 
provision of risk finance and the re-emergence of gaps in early stage finance. 
 
The public stock markets play a fundamental role in supporting the development of 
growing SMEs and offering a viable alternative to bank finance by providing a 
platform for raising equity finance and increasing the visibility of SMEs amongst their 
peers and stakeholders. The City of London acts as a global financial hub and 
conduit for international market listings and fundraisings, and is home to the London 
Stock Exchange and two growth markets - AIM and PLUS. The regulatory regimes of 
these growth markets promote a tailored and dynamic operation of business 
infrastructure, allowing them to fulfil a vital role in the SME financing ladder. They 
provide smaller businesses with an opportunity to raise significant additional funds for 
growth; allow original investors an opportunity to realise a return on their initial 
investment; and compel SMEs to start running their affairs in accordance with 
recognised standards relating to governance, which in turn gives added 
confidence to potential investors. The existence of effective, efficient and liquid 
public markets is an essential component in the evolution of fast growth SMEs and 
the long-term strength of the UK economy. This study assesses the benefits and 
efficacy in the provision of equity finance to SMEs but also identifies the areas 
through which public markets and policy makers can assist further with supporting 
the business development and growth of this target group. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
The research programme was designed to gain an understanding of the role and 
efficacy of the markets, within the context of the wider funding ladder providing 
equity finance to SMEs. The programme involved a number of activities: 
 
• A literature review gathering and analysing in detail reports and research on 
the importance of SMEs to the UK economy and the SME funding ladder. 
• Analysis of data and information relating to the characteristics and 
performance of public equity markets AIM and PLUS. 
• To the extent possible within the scope of the research, a review of regulatory 
regimes which impact upon market operation and taxation rules regarding 
investment and SMEs. 
• To understand the efficacy of the funding ladder and markets in raising equity 
finance for SMEs, interviews were held with senior representatives and 
knowledgeable experts of organisations and businesses involved in the 
provision of equity finance. Interviews were held with 19 different 
organisations in total, including the markets (AIM and PLUS) and the wider 
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advisory community (investment banks, nominated advisers, brokers, lawyers 
and accountants), the British Business Angel Association (BBAA), the British 
Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and other venture capital providers. 
Discussion topics were tailored according to the interviewee.  
 
For the public markets and its advisory community, topics of discussion 
included: 
 
o The benefits and costs of raising capital; 
o Liquidity of the SME public equity markets; 
o Appropriateness of regulation and how regulation at the UK and 
European level impacts efficiency and operation of the markets; 
o The importance of peer groups and networks of professional business 
services supporting the markets; 
o Geographical differences in the ease of access to equity finance; and 
o How the operation of the markets can be improved to meet SME 
equity financing needs. 
 
Topics of discussion with business angels and venture capitalists specifically 
focused on: 
 
o The effectiveness of the SME funding escalator, whether there are 
deficiencies/gaps in the funding escalator, the reasons for deficiencies 
/gaps and how to overcome them 
o Reasons why an SME/investor seeks trade sale over admission to a 
public market 
o Reasons for seeking a quotation on AIM or PLUS instead of the other 
markets; and  
o Experience of preparing for flotation and being a quoted company. 
 
These interviews provide a strong evidence base from a range of informed 
stakeholders, often speaking on behalf of a broader client base (i.e. SMEs) or 
peer group (other business angels or venture capital firms). 
 
• Discussions with businesses to gather views on the growth funding story of 
businesses, their experiences of accessing finance and achieving an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) on AIM or PLUS and/or raising funds through further 
issues; and the reasons for and implications of a business seeking a trade sale 
over IPO. In total 14 businesses spread across the UK1 were interviewed. 
• Research findings from the literature review, data analysis and consultation, 
which have been interwoven into chapters and presented in such a way to 
highlight key issues. 
• Research into good practice to identify how provision of and access to equity 
finance by SMEs could be potentially improved. Good practice was identified 
in pre-market equity finance as well as for equity markets operation. A 
workshop with stakeholders was held to test findings and develop 
recommendations. 
                                                     
1 Of 14 businesses consulted six were based in London, three in the South of England, two in the North, 
one in the Midlands, one in the West and one from Wales. 
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Our findings enabled us to set out a series of actionable recommendations in terms 
of how the City can improve and increase the provision of equity finance for SMEs. 
 
1.4. Report Structure 
 
Following this introduction, the first two chapters provide context to the research 
questions: 
 
• Chapter 2 sets the context to the research by identifying the importance of 
the SME sector to the UK economy; and 
• Chapter 3 illustrates the workings of the SME funding escalator and the role of 
the public equity markets within this mechanism. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the research analysis. They are based around key issues 
identified from the literature review, data analysis and consultation work as well as 
drawing upon the expertise and experience of our consultancy team: 
 
• Chapter 4 looks at deficiencies and gaps in the provision of and access to 
equity finance in the pre-market funding escalator and the implications these 
have for the public markets; and 
• Chapter 5 assesses the characteristics, role and effectiveness of the public 
markets in providing equity finance to UK SMEs. 
 
The last two chapters draw together findings, reflecting back to the research 
questions and suggest recommendations: 
 
• Chapter 6 draws together the key conclusions; and  
• Chapter 7 sets out recommendations, aimed at policy makers and growth 
markets. 
10 
 
2. IMPORTANCE OF SMEs TO THE UK ECONOMY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the context for the detailed discussion of the financing of SMEs 
which follows in Chapter 3. Its aims are threefold. First we set the current recognition 
of the economic significance of SMEs in historical context. Small businesses were 
seen as being of marginal economic significance until the 1970s and it is only in the 
past two to three decades that their importance has been recognised and valued. 
This change in attitude has been reflected in increasing government support for the 
SME sector. The first section therefore traces this revival and discusses the reasons for 
the ‘revival’ of the SME sector. Second, we briefly examine the current size and 
characteristics of the SME sector. Third, we review the economic significance of SMEs 
in terms of employment, innovation, economic development and societal 
contribution. Finally, we briefly review government support for the SME sector. 
 
2.2. The Revival of the SME Sector 
 
UK SMEs make a significant contribution to the economy particularly in terms of 
enterprise, innovation and growth. However the SME sector has not always been so 
important to the UK economy. It is widely accepted that the economies of 
developed countries, including the UK, have undergone a significant structural shift 
since the 1970s, which has set in place conditions that have promoted the growth of 
the SME sector. The 1960s and early 1970s were the apogee of what has been 
termed bureaucratic capitalism.2 It was an era of growing consumer demand, 
fostered by growing affluence. Meeting this demand involved the production of 
large volumes of standardised products using mass production, assembly-line 
technology with economies of scale critical. This favoured the emergence of 
massive, hierarchically organised corporations. Meanwhile, small business and 
entrepreneurship were marginalised. Indeed, the Labour Government of the time 
became sufficiently concerned about the future of the small business sector that it 
set up An Inquiry on Small Firms, chaired by John Bolton, to enquire into ‘the place of 
small firms in a modern economy’ and to recommend on future policy. The 
Committee’s report, published in November 1971, has been hugely influential on 
several counts – assembling a body of research which established the significant role 
of small firms in the economy, shaping subsequent policy interventions, and 
stimulating scholarly interest in the small business sector.3 
 
Since the mid-1970s, SMEs as a proportion of the UK economy have been growing in 
importance. This revival and resurgence of small firms can be attributed to a variety 
of trends. Cultural attitudes towards self-employment have become more positive.4 
The social contract between business and labour, in which large companies 
provided lifelong employment, steady pay increases with seniority and generous 
pensions in exchange for employee loyalty and commitment, started to break down 
                                                     
2 C J Schramm (2006) The Entrepreneurial Imperative: How America’s Economic Miracle will Reshape 
the World  (and change your life) New York: Collins. 
3 For example, see J.Stanworth and C.Gray (eds.) (1991) Bolton 20 years on: the small firm in the 1990s. 
London: Paul Chapman Publishing. 
4 An OECD report commented that ‘a near unanimous view held by analysts is that culture plays a 
critical role in determining the level of entrepreneurship’ (OECD, Fostering Entrepreneurship, 1998). 
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in the 1980s. Relatively few large companies now offer long-term job security. 
Pension schemes have been curtailed or closed, seniority systems have given way to 
performance pay, workloads have increased and work schedules are increasingly 
long and inflexible. As a consequence, working in the corporate sector has become 
less attractive and rewarding, especially for Generation X (the post-baby boomers 
born between 1965 and 1980) who have become increasingly willing to leverage 
their skills and professional networks to work for themselves.5 Generation Y or 
‘Millennials’, (born between 1978 and 2001) are intensive users of technology, having 
been raised on computers and the internet, are also less likely to be attracted by 
corporate careers. Wanting to maintain their independence and ‘own’ their 
careers, they are also much more likely to work for themselves compared with 
previous generations.6 
 
Meanwhile, economic, cultural and technological changes have opened up 
opportunities for small businesses. There are a number of reasons for this: 
 
• First, economies of scale have become less important. In the era of mass 
production, economies of scale favoured large-scale production, so large 
firms were able to produce goods more cheaply than small firms. However, 
technological changes in methods of production (e.g. CNC machines) and 
materials (e.g. plastics replacing steel) have lowered the minimum efficient 
scale of production and enabled short productions at no cost penalty. 
Related to this, the costs of doing business are becoming variable rather than 
fixed on account of increasing opportunities to outsource (e.g. distribution 
and shipping). ICT technology in the form of cheap and powerful personal 
computers and software, and other innovations (e.g. express parcel delivery, 
printing and copying) have provided small businesses with the power, scope 
and access of large companies but without sacrificing the independence 
and flexibility of being small. More recently, the internet, along with money 
transfer mechanisms (notably PayPal), have been particularly important in 
enabling small businesses to cost-effectively serve small, geographically 
dispersed, market niches (the ‘long tail’ phenomenon). At the same time, 
consumers have become more comfortable buying online.7  
• Second, the mass market has fragmented and has been replaced by 
numerous niche markets which favour small scale production. This has been 
driven by growing affluence which has created demands for customised, 
tailored and natural products and services tailored to their specific needs.8  
• Third, the process of sectoral shift, involving the decline in manufacturing and 
the growth of business and personal services, has also been a key driver. This is 
due to the absence of scale economies in many parts of the service sector, 
the consequent lower barriers to entry, and growing demand for specialised 
and personalised services.   
                                                     
5 Institute for the Future/Intuit (2007a) Intuit Future of Small Business Report. First Instalment: Demographic 
Trends and Small Business, The Intuit Future of Small Business Series, www.intuit.com/futureofsmallbusiness 
6 Ibid 
7 Institute for the Future/Intuit (2008) Intuit Future of Small Business Report. Third Instalment: The New 
Artisan Economy, The Intuit Future of Small Business Series, www.intuit.com/futureofsmallbusiness 
8 The growth of real ale, or boutique, breweries is often cited as an example of this trend. For example 
see: Mason, C M and McNally, K N (1997) ‘Market change, distribution and new firm formation and 
growth: the case of real ale breweries in the UK', Environment and Planning A, 29, 405-417. 
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• Fourth, restructuring, downsizing and the development of new ways of 
organising work by large organisations in efforts to reduce costs and increase 
flexibility, such as project based working, have led to a reduction in the 
number of permanent workers they directly employ and an increase in their 
use of independent contractors, freelancers and outsourcing to smaller 
businesses.9  The reliance of larger organisations on external sources of 
specialist expertise has been of particular importance in driving the growth of 
small business services firms. However, these trends have prompted some 
commentators to argue that at least part of the small firm revival is merely a 
transfer of activity from large to small firms and thus a statistical artefact.10 
Fifth, proponents of long wave theory11 have noted that the 1980s and 1990s 
were characterised by the emergence of a cluster of new technologies, 
notably ICT, which formed the basis for new industries. Studies of the evolution 
of technology-based industries note that small firms play the leading role in 
the commercialisation of new scientific discoveries at the early stages but 
large firms become relatively more important once the technologies begin to 
mature.12  
• Finally, privatisation and de-regulation, which have ended government 
monopolies in particular industries, opening them up to private sector 
businesses, and increased contracting out by government departments and 
public sector agencies have provided opportunities for SMEs, some of which 
have been able to expand into large enterprises (e.g. Stagecoach, First 
Group and Easyjet in transport, Carphone Warehouse in mobile phones). 
 
Many of these factors that have driven the revival and resurgence of the SME sector 
over the past few decades will continue to create the positive conditions for SME 
start up. As such it is important to recognise that the UK SME sector will continue to 
play an important role for the UK economy. To gauge the economic importance of 
the sector for the UK economy we next look at the employment contribution of the 
SME sector to the UK economy. 
 
2.3. Economic Significance: Number, Location and Sector 
 
There were an estimated 4.8 million enterprises in the UK at the start of 2008 (latest 
available estimate). Almost all of these businesses (97.0%) were micro or small (0-49 
employees); only 2.5% were medium sized (50-249 employees); and just 0.6% were 
considered large (250+)13 (see Table 2.1). 
                                                     
9 For examples of types of workers who have been ‘converted’ from employees to self-employed, see: 
(i) Granger, B, Stanworth, J and Stanworth, C (1995) Self-employed career dynamics: the case of 
‘unemployment push’ in UK book publishing’, Work, Employment and Society, 9, 499-516; (ii) Stanworth, 
J, Stanworth, C, Watson, A, Purdy, D and Healeas, S (2004) Franchising as a small business growth 
strategy: a resource-based view of organizational development, International Small Business Journal, 
22, 539 - 559. 
10 Harrison, B (1994) Lean and Mean: the Changing Landscapes of Corporate Power in the Age of 
Flexibility, Basic Boks: New York 
11 Alternatively known as Kondratieff cycles 
12 Rothwell, R (1984) The role of small firms in the emergence of new technologies, Omega, 12, 19-29 
13 The Companies Act 1985 definitions for an SME in relation to compulsory audit thresholds defines SMEs 
as organisations that employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not 
exceeding £22.8 million net, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding £11.4 million net. 
These criteria and thresholds are similar to The European Commission definition as per 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 
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The majority of small businesses, some 74%, have no employees14. Nevertheless, their 
self-employed owners, partners and employee-directors totalled 3.9million. Even 
though most SMEs are either one-person businesses or micro businesses, their sheer 
quantity translates into a significant number of jobs. SMEs with employees – which 
number 1.2 million - have a total combined workforce of just under 10 million. SMEs 
account for 59.4% of total private sector employment (including sole traders and 
proprietors of businesses with no employees) and generate 50.1% of private sector 
turnover. Micro and small enterprises (0-49 employees) account for 47.9% of 
employment and 36.5% of employment respectively. Older businesses (over 5 years 
old) provide most of the jobs (8 in 10).  
 
Table 2.1: Number of Enterprises, Employment and Turnover by Number of 
Employees, Start of 2008 
 
Size Definition Enterprises 
(/’000) 
Employment 
(/’000) 
Turnover 
(/£million) 
All enterprises 4,783 23,128 2,994,978 
All employers  1,238 19,239 2,763,280 
With no employees1 (Micro) 3,546 3,888 231,698 
1-9 (Micro) 1,033 3,857 420,282 
10-49 (Small) 17 3,332 442,396 
50-249 (Medium) 27 2,665 406,450 
250+ (Large) 6 9,386 1,494,152 
Source: BERR, 2008 
Note 1: Sole proprietorships and partnerships comprising only the self-employed owner-manager(s), 
and companies comprising only an employee director 
 
Behind this profile is a dynamic process of start-ups and closures, expansions and 
contractions. For example, there were 1.97 million businesses registered for VAT at 
the start of 2007. By the end of the year 148,000 existing businesses had deregistered 
(7.5%) while 206,000 new businesses had registered (10.4%). High churn rates appear 
to be beneficial to the economy, with growing regions characterised both by lower 
survival rates and higher rates of job losses but also by high rates of business start-ups 
and superior job creation. A plausible interpretation is that this process is shifting 
resources from declining activities to new activities. So, whereas business births will 
inevitably lead to business deaths because of the high closure rate amongst new 
businesses, it would also appear to be the case that business deaths are a signal of 
a culture of business experimentation. 
 
To analyse the distribution of SMEs by geography or sector, we can use the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR). However, this 
records only VAT and/or PAYE based enterprises with a turnover of £68,000 over a 12 
month period. In 2008 ONS recorded 2,152,400 businesses of which 99% were SMEs. 
By region, London and the South East are home to the largest numbers of SMEs - a 
direct reflection of population and economic activity. These two regions account for 
31% of UK SMEs. High numbers of SMEs are also present in the North West and South 
West across all size groups.  
                                                     
14 No employees means sole proprietorships and partnerships comprising only the self-employed owner-
manager(s), and companies comprising only an employee director. 
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Table 2.2: VAT and/or PAYE Based Enterprises by Size and Location, UK 
 
Region Number of Enterprises 
Micro  Small  Medium  Large  
London 339,185 304,405  27,735  5,280  1,765  
South East 337,380 302,015  29,180  4,850  1,335  
East England 217,925 195,160  18,840  3,095  830  
North West 211,915 186,170  21,365  3,455  925  
South West 202,550 180,670  18,640  2,635  605  
West Midlands 177,195 156,540  17,160  2,765  730  
East Midlands 147,980 130,505  14,475  2,425  575  
Yorkshire/Humber 152,475 132,980  16,165  2,695  635  
Scotland 145,745 127,275  15,180  2,630  660  
Wales 92,005 82,340  8,095  1,300  270  
Northern Ireland 70,620 61,970  7,350  1,100  200  
North East 57,425 49,415  6,590  1,115  305  
Total 2,152,400 1,909,445  200,775  33,345  8,835  
Source: Inter Departmental Business Register, UK Business, Size and Location, 2009 
 
In terms of sector focus, micro businesses are concentrated in wholesale, retail and 
repair (20% of all micro-sized businesses). A large group of micro enterprises are also 
active in professional, scientific and technical, and construction sectors (15.6% and 
14.0% respectively). Small enterprises are concentrated in health (25%), with a further 
18% operating in accommodation and food services. Medium enterprises are also 
concentrated in the health sector (27%), business administration and support 
services (24%) and accommodation and food services (16%). 
 
Table 2.3: VAT and/or PAYE Based Enterprises by Size and Sector, UK  
 
Employment Size Band Number of 
Enterprises 
Micro Small Medium  Large  
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 139,100 135,075 3,760 240 25 
Production 140,580 106,920 25,455 6,650 1,555 
Construction 289,085 267,645 18,795 2,310 335 
Wholesale, retail; repair 367,535 327,490 34,400 4,580 1,065 
Transport & storage 71,180 62,355 7,185 1,290 350 
Accomm & food services 134,220 109,615 21,960 2,255 390 
Info & communication 148,690 140,065 7,040 1,255 330 
Finance & insurance 43,015 38,475 3,425 760 355 
Property 75,730 70,810 4,125 600 195 
Prof, scientific & technical 321,825 298,490 19,810 2,940 585 
Business admin & support  154,800 137,020 13,260 3,525 995 
Public admin & defence 2,790 2,020 225 115 430 
Education 30,550 23,295 4,485 1,855 915 
Health 78,405 49,900 24,140 3,430 935 
Arts, entertainmt, recreatn  154,895 140,270 12,710 1,540 375 
Total (%) 2,152,400 1,909,445 200,775 33,345 8,835 
Source: Inter Departmental Business Register, UK Business, Size and Location, 2009. Based on SIC 2007. 
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SMEs are important to all regions of the UK and are well represented across many 
sectors of the economy. As we will see in the next section, their economic 
contribution is more than just employment benefits – they are symptomatic of 
entrepreneurship, they underpin innovation and they bring societal benefits.  
 
2.4. Benefits of SMEs to the UK Economy 
 
2.4.1 Job Creation 
 
There is now a large volume of evidence which indicates that SMEs – small firms in 
particular - make a disproportionate contribution to the creation of new jobs. This 
feature was first identified by David Birch for the US in his classic study The Job 
Generation Process15 but has been confirmed in a number of other studies in various 
countries, including the UK.16 Moreover, the contribution of small firms to job creation 
is fairly steady across the business cycle whereas the contribution of large firms is 
much more volatile, creating jobs in economic upswings but shedding jobs in 
recession. Thus, the relative importance of small firms to job creation becomes even 
more significant in periods of economic crisis.  
 
It is important to note that most small firms do not create many new jobs – they 
typically start small and remain small. The main contribution to job creation comes 
from a small number of fast growing companies. Whereas Birch argued that fast 
growing firms were young, labelling them gazelles, a later synthesis of research by 
OECD17 suggested that fast growth firms comprise both young and old firms, as well 
as small and large firms. Moreover, younger and smaller firms tend to expand 
organically whereas larger and older firms are more likely to grow through 
acquisition. The key point in this context is that fast growth firms – especially young 
fast growth firms - are likely to have the greatest need for external finance. A stock 
market listing is likely to assist in growth through acquisition. 
 
A new report on high growth firms, published by NESTA and based on an analysis of 
the IDBR, provides new insights into firm growth in the UK.18 Following the OECD, a 
high growth firm (HGF) is defined as a firm with an average employment growth rate 
of 20% per annum over a three year period and with 10 or more employees at the 
start of the period.  Four-fifths of HGFs had fewer than 50 employees in the base 
year. Young firms are more likely to be HGFs but the majority (70%) of HGFs were at 
least 5 years old. Finally, HGFs can be found in all sectors of the economy – there is 
no bias to high tech sectors. 
 
In the 2002 to 2005 period HGFs accounted for 6.4% of all firms employing 10 or more 
people at the base year. In the 2005 to 2008 period the proportion was 5.8%. The 
proportion of HGFs increases if a turnover definition is used (13% and 9%, 
                                                     
15 Birch, D L (1979) The Job Generation Process, MIT Program on Neighbourhood and Regional Change: 
Cambridge: MA 
16 Gallagher, C, Daly, M and Thomason, J (1990) The growth of UK companies 1985-87 and their 
contribution to job generation, Employment Gazette, February, 92-98. Anyadike-Danes, M, Bonner, K, 
Hart, M and Mason, C (2009) Mapping Firm Growth in the UK: The Economic Impact of High Growth 
Firms, NESTA: London. 
17 EUROSTAT-OECD (2007) Business Demography Manual. Paris: EUROSTAT-OECD 
18 Anyadike-Danes, M, Bonner, K, Hart, M and Mason, C (2009) Measuring Business Growth: High Growth 
Firms and their contribution to employment in the UK, London, NESTA 
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respectively).19 These HGFs created 1.9million jobs between 2002 and 2005 out of the 
3million new jobs created in this period, while in the period 2005-8 they created 
1.3million out of the 2.4million new jobs created.  
 
The types of HGFs responsible for creating the most new jobs are those employing 
more 250 people and those at least five years old.20  
 
The second part of the NESTA study involved a 10 year longitudinal study of the 1998 
cohort of new businesses. Here again it was found that instances of high growth are 
rare, with only 3.1% of businesses growing by more than 20% per annum after they 
reached 10 employees. Cases of firms growing at this rate on more than one 
occasion are extremely rare. Over half of the firms with one employee at start-up did 
not increase employment and almost half of the firms which grew added just one 
employee. Finally, growth does reduce the risk of closure. The overall closure rate of 
the cohort is 60% whereas only 18% of HGFs closed. 
 
Comparison with the US suggests that the US has a higher proportion of high growth 
enterprises than the UK, whereas the UK has a much higher proportion of very small 
businesses.21 One suggestion for these contrasts is that financial markets are more 
developed in the US than the UK, enabling new entrants in the US to access the 
capital they require to support business development.22 This study will test whether 
there are gaps in the UK SME funding escalator that are restricting business 
development opportunities. 
 
2.4.2 Quality of Jobs 
 
Rather less attention has been given to the nature of the jobs provided by SMEs and 
who fills these jobs. After allowing for the heterogeneity of the small firm sector, the 
available evidence is fairly consistent on both topics. Regarding the nature of the 
jobs the SME sector as a whole provides a 
large firms. Small firms pay lower wages and salaries, and provide fewer fringe 
benefits, and although they provide considerable on-the-job training they are less 
likely to provide formal training to their staff. On the other hand, small firms appear to 
provide more job satisfaction and have more harmonious employment relations 
than large firms. The SME workforce also differs from that of large firms in several key 
respects. Small firms are more likely to employ younger workers (16-21 years) who 
have fewer educational qualifications, are more likely to have been unemployed 
prior to obtaining their present job, and are more likely to be employed on a part-
time basis. SMEs are therefore important not just in terms of the number of jobs they 
provide but also because they are more likely to employ people who have 
disadvantages in the labour market.  Moreover, fast growth firms are reported to be 
distinctive, with human resource management practices which emphasise 
                                                     
19 However, high growth firms are a very small proportion of all firms (0.94% in the 2002-5 period and 
0.61% in the 2005-8 period) 
20 The analysis does not distinguish between organic growth and growth through acquisition. However, 
there is evidence (Deschryvere, M (2008) High growth firms and job creation in Finland, Working Paper 
1144, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki) which suggests that larger and older firms are 
more likely to expand through acquisition  
21 Kingston University (Small Business Research Centre) and Babson College (2008) Growth Challenges 
for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: A UK-US Comparative Study, A report for HM Treasury and BERR. 
22 Ibid 
different range of jobs compared to that of 
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employee training, employee development and a remuneration system that gives 
employees financial incentives,23 as well as provide opportunities for rapid career 
advancement. 
 
2.4.3 Innovation 
 
SMEs also play a disproportionate role in the generation and dissemination of 
innovative ideas in the economy and so expand the boundaries of economic 
activity. Research24 shows that despite their lack of formal R&D activity, SMEs 
produce more innovations per employee than large firms, although there are 
variations across industries. This is generally attributed to the lack of bureaucratic 
constraints in small firms. Large firms, on the other hand, even if they are well-
managed market leaders, are often slow to recognise and respond to new 
technological and market developments, especially if such changes are disruptive. 
This shortcoming can result in lost market position and even threaten the continued 
survival of the company.25 Indeed, entrepreneurs and small businesses have been 
responsible for many of the most significant innovations. Moreover, innovation by 
SMEs is not confined to ‘high-tech’ sectors. Innovations in business functions and 
business models can also transform industries and create new opportunities, (e.g. 
budget airlines, express parcel delivery, direct sale of insurance). 
 
However, three important caveats are in order. First, innovative small firms are often 
based on knowledge and discoveries generated in large firms and laboratories 
which fail to see their commercial application. This knowledge is typically transferred 
as a result of the departure of employees who can see the commercial applications 
and leave to start their own businesses or to join smaller firms. Second, because of 
resource constraints in SMEs the widespread commercialisation of innovations that 
they have pioneered may require the managerial and financial resources and 
distribution channels of larger businesses if they are to expand from their initial 
customer base to the mass market.26 The decision to sell out to a large business is a 
common response to such challenges. Third, SMEs in the US have been much more 
likely to be responsible for generating disruptive technologies that lead to the 
creation of new industries than their counterparts in the UK, or indeed, Europe. This is 
attributable to a variety of factors, including the size of the US domestic market, the 
scale of government spending on research and development (much of it military- 
and space-related), its venture capital industry and the range of active 
programmes to promote commercialisation. 
 
                                                     
23 Barringer, B R, Jones, F F and Lewis, P S (1998) A qualitative study of the management practices of 
rapid-growth firms and how rapid-growth firms mitigate the managerial capacity problem, Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship, 3, 97-132. 
24 Acs, Z J and Audretsch, D B (1988) Innovation in large and small firms: an empirical analysis, American 
Economic Review, 78, 678-90 and Rothwell, R (1989) Small firms, innovation and industrial change. Small 
Business Economics, 1, 51-64. 
25 The most cited example of this situation is computing. IBM dominated the mainframe computer 
market but missed the emergence of mini-computers which were exploited by Digital, Data General, 
Prime, Wang, Hewlett-Packard and Nixdorf. However, all of these companies missed the development 
of the personal computer which was led by Apple, Commodore and Tandy (C M Christensen: The 
Innovator’s Dilemma) 
26 Moore, G (1999) Crossing the Chasm, Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to Mainstream 
Customer (revised edition), HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1999 
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2.4.4 Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth 
 
There is considerable evidence to support the claim that entrepreneurship is 
positively associated with economic growth.27 Indeed, Michael Porter regards 
entrepreneurship as ‘being at the heart of national advantage’. Entrepreneurship’s 
impact on economic growth arises in three ways. First, entrepreneurship is a 
mechanism for knowledge spillovers. Most new firms – especially in technology 
sectors – arise from the departure of individuals or groups of people from an existing 
enterprise to start a new business that is based on exploiting the knowledge that 
they gained as employees in their previous business(es). In other words, such 
individuals take knowledge from the source where it was created to a new business 
where it is commercialised. Second, by increasing the number of enterprises new 
firms result in increased competition which generates efficiency gains. Third, new 
firms contribute to diversity. Not only do they result in new firms but they also create 
variety. A process of competition between these various new ideas and initiatives 
takes place, continually leading to the selection of the most viable firms and 
industries. Variety, competition, selection and also imitation expand and transform 
the productive potential of regional and national economies by displacing obsolete 
firms, increasing productivity and expanding new niches and industries.28 
 
2.4.5 Societal Contribution 
 
SMEs also make a wide variety of societal contributions that are less amenable to 
statistical quantification, but are no less important. First, SMEs are the bedrock of their 
communities and provide localities with a source of uniqueness. Second, 
entrepreneurship is arguably the most important source of social and economic 
mobility. As Timmons observes: it ‘rewards only for talent and performance and 
could not care less about religion, sex, skin colour, social class, national origin and 
the like’29. Indeed, a number of the UK’s successful entrepreneurs, such as Lord Alan 
Sugar, had humble origins. And third, a significant proportion of SMEs are involved in 
community engagement of various types (e.g. supporting local charities and 
sporting activities). Meanwhile, successful entrepreneurs have a high propensity to 
engage in philanthropic activities, giving not just their money but often also their 
time and expertise to support local, national and international causes. More than 
two-thirds of the people on the 2008 Top 100 Giving List are self-made men and 
women (including entrepreneurs, entertainers and sports people). 
 
2.5. Government and the SME Sector 
 
Virtually all governments have a range of programmes designed to support small 
firms. In many cases these policies were first introduced after World War Two. 
However, the main growth in such initiatives occurred in the 1980s, prompted by a 
combination of high levels of unemployment, weak economic performance and 
research by Birch and others on the role of small firms in job creation. Cross-country 
                                                     
27 Audretsch, D and Keilbach, M (2004) Does entrepreneurship matter? Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28, 419-429; Audretsch, D (2005) Entrepreneurship capital and regional growth, Annals of 
Regional Science, 39, 457-469; Audretsch, D (2007) Entrepreneurship capital and economic growth, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 23, 63-78. 
28 Carree, M A and Thurik, A R (2006) The impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth. In S C Parker 
(ed) Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research. Kluwer: Dordrecht), pp 437-471. 
29 Timmons, J A. (2009). New Venture Creation, Irwin McGraw Hill, p 5 
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comparison reveals a high degree of similarity in these programmes. In the UK the 
Bolton Report provided an early impetus to small business policy, with several of their 
recommendations implemented by the 1974-79 Labour Government. The post-1979 
Thatcher Government introduced a plethora of schemes to encourage business 
start up and growth. Subsequent Governments have maintained a pro-SME stance. 
For example, the present Government’s enterprise policy objective is to ‘make the 
UK the most enterprising economy in the world and the best place to start and grow 
a business’ so that more people will have the ambition to start and grow a 
business.30 The policy focuses on so-called enterprise enablers: 
 
• Culture – develop a culture where people are aware of the rewards available 
from enterprise and have the motivation to act upon aspirations; 
• Knowledge and skills – fostering and supporting the development of 
enterprise skills and knowledge across the education system and enabling 
people running businesses to access the support and skills they need; 
• Access to finance – ensuring that businesses that are starting up and seeking 
to grow are not constrained by a lack of finance; 
• Regulatory framework – reducing regulatory burdens on small firms; and 
• Innovation – to support the role of innovation as a driver of enterprise. 
 
These policy themes have a strong continuity with the approaches of previous 
Governments.  
 
The rationale for small business policy is based on two lines of argument. The 
argument from principle rests on the proposition that small businesses are at an 
economic disadvantage to large firms because of various ‘market failures’ which 
impose greater costs on small firms. The argument from practice is that small firms 
are desirable on account of their economic and social contributions such as 
employment, innovation and flexible labour markets. Government intervention to 
promote the SME sector has, however, attracted a range of criticisms. First, the 
market failure case has not been convincingly demonstrated. This is a particular 
criticism of interventions intended to increase the supply of finance to SMEs. 
Moreover, it is argued that even if market failure could be demonstrated, this is not a 
sufficient condition for government intervention. The case for intervention must 
establish that post-intervention welfare improvements can be demonstrated after 
taking account of the costs of the intervention. Second, and more problematic, 
many of the interventions have little explicit rationale for their introduction. Third, the 
impact of many of the interventions has been questionable. This is not simply 
because of vague and opaque objectives but also because the assessment has 
focused on ‘evaluation’ rather than ‘impact’. In other words the assessment has 
focused on the recipients of the scheme (take-up rates, characteristics of recipients, 
opinions of recipients) rather than comparing the performance of assisted firms with 
that of a sample of matched firms, taking account of selection bias in the assisted 
firms.31  
 
                                                     
30 HM Treasury and BERR (2008) Enterprise: unlocking the UK’s talent 
31 D Storey (2000) Six steps to heaven: evaluating the impact of public policies to support small 
businesses in developed countries. In D L Sexton and H Landström (eds) The Blackwell Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship (Oxford: Blackwell) pp 176-193. 
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Graham Bannock - a key analyst and commentator on the SME sector for many 
years (and secretary of the Bolton Commission) - argues that no matter what way 
the assessment of policy is done the results are generally unimpressive. He attributes 
this to two factors. First, the SME sector is so large that any realistic scale of 
intervention can only be marginal, with resources too widely dispersed and diluted 
over a proliferation of small interventions. Second, there is a mismatch between the 
constraints that owners of SMEs face and the types of intervention provided by 
government. Small business owners have in general shown little interest in loans and 
management assistance. Rather the problems which most exercise SME owners are 
related to taxation and regulatory burdens. Bannock’s conclusion, therefore, is that it 
would be more productive for government to focus on improving the framework 
conditions for all enterprise. This will benefit SMEs disproportionately because 
regulatory burdens impose a greater burden on them.32 Professor David Storey – 
another influential commentator on small business policy – is critical of the emphasis 
of policy on increasing the numbers of small firms, arguing that a high proportion fail 
and few exhibit growth. He argues that there needs to be more emphasis on 
quality..33 
 
2.6. Summary 
 
SMEs, by number, dominate the economy in the UK as in other advanced 
economies and in aggregate make a significant contribution to employment, 
innovation and economic development. The SME sector is highly skewed in terms of 
proportion towards one-person businesses and micro firms. The main economic 
impact of the SME sector derives from the small minority of firms which achieve rapid 
growth over a relatively short time period, generally on the back of technological or 
other types of innovation which have created new market opportunities.  
 
The link to finance is twofold. First, high growth firms are likely to need access to 
finance – especially equity finance – to support their growth. Second, compared to 
the US, the UK has been less successful in generating high growth firms and has a 
higher proportion of micro firms, features which have been attributed to the more 
efficient financial markets in the US. When set in this context the availability of 
finance for SMEs becomes a key factor in the UK’s ability to emerge from recession 
and promote economic growth. 
 
                                                     
32 Bannock op. cit. 
33 Greene, F J, Mole, K F and Storey, D J (2004) Does more mean worse? Three decades of enterprise 
policy in the Tees Valley, Urban Studies,, 41 (7), 1207-1228 
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3. THE SME FUNDING ESCALATOR 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to put equity into context as a source of finance for 
SMEs. In context, the vast majority of SMEs do not seek equity finance and most 
would not meet the investment criteria of funders even if they did. Indeed, many 
SMEs are self-funded, through choice or necessity, and amongst those that do seek 
external finance the preference, after family and friends and bootstrapping, is bank 
overdraft followed by bank debt. Equity finance, in contrast, accounts for a very 
small proportion of SME funding, and it is only a very small proportion of the SMEs 
population which seeks and successfully obtains equity finance. Nevertheless, equity 
finance is critical in an entrepreneurial economy because it is a much more 
appropriate source of finance upon which to grow a business than debt finance, 
and is essential in situations where business success is based on significant up-front 
investment as in the case of new technology-based firms. As we noted in Chapter 2, 
it is fast-growing firms – which will often be reliant upon external sources of equity 
finance – which have a disproportionate economic impact, in terms of employment, 
exporting, innovation and competitiveness. 
 
The chapter goes on to develop the concept of the funding escalator as a means 
of illustrating the different sources of equity finance that a firm might access as it 
grows.  
 
3.2. Sources of Finance Used by SMEs: an Overview 
 
Contrary to the prevailing view, the majority of SMEs are self-financed, either through 
personal savings or retained profits.  For example, the Warwick Business School study 
for the Small Business Investment Taskforce34 reported that only 44% of SMEs had 
sought new finance in the previous three years. The Annual Survey of Small 
Businesses for 2007-8 reported an even smaller proportion of firms - just 23% - had 
tried to obtain finance, mainly in the form of bank loans and overdrafts. Most start-
ups and a significant proportion of established small firms are funded through a 
combination of ‘3F’ money (founder, family, friends) and ‘bootstrapping’ - that is, 
creative ways of acquiring resources without the use of financial resources.  
 
This pattern of financing – with a heavy reliance on self-financing, followed by bank 
overdraft and then bank debt, and very little use of equity – has been explained in 
terms of the pecking order hypothesis35 which argues that the financing preferences 
of small business owners are based on their fear of loss of control. Thus, their 
preference will be for types of finance that minimise external interference and 
ownership dilution. Hence they will prefer internal over external financing, debt over 
equity finance. When seeking debt finance, they will prefer short-term debt which 
does not involve security and covenants over term loans. The least preferable option 
is to raise equity finance which most SME owners regard as financing of the last 
resort. However, Amar Bhidé suggests an alternative view. He argues that “most 
start-ups … don’t have the assets that an objective investor would consider 
                                                     
34 S Fraser (2005) Finance for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: A report on the 2004 UK survey of SME 
Finances, Warwick Business School 
35 Myers, S C (1984) The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39 (3), 575-92. 
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valuable. They have little to offer investors besides their hopes and dreams. The 
founders, therefore, have to rely on their own resources or raise funds from their 
relatives and friends who are willing to overlook the founder’s me-too strategies and 
inexperience.”36 There is mixed evidence regarding provision of bank finance for 
SMEs. In the Warwick survey, 11% were rejected outright and 19% received less 
finance than they needed. 37 In a survey on behalf of the Federation of Small 
Business (FSB), 9% were rejected. The overdraft rejection rate is nearly twice as high 
as for business loans (16% compared to 9%).38 The Annual Small Business Survey (SBS) 
reported that 14% were unable to obtain finance,39 with rejection mainly associated 
with lack of security and track record. The most frequently cited reasons for 
difficulties in obtaining finance were insufficient security, no credit history/not in 
business long enough, business sector too risky, and poor business 
performance/profit margins.40 However, other SMEs do not seek external finance 
because they fear that they will be rejected by funders. These ‘discouraged 
borrowers’ represented 8% of firms in the Warwick survey41 and 10% in the FSB 
survey42.  
 
More recent research however has found that the rate of rejection of SMEs seeking 
bank finance has increased. Research by the Institute of Directors (IoD), published in 
February 2010, found that difficulties in accessing bank finance have intensified. In a 
survey of more than 1,000 company directors, a quarter said they had tried to 
access finance from their banks. Of these, 57% said their application had been 
rejected. By contrast the Treasury has said that government data showed approval 
rates for loans and overdrafts were running at about 66% for businesses with a 
turnover of up to £1m and close to 90% for companies with a turnover of £1m to 
£25m.43 As with the UK, Eurozone SMEs have experienced difficulties in accessing 
bank finance. A European Central Bank survey of SMEs in February 2010 found that 
rejections of bank loan applications rose significantly in the second half of 2009 
compared with the previous six months. In the first half of 2009, 77% of SMEs had 
received in full or part the bank loans they had sought; however, in the final six 
months of 2009, this figure fell slightly to 75%. Moreover, the share of SMEs saying 
bank loans had been rejected rose from 12% to 18%.44 
 
A final reason for the reliance on internal sources of finance is that many businesses 
are too small to need to raise external finance. The Warwick survey found that by 
far, the main reason for firms not to seek external finance was because “they did not 
need it”. Home-based businesses – which account for nearly 60% of all SMEs45 – are a 
significant category of businesses that make limited use of external finance, with 
                                                     
36 Bhidé, A (2000) The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses, New York: Oxford University Press., quotes 
from pages 37 and 39. 
37 Fraser, op. cit. 
38 Carter, S, Mason, C and Tagg, S (2006) Lifting The Barriers to Growth in UK Small Businesses. Federation 
of Small Business, London. 
39 Williams, M and Cowling, M (2009) Annual Review Small Business Survey 2007/8, Institute of 
Employment Studies, University of Sussex, for BERR 
40 Fraser, op. cit. 
41 Carter et al, op. cit. 
42 Fraser, op. cit. 
43 See ‘Banks shun half of companies’; Financial Times, February 15 2010 
44 Europe’s SMEs face funding difficulties; Financial Times, February 16 2010 
45 Levie, J and Mason, C (2009) Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: Scotland 2007/8. Hunter Centre for 
Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde. 
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cost-minimisation’ being the biggest single reason for locating the business in the 
home.46  
 
The financial crisis has clearly made it harder for SMEs to raise external finance. A 
follow-up survey by Warwick Business School of their 2004 respondents found that 
rejection rates have risen, with term loans more affected than overdrafts, but the 
banks have not stopped lending. Firms most affected are those with low assets (lack 
of collateral), high credit demands, poor credit ratings and low business experience 
(start-ups).47 The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ SME Business 
Barometer48 – a longitudinal survey of 500 businesses with employees – reported in 
their June 2009 survey that 33% of firms were unable to raise any finance, compared 
with 14% in July 2008. Bank overdrafts were the most problematic source of funding 
to obtain. 
 
Looking at sources of external finance used, the Warwick Business School study49 
noted that the most commonly used sources in the previous three years were credit 
cards (both business and personal50) and bank overdraft, both used by just over half 
of the firms in the survey. Asset financing (hire purchase) and term loans were each 
used by around one-quarter of firms. External sources of equity finance – in contrast 
– were used by a small proportion of SMEs (3%) (Table 3.1). This pattern of financing is 
corroborated by other studies. For example, a survey of the members of the FSB 
highlighted bank overdraft, bank loans, personal credit cards and company credit 
cards as the most frequently used external sources of finance, with very little use of 
external equity investment from friends, business angels and venture capital funds 
(see Table 3.2). The Annual Survey of Small Businesses for 2007-8 reported the main 
demand for finance was for bank loans and overdrafts with 25% seeking finance in 
the £10,000 to £25,000 range.51 The BIS SME Business Barometer52 for June 2009 
reported that bank loans (40%) and bank overdrafts (27%) were the most common 
types of finance sought. Only 1% sought equity. In all of these surveys the larger and 
older firms made the greatest use of external sources of finance. 
Table 3.1: Types of External Finance Used in the Previous Three Years 
Overdraft Grants Term 
loans 
Asset 
finance 
Asset-
based 
Credit 
cards 
Equity 
finance 
52.9% 6.4% 24.3% 26.9% 3.0% 55.3% 2.9% 
 
Note: Excluding friends and family 
Source: S Fraser (2005). Finance for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: a report on the 2004 UK survey 
of SME finances, Warwick Business School 
 
                                                     
46 Mason, C M, Carter, S and Tagg, S K (2011) Invisible businesses: the characteristics of home based 
businesses in the United Kingdom, Regional Studies, forthcoming. 
47 Fraser, S (2009) How have SME finances been affected by the credit crisis, SME Centre, Warwick 
Business School 
48 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009) SME Business Barometer: June 2009. URN09/P75D 
49 S Fraser (2005) Finance for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: A report on the 2004 UK survey of SME 
Finances, Warwick Business School 
50 The latter can be regarded as a type of financial bootstrapping 
51 Williams, M and Cowling, M (2009) Annual Review Small Business Survey 2007/8, Institute of 
Employment Studies, University of Sussex, for BERR. 
52 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009) SME Business Barometer: June 2009. URN09/P75D 
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Table 3.2: Typical Sources of Finance by SMEs 
Source Number of businesses % 
Bank overdraft 8,267 49.2 
Own savings 6,977 41.2 
Retained profit 5,963 35.5 
Bank loan 5,068 30.2 
Personal credit card 3,596 21.4 
Company credit card 3,153 18.8 
Supplier credit 2,351 14.0 
Family 2,204 13.1 
Leasing 1,253 7.5 
Second mortgage 1,158 6.9 
Grants 954 5.7 
Pension 621 3.7 
Inheritance 620 3.7 
Other business/ employment 608 3.6 
Factoring 582 3.5 
Friends 490 2.9 
Redundancy payment 436 2.6 
Small firm loan guarantee 367 2.2 
Business angel/ private investor 168 1.0 
Enhanced capital allowances 85 0.5 
Public sector low interest loan 75 0.4 
Venture capital 58 0.3 
Total Responding 16,776 - 
Non respondents 2,163 - 
 
Source: Carter. S, Mason. C and Tagg. S (2006) Lifting The Barriers to Growth in UK Small Businesses 
(Federation of Small Business, London) 
 
The purpose of this brief overview of SME financing is to make three very simple, but 
often overlooked, points. First, a significant proportion of SMEs, particularly new and 
recent start-ups and micro businesses, do not seek formal sources of external 
funding, either through choice or necessity. Second, bank financing is the primary 
form of external finance for SMEs, commonly in the form of overdrafts and term 
loans. Third, firms which seek and successfully raise equity finance are very much the 
exception rather than the norm. However, as we noted in Chapter 2, these SMEs are 
significant for the economy on account of their entrepreneurial qualities, innovation 
and fast growth. Accordingly, we focus for the remainder of this report on sources of 
equity finance for the growing firm. 
 
3.3  Finance and the Growing Firm – The Funding Escalator 
 
Equity finance is generally regarded as a more appropriate form of finance for 
growing firms than bank finance for several reasons. On the one hand, the bank 
lending decision is a credit decision not an investment decision.53 The bank needs to 
                                                     
53 Rowlands Committee (2009) The Provision of Growth Capital to UK Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises, Stationery Office. 
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be reassured that the business can generate the cash to service the loan and can 
offer security that can repay the lender in the event of a default. However, growth 
businesses are likely to have few, if any, tangible assets against which to secure a 
loan so their borrowing potential is limited. Furthermore, growth potential businesses -
especially if they are based on the development or application of new technology - 
are likely to have irregular revenue streams in their early stages and need to invest 
ahead of revenue generation, making it difficult if not impossible to service a loan. 
Moreover, bank lending yields only a small margin over the Bank of England base 
rate to the lender who will therefore normally only lend where it is judged that the risk 
of capital loss is very low.54 Banks will therefore be unwilling to finance businesses 
which they judge to involve high risk because they do not share in the upside. 
 
The advantage of equity finance is that it provides a permanent injection of finance 
into a business in exchange for a share in its ownership. In the event that the business 
performs well, equity holders will get a share of that return. However, shareholders 
are in a subordinate position to debt holders in the event that the business fails and 
so are likely to lose their investment. For this reason equity investors in SMEs seek a 
high return. A further benefit of at least some types of equity investors is that they 
offer ‘smart money’. Business angels and venture capital funds are typically ‘hands 
on’ investors who make various value-added contributions, notably advice, strategic 
insight and networking to their investee companies, while raising finance from a 
corporate investor brings access to its tangible and intangible assets. 
 
There are various sources of finance available to growing firms. However, they are 
differentiated in terms of amounts, rate of return sought, terms, conditions and 
obligations and value-added contribution. These different sources of equity finance 
are also appropriate at different stages in a firm’s growth. This so-called funding 
escalator is shown in Chart 3.1. A good example of the funding escalator in practice 
is Amazon.com (Table 3.3). 
 
                                                     
54 Ibid. 
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Chart 3.1: The SME Equity Funding Escalator 
 
£0k
£50k
£100k
£500k
£1m
£2m
£5m
£10m
£100m
Concept& 
seed stage
Start-ups Early-stage Later-stage Expansion
Idea 
generation
Idea 
evaluation
Product 
development
Product 
launching
Expansion & 
marketing
Profit 
generation
Business 
Angels
Venture 
Capital
Public Equity 
Markets
Private Venture 
Capital
A
m
ou
nt
 in
ve
st
ed
Main sources of capital Finance Gaps
Publicly backed 
Venture Capital 
Private Venture 
Capital
3F 
Grants
A
m
ou
nt
 in
ve
st
ed
 
 
Source: Amended Figure 1 of ‘Reshaping the UK economy: The role of public investment in financing 
growth’ (NESTA, June 2009) 
27 
 
Table 3.3: A Financial Chronology of Amazon.com, 1994-1999 
 
Source: Van Osnbrugge and Robinson (2000), p 59 
 
3.3. Sources of Equity Finance for High Growth Firms 
 
The main sources of equity funding available to finance new businesses through 
stages of growth and development are as follows: 
 
• Personal savings of the entrepreneur 
• Family and friends 
• Business angels 
• Venture Capital Firms 
• Public Stock Markets 
 
We introduce each of these in turn. 
 
3.3.1 Personal Savings of the Entrepreneur or Team 
 
This is typically the primary source of initial funding. Even though the amounts 
involved are typically quite small, this funding is important for two reasons. First, 
subsequent investors will expect to see that the entrepreneurs have committed 
themselves financially to the business. Second, the effect of raising outside capital 
will be to dilute the proportion of the business owned by the original entrepreneurs. 
Thus, the larger the amount they are able to invest, and the longer they can survive 
on this and other non-equity sources of funding and bootstrapping, the less dilution 
they will experience when they come to raise external capital. The entrepreneur is 
also likely to contribute ‘sweat equity’ by working for no salary or at a level below 
what could be obtained by working for someone else until the business is on a solid 
financial footing. 
 
 
 
Date (m/yr) Price per share Source of funds 
7/94 to 11/94 $0.001 
Founder: Jeff Bezos starts Amazon.com with 
$10,000 of his own money and borrows a further 
$44,000 
2/95 to 7/95 $0.1717 Family: father and mother invest a combined $245,000 
8/95 to 12/95 $0.1287-$0.3333 
Business angels: two angels invest a total of 
$54,408 
12/95 to 5/96 $0.3333 Angel syndicate: twenty angels invest $46,850 each on average for a total of $937,000 
5/96 $0.333 Family: siblings invest $20,000 
6/96 $2.3417 Venture capitalists: two venture capital funds invest $8 million 
5/97 $18 Initial Public Offering: three million shares are offered on the equity market raising $49.1million 
12/97 to 5/98  $52.11 
Loan and bond issue: $326 million bond issue is 
used to retire $75 million in loan debt and to 
finance operations 
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3.3.2 Family and Friends 
 
Recent research by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) consortium, an 
international association of more than 40 countries which collect data on 
entrepreneurial activity on a consistent basis by means of large scale household 
surveys, reports that close family members, friends and neighbours are by far the 
biggest source of start-up capital after the founders themselves. A study of 29 
countries reported that some three-quarters of all informal investments were 
provided by a close family member, other relative or friend/neighbour.55 Such 
investments typically take the form of short-term loans which may be converted into 
equity at a later stage. This form of finance is relatively easy to get, although the 
amounts involved are relatively small. The providers are unlikely to regard their 
investment as a commercial one and, indeed, may not expect it to be repaid. 
However, entrepreneurs may be reluctant to ‘take advantage’ of kinship and 
friendship ties and may feel under emotional pressure not to lose the money. 
 
3.3.3 Business Angels 
 
Business angels are conventionally defined as “high net worth individuals who invest 
their own money directly in unquoted companies in which they have no family 
connection in the hope of financial gain and typically play a hands-on role in the 
businesses in which they invest.” 56 They typically have a business background and 
often are cashed out entrepreneurs.  
 
Their investments are typically at, or soon after, start-up. Business angels rarely invest 
at the seed stage. The amounts they invest range from under £10,000 to over 
£250,000, although the norm is £50,000 to £100,000. However, there is a trend for 
business angels to increasingly invest as part of an angel group, rather than on their 
own, enabling firms to raise larger amounts from this source. A key feature of angel 
investing is their hands on involvement in supporting their investee businesses through 
a variety of hands-on roles, including mentoring, the provision of strategic advice, 
networking and in some cases direct involvement in a specific functional capacity. 
This has prompted the description of informal venture capital as “capital and 
consulting”. 
 
Business angels are investing in the hope of achieving a financial return, typically in 
the form of a capital gain that is accomplished through some form of harvest event 
such as an acquisition of the investee company or an IPO. The psychological 
rewards are also an important motivation however. Studies are consistent in 
identifying that the fun and enjoyment derived from such investments is an 
important subsidiary reason for becoming a business angel. This links back to the 
point that business angels are also characterised as being hands-on investors. Some 
angels also express altruistic motives.57 US evidence indicates that most business 
                                                     
55 Bygrave, W.D., Hay, M., Reynolds, P.D. (2003), Executive forum: a study of informal investing in 29 
nations composing the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor", Venture Capital,  5 (2),101-16.  
56 Mason, C.M. (2006) ‘Informal sources of venture finance’, in S C Parker (ed) The Life Cycle of 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, New York: Springer: New York, pp. 259-299. 
57 One study quotes a Scottish angel as follows: “don’t get me wrong, I want to make money. But I’ve 
done well out of Scotland and I’d like to help others to do the same.” Source: Paul, S., Whittam, G. and 
Johnston, J. B., 2003, The Operation Of The Informal Venture Capital Market In Scotland. Venture 
Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 5: 313-335. 
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angels would be willing to forego some financial return either to invest in businesses 
that were seen as socially beneficial58 or simply to support new entrepreneurs.59  
 
The strong desire amongst angels for anonymity and the private nature of the 
process means there are no accurate statistics on the number of business angels, 
the number of investments they make and the amount they invest.60 Some evidence 
is available from ad hoc academic and other studies. There is also evidence from 
that part of the market that is visible: (i) business angel groups and (ii) business angel 
networks – private and public sector organisations that have been established to 
facilitate business angel investments.61 Studies in the US and UK have both sought to 
extrapolate from this visible market to estimate the overall amount invested by 
business angels.62 The UK study estimated that in the late 1990s there were between 
20,000 and 40,000 business angels investing between £0.5bn and £1bn per annum in 
between 3,000 and 6,000 businesses. The study further suggested that business 
angels financed eight times as many early stage businesses as venture capital funds 
although because of differences in the size of investments the overall amounts 
invested were similar. This confirms earlier US research which found that business 
angels are much more prominent than venture capital funds in funding the start up 
and early growth stages of businesses.63 
 
3.3.4 Venture Capital Firms 
 
Venture capital firms are financial intermediaries which attract investments from 
financial institutions (banks, pension funds, insurance companies), large companies, 
wealthy families and endowments into fixed life investment vehicles (‘funds’) with a 
specific investment focus (location, technology, stage of business development) 
which are then invested in young, growing businesses which offer the prospects of 
high reward. The function of the fund managers (the general partners) is to identify 
promising investment opportunities, support them through the provision of advice, 
information and networking and ultimately exit from the investment. The proceeds 
from the exit are returned to the investors (the limited partners). Most venture capital 
firms are independent organisations. Some are subsidiaries of financial institutions 
(termed ‘captives’). A few large non-financial companies, particularly technology 
companies, have their own venture capital subsidiaries which invest for strategic 
                                                     
58 Sullivan, M.K., 1994, Altruism And Entrepreneurship. In Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, edited 
by W.D. Bygrave, S. Birley, N.C. Churchill,  E. Gatewood, F. Hoy, R.H. Keeley and W.E. Wetzel jr., pp. 373-
380. Babson College: Babson Park, MA. 
59 Wetzel, W.E., 1981, Informal Risk Capital In New England. In Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 
1981, edited by K.H. Vesper, pp. 217-245. Babson College, Wellesley, MA. 
60 For a review of potential ways to measure business angel activity see Mason C M and Harrison, R T 
(2008) Measuring business angel investment activity in the United Kingdom: a review of potential data 
sources, Venture Capital: an international journal of entrepreneurial finance, 10, 309-330. 
61 Mason, C M (2006) ‘The informal venture capital market in the United Kingdom: adding the time 
dimension’, in J E Butler, A Lockett and D Ucbasaran (eds) Venture Capital and the Changing World of 
Entrepreneurship,  Information Age Publishing, Greenwich: CT., pp 137-171. 
62 US estimates are produced by Prof Jeffrey Sohl at the Center for Venture Research, University of New 
Hampshire (http://wsbe2.unh.edu/cvr). For an estimate of the UK market see Mason, C M and Harrison, 
R T (2000) The size of the informal venture capital market in the UK, Small Business Economics, 15, 137-
148. Colin Mason and Richard Harrison are currently undertaking a project on the angel market for the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, one of the objectives being to estimate the size of angel 
investment activity in the UK on an annual basis. 
63 Freear, J and Wetzel, W E (1990) Who bankrolls high-tech entrepreneurs? Journal of Business 
Venturing, 9, 109-123. 
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reasons to complement their own internal R&D activities (corporate venture capital). 
Venture capital investments are typically in the range of £2m to £10m. 
 
The government has become much more significant in recent years as a source of 
early stage venture capital in response to concerns about an ‘equity gap’ which 
has arisen on account of the withdrawal of many private sector venture capital 
funds from the early stage market for a combination of the high transaction costs 
involved in making small investments and low returns.64 The form of intervention has 
varied over time. Current government intervention has taken the form of hybrid 
funds which involve a combination of public and private investment, with incentives 
which enhance the returns or lower the risk to attract private sector institutions to 
invest, and are managed by private sector fund managers.65 Examples include the 
Early Growth Funds, University Challenge Funds; Regional Venture Capital Funds. 
Many of these funds are regionally focussed. Both the English Regional Development 
Agencies and the development agencies in Scotland and Wales have also created 
their own funds. Most of the public sector funds have an upper investment threshold 
of £500,000. 
 
Venture capital funds are highly selective as to the businesses in which they invest. 
The need to generate a large return on their investment in a five to seven year time 
frame through an IPO or acquisition means that only certain types of start-ups are 
candidates for this type of funding. Management needs to be capable of rapidly 
building an enterprise. Venture capitalists normally avoid businesses that are trying to 
create a market. Rather, they tend to wait for evidence of sizeable sales in 
conjunction with a large number of potential users who have not yet become 
customers”.66 Venture capitalists tend to avoid investing in mature markets and 
generally prefer businesses that offer a durable competitive advantage. Typically 
this means a business that has technological foundations in the form of their own or 
someone else’s patents (usually obtained prior to raising venture capital) and an 
incipient technological advantage. However, venture capitalists avoid companies 
that are developing ground-level technologies. Rather, they seek to build on, or 
combine, the high level knowledge that the business has already secured. Finally, 
venture capitalists look to invest in businesses where rapid expansion has significant 
payoffs. That said, they will make a range of trade-offs amongst these criteria. For 
example, exceptionally credible founders may lead Venture Capitalists to suspend 
their normal criteria for evaluating potential markets or competitive advantages.67 68 
 
                                                     
64 Pierrakis, Y and Mason, C (2008) Shifting Sands: The Changing Nature of the Early Stage Venture 
Capital Market in the UK, Research Report, NESTA, London. 
65 Murray, G C (2007) Venture capital and government policy, in H Landström (ed) Handbook of 
Research on Venture Capital, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 113-151. 
66 Bhidé, A (2007) The Venturesome Economy, Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
67 ibid 
68 See the following for reviews of how venture capital fund managers make their investment decisions: 
Mason, C M (2006) ‘Venture capital and the small business’ in S Carter and D Jones-Evans (eds) 
Enterprise and Small Business: Principles, Practice and Policy, 2nd edition, FT-Prentice Hall, pp 357-384; 
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3.3.5 Public Stock Markets 
 
Acquiring a listing on a public stock market – often termed an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) - may be the logical final step for a fast growing company which can offer a 
good track record of profitability and good prospects of further growth. Recent US 
research underlines that the majority of firms making an IPO will have previously 
raised finance from business angels and/or venture capital funds (unfortunately, 
there is no equivalent evidence for the UK). The US study, which covered the 2001-
2007 period, discovered that 13% of the firms making an IPO had business angel 
investors, 33% had venture capital fund investors and 16% had both business angel 
and venture capital fund investors. The remaining 38% had neither business angel 
nor venture capital investors.69 This underlines the strong inter-dependence between 
venture capital and the stock market. Indeed, there is considerable academic 
evidence70 that active stock markets significantly stimulate venture capital activity 
because they enable venture capital firms to exit faster and more profitably, 
although the effect is stronger on later stage Venture Capital than early stage 
Venture Capital. 
 
There are three financial markets in the UK on which a company can be floated. 
 
The London Stock Market’s Main Market is an international market for large, 
established companies with high standards of regulation and disclosure. It currently 
has 1,600 companies from 60 countries. The majority of its companies (70%) have a 
market capitalisation of over £50m (40% of these are over £250 million). 
 
AIM, which is part of the London Stock Exchange, was launched in 1995 (replacing 
the Unlisted Securities Market) as a market specifically for smaller growing firms 
seeking to raise capital. Various observers also emphasise its importance as a 
stepping stone to the Main Market.71 Compared with the Main Market, AIM has 
simplified admission requirements and regulatory framework tailored for SMEs.   
Central to AIM are the Nominated Advisers (Nomads), approved by the London 
Stock Exchange to act in such a capacity. Nomads are responsible for ensuring 
companies are appropriate to admit to the market and continue to remain 
appropriate thereafter.  
 
AIM has attracted over 3,000 companies since its launch. However, in the economic 
downturn companies seeking a market quotation have fallen back. AIM currently 
has fewer than 1300 companies quoted of which 19% are incorporated outside of 
the UK. Most AIM-quoted companies have small market values - approximately 25% 
of companies have a value under £5m and 78% have a market value of less than 
£50m72.  
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PLUS (previously known as OFEX) is a smaller market, with around 200 companies73, 
mostly with a market cap of around £5m. The cost of joining via an IPO and 
maintaining a quotation is lower on PLUS than on AIM.74  
 
Regulation is also said to be lighter than on AIM. However, in contrast to AIM, PLUS 
attracts higher levels of private rather than institutional investors, which means there 
is less liquidity on PLUS than on AIM. 
 
Becoming quoted on a public market has two main purposes. First, it is a means of 
funding ongoing growth. Finance can be raised both at the IPO and subsequently 
through secondary issues. Raising debt finance also becomes easier with a public 
listing. Public companies can also use their shares to make acquisitions. Indeed, 
businesses quoted on AIM report that the primary benefit of a quotation is the ability 
to raise money in their early stages of growth.75 Second, a stock market listing is an 
important way in which existing shareholders – notably the founders and their 
families, business angels and venture capital funds – can realise their capital gains.  
 
However, the costs involved in both obtaining and maintaining a stock market 
listing, in the form of lawyer, accountant and broker fees and commissions, joining 
fees and an annual charge, and ongoing compliance regulations and disclosure 
requirements mean that a stock market listing is likely to be unsuitable for small, early 
stage firms. Moreover, if the purpose of an IPO is to raise additional finance it is only 
worthwhile for companies seeking to raise significant amounts otherwise the costs 
will absorb too high a proportion of the funds raised.  
 
Other aspects of the stock market may also discourage some owners from seeking a 
listing. First, shareholders who are insiders in the business (entrepreneurs and 
investors) are often subject to a ‘lock-in’ period after the IPO before they are 
allowed to sell their shares. Clearly, if inside investors sold their shares immediately 
after the IPO this would drive the share price down. However, this exposes them to 
risk that the share price will fall during this lock-in period.  
 
Our consultations with the venture capital community respondents were consistent 
in stating that a trade sale was their preferred means of exit. Moreover, they could 
not remain as long-term shareholders in companies that had achieved an IPO 
because their Limited Partners wanted the cash to be recycled back to them after 
an exit. Some respondents went further, saying that it is mistaken to see an IPO as an 
exit; rather, it should be seen as representing a further round of capital raising. 
Second, there is a weight of academic evidence that the short-term performance 
of IPOs is positive, relative to the market as a whole, meaning that they are under-
priced and so ‘leave money on the table’, while their longer term performance is 
worse than the market as a whole because of a lack of liquidity in their shares. 76 The 
amount of under-pricing is related to the extent of information asymmetry. There is, 
                                                     
73 PLUS provides a market for two types of companies: PLUS-listed companies which trade on a quote-
driven basis with market makers and PLUS-traded companies which trade on an order driven, matched 
bargain (trade) basis. Shares in any public companies can be traded on PLUS. 
74 The cost of a listing on the PLUS Market is typically around £100,000-£150,000 compared with £350,000-
£1m on AIM 
75 Arbuthnot Securities (2009) AIM Investor Survey: The Road to Recovery 
76 Ritter, J R and Welch, I (2002) A review of IPO activity, pricing and allocation, Journal of Finance, 53, 
1795-1828, 
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however, evidence that venture capital-backed IPOs are less likely to suffer either 
problem.77 There are a number of potential explanations for this. The companies they 
bring to market may be of better quality because of their skills in selecting 
companies to invest in and the value-added that they contribute. It may also reflect 
a certification effect. Venture capital firms repeatedly bring companies to the 
market so have reputational capital to protect. They also have strong relationships 
with underwriters to sell the shares. All of this reduces information asymmetry. Third, 
some entrepreneurs may also be deterred from seeking a stock market listing 
because of the exposure to greater outside scrutiny and the governance 
arrangements required (e.g. non executive directors) and the associated dilution of 
control and decision-making. 
 
3.3.6 Sources of Finance and Stages of Growth 
 
These various sources of equity finance come into play at different stages in a firm’s 
growth. At the seed stage the business is in the process of being established. It may 
therefore be undertaking R&D, solving key product or service development issues 
and moving to an operating demonstration prototype of the initial product or 
service. This phase may occur in the founder’s home and the founder may even 
continue to work full-time. Financial needs are likely to be fairly minimal and will be 
met by a combination of the founder’s own personal savings, family and friends (the 
3 Fs) and ‘bootstrapping’ techniques. Commercial investors will regard such ‘pre-
ventures’ as being too high risk. However, government support may be available in 
the form of R&D and proof-of-concept grants for technology-based firms. 
 
The start-up stage begins with the founding of the company, demonstration of 
commercial applicability, securing of initial sales and seeking new sales channels. 
The financial needs increase as the company invests in capital equipment and 
infrastructure, begins to employ staff and has growing working capital requirements. 
Investment in businesses at this early stage is very high risk – the management is 
unproven and the product or service has yet to demonstrate widespread 
acceptance - and any return may not materialise for several years. Thus, businesses 
are likely to continue to rely upon a combination of founder, family and friends (3Fs) 
money, bootstrapping78 and government support, although those with growth 
prospects may be able to raise finance from business angels. Importantly, business 
angels will typically mentor such businesses, providing expert advice and guidance. 
Venture capital funds are unlikely to be interested in investing at such an early stage 
unless the fund has been established with an economic development mandate (i.e. 
set up by a government agency such as a Regional Development Agency). 
 
Companies which come through the start-up stage with a product or service which 
is in demand enter the initial growth stage. The business will be seeking to improve 
product quality, lower its unit costs and develop new products. The business may be 
reaching profitability but this is insufficient to fund the expansion of plants and 
equipment, bigger premises, additional staff to fill out each of the functional areas 
                                                     
77 Megginson, W L and Weiss, K (1991) Venture capital certification in Initial Public Offerings, Journal of 
Finance, 46, 879-903. 
78 Defined as “a range of highly creative ways of acquiring the use of resources without borrowing 
money or raising equity financing from traditional sources”. Harrison, R T, Mason, C M and Girling, P 
(2004) ‘Financial bootstrapping and venture development in the software industry’, Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development, 16, 307-333. 
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and larger working capital requirements. Risk and uncertainty have declined. By this 
stage the business will no longer be reliant on 3F money. The main source of external 
funding will be a combination of equity investment from business angels and bank 
finance. However, larger funding requirements and follow-on financing are likely to 
be met by venture capital funds.  
 
Companies that continue to grow enter the sustained growth stage. Profits and cash 
flow are sufficient to meet the majority of their capital requirements but additional 
finance may be required to grasp new growth possibilities (including acquisitions). 
Such companies will look to venture capital funds specialising in development 
capital and even to more esoteric financing instruments and ultimately to a stock 
market listing. 
 
It is, however, important to emphasise that this model is not deterministic. By no 
means will every growing business access finance from all of these sources. Some 
may go from 3F money to venture capital without raising angel finance. Others 
might raise finance from business angels but not venture capital firms. Relatively few 
firms achieve an IPO. Indeed, some firms can achieve high growth without recourse 
to external sources of equity finance, particularly if the business is in a cash-
generative sector (e.g. retail) or is dependent on human, rather than physical, 
capital.  
 
Moreover, the takeover option is ever-present, particularly as an alternative to an 
IPO for businesses whose investors are seeking an exit. Indeed, rightly or wrongly, a 
trade sale is often seen by both entrepreneurs and investors as an easier, quicker 
and more appropriate means of achieving a harvest event. There is evidence that a 
trade sale is likely to have less information asymmetry than an IPO because the 
potential purchaser has the opportunity, inclination and ability to carry out due 
diligence. This, in turn, should reduce under-pricing.79 However, the benefits of a 
trade sale vis-à-vis an IPO are based on the assumption that, as noted above, 
investors are locked in for a period of time after an IPO whereas they immediately 
gain cash following a trade sale. In reality, investors may be paid in part or fully in 
paper and so incur the risk that the acquirer’s shares may have gone down in price 
by the time they want to sell (although it is also possible that they will have gone 
up!). From the perspective of the growing business a trade sale is also a means of 
accessing further resources for growth. The non-financial resources that a strategic 
purchaser can bring to an acquisition, for example, in terms of management talent 
and distribution channels, are likely to be particularly valuable. This example is 
illustrated in Chapter 4 by the DXS case study where the trade sale was motivated 
by a combination of price and strategic benefits. There is also evidence in the 
literature that venture capital firms derive higher returns from IPOs than from trade 
sales80, but this is likely to reflect a selection effect because their better performing 
firms are more likely to be taken public than sold to another company. But whether 
trade sales are in the best long-term interests of the company or UK economy 
remains a matter for debate.81 It is certainly one plausible reason why there is an 
                                                     
79 Cumming, D and Johan, S (2008) Information asymmetries, agency costs and venture capital exit 
outcomes, Venture Capital: an international journal of entrepreneurial finance, 10 (3), 197-231. 
80 Gompers, P  and Lerner, J (2001) The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth, 
Cambridge: MA, Harvard Business School Press. 
81 Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2006) After the exit: acquisitions, entrepreneurial recycling and regional 
economic development, Regional Studies. 40, 55-73. 
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absence of American style ‘gorilla’ firms in the UK – firms like Cisco and Microsoft 
which grow very fast over a sustained period to become major global companies.82 
 
3.4. Summary 
 
In well-developed entrepreneurial economies, various sources of equity finance will 
be present. The concept of the funding escalator suggests that growing SMEs will use 
these different sources of finance at different stages in their development. In simple 
form the funding escalator is as follows: 3Fs to business angels to venture capital and 
finally listing on a public market. However, the model is not deterministic. It is also 
clear from the funding escalator model that it is an inter-dependent system, with 
gaps in one part of the ladder having potential knock-on effects, either forward or 
backward, on other parts of the ladder. We further noted that government has had 
to intervene where there was perceived to be a gap in the provision of finance, 
typically at the bottom of the escalator.  
 
The funding escalator is impacted by changes in the economic and financial 
environment and is therefore in a constant state of evolution. Government 
periodically intervenes when it sees gaps appearing in the funding escalator. The 
next chapter therefore moves on from this static perspective to examine the current 
effectiveness of the funding escalator in the UK in the context of recent and longer-
term changes in the financial environment. Specifically it examines the effectiveness 
of recent government interventions to ‘fix’ problems in the availability of finance for 
growing businesses and to highlight emerging aspects of the funding escalator 
where further intervention might be required. 
 
                                                     
82 Owen, G (2004) Where Are The Big Gorillas: High technology entrepreneurship in the UK and the role 
of public policy. The Diebold Project UK. www.dieboldinstitute.org/papers.htm 
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4. EQUITY GAPS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The funding escalator is an idealised model of the various sources of finance that 
firms might access at different stages in their growth. It assumes a seamless 
progression from one funding source to another. The reality is different: the escalator 
is continually evolving in response to the wider economic environment, creating 
funding gaps and frictions between different funding sources. Government 
intervenes to ‘fix’ these issues but the complex and dynamic nature of the system 
often means that solutions are ineffective. The aim of this chapter and the following 
chapter is therefore to consider the current effectiveness of the UK SME funding 
escalator in providing growing SMEs with the equity finance that they need to grow. 
This chapter considers the funding of companies up to an IPO. Chapter 5 considers 
issues associated with the public markets. 
 
Our review and consultations identify the several parts of the pre-IPO funding ladder 
that appear to be operating sub-optimally: 
 
• The lack of commercial seed capital, which hinders the process of 
commercialising scientific and engineering discoveries and the growth of 
university spin-off companies; 
• A reduction in the supply of early stage venture capital, which has had 
knock-on effects for the business angel market, notably the emergence of 
business angels groups which have the capability to make bigger investments 
before exiting;  
• The business angel – venture capital disconnect; and 
• A depressed Initial Public Offering (IPO) market83. 
 
Meanwhile the effectiveness of Government interventions has been mixed.  
 
We look at each of these issues in turn. 
 
4.2. Lack of Seed Capital 
 
New technology-based firms – firms that are seeking to develop and exploit new 
technologies - occupy the very bottom of the funding escalator. They are likely to 
need seed funding to cover what may be a lengthy period of negative earnings as 
they turn their intellectual assets into products in advance of sales. Further substantial 
funding is also likely to be needed to bridge the gap between early adoption and 
mainstream customer use. However, all the available evidence suggests that seed 
investing on a commercial basis is unlikely to be achievable.84 Certainly, the venture 
capital industry does not provide seed capital and even business angels tend to 
                                                     
83 An initial public stock offering can also be referred to as an offering, flotation or listing.  
84 Mason, C (2004) The Financing Of Early Stage Technology Businesses In The UK: A Review. Hunter 
Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde, for NESTA. 
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avoid investing in pre-commercial, pre-revenue businesses, with seed investments 
consistently accounting for no more than 2% or 3% of all their investments.85  
 
The main source of seed capital has been government sponsored micro venture 
funds. These operate on the hybrid principle of using public money to leverage in 
additional private investment. The funds are managed by private venture capital 
fund managers. The performance of these funds to date indicates that “they do not 
appear to be on track to meet the commercial expectations of investors …”86  There 
are several reasons for this. First, seed investments are very high risk and there is a 
very long time to wait for any returns. Second, these schemes have a maximum 
investment size which limits their ability to make follow-on investments. But without 
the ability to do their own follow-on investing the seed fund’s position will be severely 
diluted because of the greater bargaining power of later stage investors. Third, funds 
have to be large to be able to selectively follow-on investments and to be able to 
keep investing until the returns from the initial investments start to appear (if they 
ever do). Fourth, evidence from a Scottish study of university spin-offs indicates that 
the commercially successful businesses have typically taken more than 10 years to 
realise their potential87. This suggests that the typical 10 year partnership structure of 
venture capital funds is inappropriate for making seed capital investments. Finally, 
there are high management costs because of the need for post-investment support. 
University spin-out companies have a particular need for ‘smart’ investors who are 
able to add value.  The academic management team may have limited 
commercial awareness and the technologies more often than not have a wide 
range of potential applications and it can be difficult to work out which is the best 
market. Indeed, even some of the most successful Scottish university spin-out 
companies changed their business model substantially before they succeeded.88 
 
Indeed, there are strong arguments for suggesting that equity is an inappropriate 
source of finance at this initial stage in the funding escalator. First, it is very difficult to 
value a seed investment. The availability of data is limited and so it is problematic to 
apply formal valuation tools. Only as a company moves to the revenue generation 
stage is there sufficient quantifiable data available to perform a more rigorous 
valuation. The high degree of uncertainty inherent in the seed and early stage 
translates into low pre-money valuations. For these reasons it may be better to avoid 
equity at the seed stage and use alternative financial instruments. Second, the 
Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration noted that the availability of 
equity finance in the form of University Challenge Funding led to the creation of too 
many unsustainable spinouts which were unable to attract follow-on equity finance 
because the funding had run out before the technology was proven.89 The 
Committee advocated proof-of-concepts funds as a more appropriate form of 
funding at this stage in the funding escalator. 
 
                                                     
85 Mason, C M (2006) ‘The informal venture capital market in the United Kingdom: adding the time 
dimension’, in J E Butler, A Lockett and D Ucbasaran (eds) Venture Capital and the Changing World of 
Entrepreneurship,  Information Age Publishing, Greenwich: CT., pp 137-171. 
86 Sharpe, S, Cosh, A, Connell, D and Parnell, H (2009) Start-up Finance: The role of micro funds in the 
financing of new technology-based firms. London: NESTA 
87 Targeting Innovation (2008) Scottish Spin-out Study. Glasgow 
88 Ibid 
89 Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration: Final Report. London: HMSO, 2003. 
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The consequence of this inadequate funding regime is that most university spin-outs 
are small and do not grow significantly90. For example, a study of 200 spin-offs from 
Scottish universities reported that 30% were no longer trading, 55% employed fewer 
than 10 people and only 15% employed more than 15 people. Just 17 spin-outs 
employed more than 50 people and just six are substantial businesses.91  
 
4.3. Decline in the Supply of Early Stage Venture Capital 
 
Trends over the past decade show a reduction in the supply of early stage equity 
finance from venture capital firms. This has had two significant consequences. First, it 
has meant that business angels are now increasingly important as the only source of 
early stage venture capital. Second, it has prompted government intervention with 
a range of hybrid funds in an effort to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of 
private venture capital funds. We address these points below. 
 
4.3.1 Withdrawal of Venture Capital Funding 
 
More than 70% of the amount invested by the 200+ members of the British Venture 
Capital Association in 2008 comprised private equity rather than venture capital. 
Private equity can be defined as investments in established businesses to facilitate 
enhanced performance through a mixture of financial engineering, turnaround 
management skills and ownership change. Typically this involves management 
buyouts and buy-ins of family-owned businesses and divisions of corporate groups 
although in terms of deal sizes the public-to-private deals in listed companies 
dominate.92 Venture capital, by contrast, is the injection of additional finance into a 
business in the form of equity finance to enable it to grow.  
 
In 2008, BVCA members invested over £20bn in companies of which investment in 
the UK was £8.5bn, a figure significantly down from 2007 reflecting the negative 
economic climate but still considerably higher than previous figures (see Chart 4.1). 
The UK share of total BVCA member investment has fallen sharply since 2000 - prior 
to 2000 around 80% of investment was in the UK but this has since declined to about 
40%. 
 
Private equity accounted for 72% of total investment by value in 2008 with venture 
capital accounting for the remainder. However, in terms of the number of 
investments, the same proportions applied but in reverse, with 72% in venture capital 
and 28% in private equity, reflecting the much larger size of private equity 
investments.93 This focus on late stage investments is in line with other major 
European countries. However, in comparison to the US, Europe is much more heavily 
involved in later stage activity. 
 
 
                                                     
90 It should be noted limited growth is not just a direct consequence of the funding regime. In several 
cases the product ideas are simply not viable in the first place.  
91. See Targeting Innovation (2008) op cit, and Harrison and Leitch, C op. cit. 
92 For a review of private equity see M Wright, J Gilligan and K Amess (2009) The economic impact of 
private equity: what we know and what we would like to know, Venture Capital: an international 
journal of entrepreneurial finance, 11, 1-12. 
93 BVCA (2009) Private Equity and Venture Capital Report on Investment Activity 2008. London: British 
Venture Capital Association. 
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Chart  4.1: Funds Invested by BVCA Members 
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Source: BVCA 
 
The amount invested by BVCA members in early stage deals has fallen since 2000, 
albeit irregularly, from £703m to £359m in 2008. In proportional terms this represents a 
decline from 11.0% to 4.1%. However, the actual number of early stage investments 
has actually increased slightly from just over 400 investments at the start of the 
decade to 455 in 2008, while the proportion of all investments has remained fairly 
constant at just over one-third (Table 4.1 and 4.2). The obvious explanation from 
these two trends is that the average size of early stage investment has declined 
since 2000.  
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Table 4.1: UK Early Stage Investments 2001-8: Amount invested (£m) 
 
Finance stage 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Start-up 175 163 99 73 96 160 531 190 172 
Other early stage 528 227 196 190 188 222 415 244 187 
Total early stage 703 390 295 263 284 382 946 434 359 
Early stage as a % 
of total investment 11.0 8.2 6.6 6.5 4.2 5.6 9.3 3.6 4.1 
 
Source: BVCA Report on Investment Activity (various years) 
 
Table 4.2: UK Early Stage Investments 2001-8: Number of Companies 
 
Finance stage 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Start-up 153 190 165 185 190 208 245 207 170 
Other early stage 256 218 233 242 264 285 255 295 285 
Total early stage 409 408 398 427 454 493 500 502 455 
Early stage as a % 
of total investment 35% 31% 33% 34% 35% 38% 38% 38% 36% 
 
Source: BVCA Report on Investment Activity (various years) 
 
What these tables do not reveal is the significant change in the supply of early stage 
venture capital from private to public venture capital funds.94 This has been driven 
by three main factors. First, early stage investments involve higher risk. These risks are 
not compensated with higher returns. Poor investment returns since the post-
technology bubble period have reduced the attraction of venture capital as an 
asset class for institutional investors, making it difficult for existing venture capital firms 
to raise new funds and for new venture capitalists to enter the industry (Table 4.3). In 
the UK the average size of funds has fallen continuously since 2004, and just seven 
new funds were created in 2008 compared with two or three times that number in 
previous years. Second, existing fund managers have sought to conserve their cash 
to meet the financial needs of their existing investments and have largely stopped 
making new investments. This has been reinforced by the lack of exit opportunities 
which has forced investors to stay involved with their existing businesses for longer, 
further constraining their ability to make new investments. Third, the personal 
remuneration of fund managers is related to fund size. Fund managers with a track 
record have therefore had an incentive to shift to later stage and private equity 
where larger funds are the norm. 
 
The recent publication of the Rowland’s Review of Growth Capital highlights equity 
gaps not just in the sub £2million but also in the provision of growth capital in the 
£2m-£10m range. This is being driven by the same factors of risk, returns and 
remuneration.95 
 
 
 
                                                     
94 Pierrakis, Y and Mason, C (2008) Shifting Sands: The Changing Nature of the Early Stage Venture 
Capital Market in the United Kingdom. London: NESTA. 
95 Rowlands, C (2009) The Provision of Growth Capital to UK Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. 
London: The Stationary Office. 
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Table 4.3: Venture Capital Funds Established 1996-2004: Returns since Inception to 
December 2008 
 
 Venture Capital Small MBO Mid MBO Large MBO Total 
IRR -1.8 6.5 14.9 21.5 17.2 
Source: BVCA 
 
4.3.2  The Growing Importance of Public Sector Venture Capital Funds 
 
Increased intervention by government explains why the decline in early stage 
venture capital investment has not been more dramatic. The Labour Government 
has established a range of ‘hybrid’ funds in which the state invests as a special 
limited partner alongside private investors in a fund that is managed by a 
commercial fund manager. In such schemes the private investors are offered some 
kind of downside protection against losses or upside leverage to offset the low 
returns typically associated with early stage investment.96 This contrasts with previous 
approaches in which government has been the only source to provide the 
investment funds. It should be noted that the objectives of these hybrid funds were 
not only to fill the gap in early stage funding but also to provide a demonstration 
effect that it was possible to make good returns from early stage investments. 
Examples of hybrid funds include the Early Growth Funds, University Challenge Funds; 
Regional Venture Capital Funds (see Table 4.4). Many of these funds are regionally 
focussed. Both the English Regional Development Agencies and the development 
agencies in Scotland and Wales have also created their own funds.  
 
                                                     
96 Murray, G (2007) 
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Table 4.4: Publicly Backed Venture Capital Funds 
 
Fund Type Total funds 
available 1  
Investment 
size range 
End of 
investment 
period 
Scope 
Regional Venture Capital 
Funds 
£241m Up to £660k 2007 - 2008 Regional 
RDA VC Funds2 £220m £50k - £2.5m 2008 - 2012 Regional 
Early Growth Funds (EGFs) £36.5m Up to £200k 2014 - 2016 Regional 
University Challenge Seed 
Funds (UCSFs) 
£60m £25k - £250k Evergreen National 
UK High Technology Fund  £126m Up to £2m 2006 National 
Community Development 
Venture Fund 3 
£40m £100k - £2m May-09 National 
Enterprise Capital Funds 
(ECFs) 
£185m £500k - £2m 2011 - 2013 National 
Carbon Trust Funds £27m £250k - £3m Still open to 
investments 
National 
NESTA fund £50m £250k - £1m Evergreen National 
 
Source: SQW Consulting (2009) The Supply of Equity Finance to SMEs: Revisiting the Equity Gap. 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, URN 09/1573. 
1: During investment period 
2: Data does not include figures from the North West and South East Venture Capital Funds  
3 Also known as Bridges fund 
 
A variant on the hybrid funds model are co-investment funds which provide public 
money to match investments made by private early stage investors. However, they 
differ in terms of how they operate. One model is the passive fund, such as the 
Scottish Co-Investment Fund, which follows the lead of its private sector partners 
who have been approved to invest under the scheme. It does not undertake its own 
due diligence and plays no part in the investment. Any investment that the investor 
makes and which meets the scheme’s criteria will automatically qualify for co-
investment. The Co-Investment fund invests on identical terms and conditions to 
those of the private investors. This feature removes any uncertainty for the investor, 
and reduces the operating costs of the scheme to a minimum. Another model of 
co-investment schemes involves more active management, inviting investors to 
bring deals to them (or approve deals from particular sources, such as business 
angel networks) but make their own investment decisions and possibly invest on 
different terms and conditions to those of the business angel group.97 Because of the 
maximum investment size under the scheme (£500,000) the partners are almost 
exclusively business angel groups – that is, organised and managed groups of 
business angels who invest together rather than as individuals. 
 
The early stage venture capital market is therefore increasingly underpinned by 
public sector and hybrid funds. In 2001, public sector funds were involved in 36% of 
investments. By 2003, as the various funds established by the Labour Government 
came on stream, this had risen to 51% and by 2008 it accounted for 68% of all 
                                                     
97 For example, London Seed Capital co-invests with the London Business Angels Network and the 
Great Eastern Investment Forum (GEIF) has a co-investment fund that only invests in companies which 
receive investments from GEIF business angels. 
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investments. This reflects the growth of co-investment schemes which have risen from 
10% of all investments in 2001 to more than 30% since 2005 (Chart 4.2).98 Several of 
these funds have now reached the end of their investment phase99, suggesting that 
early stage investments will have declined in 2009. 
 
Chart 4.2: Proportion of Investments by Type of Investor, 2000-2008 
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Source: Mason, C and Pierrakis, Y (2009) Venture capital, the regions and public policy: the United 
Kingdom since the post-2000 technology crash, Working Paper, Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, 
University of Strathclyde. 
 
Emerging evidence suggests that these hybrid funds have not been effective. First, a 
NESTA/BVCA study found that investee companies performed only marginally better 
than a control sample.100 Second, a National Audit report noted that both the RVCFs 
and the UK High Technology Funds have produced negative returns to date.101 This is 
largely attributed to deficiencies in the design of these funds. First, the funds had 
                                                     
98 Mason, C and Pierrakis, Y (2009) Venture capital, the regions and public policy: the United Kingdom 
since the post-2000 technology crash, Working Paper, Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of 
Strathclyde. Note that these proportions exclude investments made under the Enterprise Investment 
Scheme and by Venture Capital Trusts (see next section) so under-estimates government’s effect in 
underpinning early stage venture capital. 
99 SQW Consulting (2009) The Supply of Equity Finance to SMEs: Revisiting the Equity Gap. Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, URN 09/1573. Pierrakis, Y and Mason, C (2008) Shifting Sands: The 
Changing Nature of the Early Stage Venture Capital Market in the UK, Research Report (NESTA,  
London) 
100 Nightingale, P, Murray, G,  Cowling, M, Baden-Fuller C,  Mason, C, Siepel J, Hopkins M and  
Dannreuther C (2009) From funding gaps to thin markets: UK Government support for early-stage 
venture capital, NESTA and BVCA. London 
101 Comptroller and Auditor General (2009) Venture Capital Support to Small Businesses, National Audit 
Office. London: The Stationary Office. 
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multiple objectives, seeking both a commercial return and encouraging economic 
development. Second, for the laudable reason of preventing ‘mission drift’ the funds 
had an upper size of investment, generally £500,000 and in some schemes much 
smaller. However, this has typically been too small to meet the funding needs of 
high-growth firms. In addition, the funds are generally too small to have the capacity 
to make significant follow-on investments. The consequence for the management 
teams of the investee businesses is that they are forced to spend a disproportionate 
amount of their time seeking further finance. If follow-on investment is not found, this 
may necessitate the premature sale the company, or even its closure. Moreover, 
because the public fund has not been allowed to make follow-on investments 
beyond its investment limit, its original investment has been was diluted thereby 
reducing its eventual return. Third, the restricted geographical focus of the regional 
funds limited their deal flow, reducing their prospects of making good investments. 
Fourth, the funds were not set up, either in terms of their size or rules, to support 
companies in the number of funding rounds or time required to achieve an exit. 
There is evidence that these lessons have been taken on board by government and 
its new approach is to favour a UK fund-of-funds model in which government sets up 
a scheme to match public with private money in a fund which is then invested in a 
variety of early stage private sector funds. This will include both those with an 
established track record and also new funds led by a management team 
comprising investment managers with credible early stage investment skills and 
experience. Whilst an upper limit to the size of the initial investment is appropriate, 
the funds need to be able to make larger follow-on investments in order to support 
their investee companies across several stages of the funding escalator. This also 
means that the funds themselves must be fairly large. Murray (1999)102 has argued for 
a minimum size of £20m. More recently Pierrakis and Westlake (2009)103 have argued 
for a minimum of £40m. 
 
There are two alternative interpretations for the lack of effectiveness of these funds. 
First, public sector venture capital funds may not be as ‘smart’ as private sector 
venture capital in terms of deal selection and adding value. Second, it may indicate 
that the UK does not have a large stock of high potential firms that are only being 
held back by a simple lack of equity funding.  
 
Co-investment schemes, in contrast, appear to have been very successful in 
significantly increasing the volume of investment activity in the early stage venture 
capital market. However, the only scheme to have been the subject of evaluation is 
the Scottish Co-Investment Scheme.104 This highlights business angel groups as being 
the main beneficiary, accounting for 82% of the co-investments. By providing 
matched funding it has enabled these groups not only to make more investments 
but also to make investments that in the absence of the co-investment fund they 
would not have made, notably larger investments that require significant follow-on 
funding.  
 
 
                                                     
102 Murray, G. (1999). Early stage venture capital funds, scale economics and public support, Venture 
Capital: an international journal of entrepreneurial finance, 1, 351-384. 
103 Pierrakis, Y., Westlake, S. (2009). Reshaping the UK Economy: the role of public investment in 
financing growth. Research Report 91, NESTA, London. 
104 Hayton, K., Thorn, G., Percy, V., Boyd, C. and Latimer, K. (2008) Evaluation of the Scottish 
Co-Investment Fund: A Report to Scottish Enterprise. Glasgow: Hayton Consulting/GEN. 
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4.3.3  Implications for Business Angels 
 
Evidence on business angel investment activity (from academic studies and 
consultations with angel groups and networks) indicate that business angels make 
significantly more investments than venture capital funds, especially at the start-up 
and early growth stages. However, because business angels make smaller 
investments the overall amount that they invest is lower than that of venture capital 
funds. 
 
The reduction in the supply of early stage venture capital has had three 
consequences on the business angel community: 
 
• Increased demand; 
• the need to make bigger investments; and 
• the need to make more follow-on investments 
 
First, as they are increasingly ‘the only game in town’, business angels have 
experienced an increase in demand from businesses seeking finance for the first 
time.  At the same time they are seeing more opportunities as a consequence of 
banks making fewer loans.  Second, business angels are now seeing much larger 
investment opportunities from companies that in the past would have approached 
venture capital funds. A third consequence is that business angels are having to 
support their existing investee companies through more funding rounds instead of 
handing them on to venture capitalists. One of the knock-on effects of business 
angels having to provide larger sums of investment and make more rounds of follow-
on funding before exiting – which has been well documented and is also supported 
through consultations with business angels and venture capital fund managers – is a 
reduction in their capability to make new investments.  
 
The ability of business angels to fill at least some of the gaps left by the withdrawal of 
venture capital funds can be attributed to two main factors. The first factor is that 
the business angel community has responded to this changed investment 
environment by organising themselves into semi-formal angel groups. The obvious 
benefit of forming angel groups is that they have much deeper pockets than solo 
angels and ad hoc angel groups and so are therefore able to make bigger 
investments and make more rounds of finance, even taking firms to an exit without 
the need to involve other providers of finance such as venture capitalists. 
Advantages for the individual investor from working together include better deal 
flow, superior evaluation and due diligence of investment opportunities, and the 
ability to diversify their investments and to participate in bigger investments, as well 
as social attractions. Indeed, there is clear evidence, particularly in Scotland, that 
business angels groups now provide longer-term commitment, with five rounds of 
investments across seven years, before exiting, being typical (see Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5: Archangel Informal Investment Group 
 
Current Portfolio  
Average age investment 5 yrs 
Average amount £1.5m 
Scottish Enterprise Co-Investment 18 out of 23 
Venture Capital investment 4 out of 23 
Average new deals per year 3 
Average number of rounds 5 
Average number of angels 22 
5 profitable companies 5 
Sectors: 27% IT; 27% High-Tech; 36% Life sciences 
Outcomes  
Total invested £57m 
Total with others £94m 
New deals in 2008 1 
Follow-ons in 2008 16 
Scottish Enterprise 27 
VC Investment 11 
Scottish jobs created 600+ 
Companies seeded 63 
Active 23 
Failed/Moribund 29 
Flotations 3 
Profitable Sales 3 (5 trade sales in total) 
Dividend paying companies 3 
 
Source: Presentation by Barry Sealy on ‘Angel investing in Scotland’, Edinburgh University Business 
School, 8 October 2009 
 
The second factor which has enabled business angels to go some way towards filling 
the funding gap has been the creation of co-investment funds which provide public 
sector funding to match private investments. Given the upper investment threshold 
on co-investment funds (£500,000) the main partners have been business angel 
groups. In most schemes, the co-investment fund invests on a pound-for-pound basis 
and on the same terms and conditions as the investment partner. As noted earlier, 
an evaluation of the Scottish Co-Investment Fund has been shown to stimulate 
investment and is strongly supported by business angels as they enable angels to 
fund larger investments. Hybrid funds have also been important co-investment 
partners for business angels. Nevertheless, even with the availability of co-investment 
schemes, evidence from the more mature Scottish market suggests that there is a 
natural tendency for angel groups to make fewer new investments as they mature. 
The implication is the need to continually create new angel groups able to invest in 
new growth opportunities.  
 
A concern is that co-investment funds are overly dependent on European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funding, 
which is linked (typically) to economic deprivation and is patchy across the UK 
regions. Better coordination and extension of co-investment funds is supported by 
the business angel network BBAA who highlight the need for ‘[a] UK framework to 
support and promote angel co-investment fund development across the UK regions 
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[which would be] …established by government (BERR), using both the ERDF and EIB 
framework, and centrally through Capital for Enterprise Ltd’. 105 
 
Two other factors have been critical in maintaining a vibrant angel market. The first 
concerns tax-based measures to encourage high net worth individuals to invest in 
unquoted businesses. This approach was introduced in 1981 with the Business Start-
up Scheme, which was extended to the Business Expansion Scheme (BES) in 1983. 
Under this scheme private individuals could reclaim tax at their highest marginal rate 
on investments in ‘qualifying’ companies. However, the operation of the scheme 
was deemed to be largely ineffective in meeting its original objectives of 
channelling funds to small companies, particularly in high technology sectors, as a 
result of being institutionalised by the financial services community which created 
investment vehicles to make large investments in asset backed companies.106 The 
BES was replaced in 1993 by two new schemes. The Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) provides both front-end and capital gains tax relief on investments made 
directly in qualifying unquoted companies, and which therefore appeal mainly to 
business angels. Venture Capital Trusts (VCT) are collective investment vehicles 
which appeal largely to passive, retail investors. Funds raised by VCTs peaked at 
£780m in 2005-6 but fell back to less than £300m in 2006-7 and 2007-8 following a 
tightening up of the rules (see Table 4.6).  
 
                                                     
105 ‘Siding with the Angels’ (p 9. NESTA and BBAA, May 2009) 
106 Mason, C.M., Harrison, J., Harrison, R.T. (1988), Closing the Equity Gap? An Assessment of the Business 
Expansion Scheme, Small Business Research Trust, London 
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Table 4.6: Venture Capital Trusts1: Number (actual) of Trusts and Amount of Funds 
Raised (£ million) 
 
Year Funds raised ² 
(Amount) 
VCTs raising funds 
in the year 3 
(Number) 
VCTs managing 
funds  4 
(Number) 
Rate of income 
tax relief  
(%) 5 
1995 - 96 160 12 12 20 
1996 - 97 170 13 18 20 
1997 - 98 190 16 26 20 
1998 - 99 165 11 34 20 
1999 - 00 270 20 43 20 
2000 - 01 450 38 61 20 
2001 - 02 155 45 70 20 
2002 - 03 70 32 71 20 
2003 - 04 70 31 71 20 
2004 - 05 520 58 98 40 
2005 - 06 780 82 108 40 
2006 - 07 270 32 121 30 
2007 - 08 230 54 131 30 
2008 - 09 150 46 129 30 
Total 3,650 ** **  
 
Source:  HMRC 
1. The data sources are outside the managerial control of HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and 
therefore we cannot ensure their completeness and quality; hence, this table falls outside the scope of 
National Statistics. 
2. The amount of funds raised by VCTs raising funds in each tax year, rounded to the nearest £5 million. 
3. The number of VCTs raising funds in each tax year, consisting of both new VCTs raising funds for the 
first time and existing ones raising further funds. 
4. The number of VCTs in existence in each tax year. 
5. The rate of investors' income tax relief in each tax year; capital gains tax deferral relief was available 
until 5 April 2004. 
** The totals are not given to avoid duplication of number of VCTs as VCTs can raise funds in multiple 
tax-years. 
 
The Enterprise Investment Scheme covers qualifying investments made by private 
investors directly in small businesses and is designed to offset the high risks involved in 
making such investments. This risk is highlighted by research which indicates that at 
least half of all investment fails to return the capital invested107. In recent years over 
2,000 companies per annum have raised finance through the EIS, involving some 
£600m-£700m. This is down from the level at the peak of the dot.com boom in 2000-1 
when over £1 billion was invested in over 3,330 companies. Informed comment 
suggests that the onset of the financial crisis will have resulted in a lower figure in 
2008-9 (see Table 4.7). Evaluations of the economic impact of both schemes have 
been fairly positive. A 2003 evaluation noted that between 52% and 87% of the 
finance invested through the two schemes was additional (i.e. would not have been 
invested in SMEs in the absence of the schemes) and that the investment has a 
                                                     
107 Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2002) Is it worth it? The rates of return from informal venture capital 
investments, Journal of Business Venturing, 17,  211-236. 
Wiltbank, R (2008) Siding with the Angels: business angel investing – promising outcomes and effective 
strategies. London: NESTA 
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positive impact on the growth of the investee companies.108 A 2008 evaluation, 
which just focused on company performance, again found that investments made 
under the schemes had positive effects on the investee companies.109 Consultations 
with members of the business angel community confirm that tax incentives play a 
critical role in stimulating angel investment activity.110 However, as angels are 
investing larger amounts in their investee companies so they risk being hit by two 
restrictions of the scheme: (i) its limitation to companies with 50 employees or less; (ii) 
30% maximum shareholding per company. 
 
Table 4.7: Enterprise Investment Scheme: Number (actual) of Companies Raising 
Funds, Number of Subscriptions and Amounts Raised (£ million). Claims Received by 
November 20081 
 
Year  Companies 
raising funds 
for first time 
(Number) 
All companies 
raising funds 
(Number) 
Subscriptions 2 
(Number) 
Amount 
1993-94 77 77 482 4 
1994-95 399 427 4,969 41 
1995-96 439 550 5,142 53 
1996-97 474 651 11,819 94 
1997-98 532 725 11,396 113 
1998-99 1,036 1,267 15,341 294 
1999-00 1,641 2,106 29,349 614 
2000-01 2,378 3,314 45,765 1,061 
2001-02 1,685 2,856 25,483 759 
2002-03 1,338 2,455 27,639 667 
2003-04 1,147 2,172 28,139 627 
2004-05 1,204 2,184 32,323 605 
2005-06 1,143 2,126 31,476 645 
2006-07p 1,057 2,062 39,039 699 
All Years 14,550 n/a 3 308,362 6,276 
 
Source:  HMRC, EIS1 forms 
1. At most, companies have up to three years after shares are issued to submit an EIS1 compliance 
statement. Therefore, with the likelihood of sizeable revisions due to claims not yet received 
2. The number of subscriptions is not equal to the number of investors as an individual can invest in more 
than one company 
3. The total is not given as companies may raise funds in more than one year 
 
The second factor that has been critical in maintaining a vibrant angel market is the 
support that the public sector has provided towards the costs of operating Business 
Angel Networks (BANs). These are organisations which have sought to provide a 
superior channel of information between business angels seeking investment 
                                                     
108 Boyns, N, Cox, M, Spires, R and Hughes, A (2003) Research into the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
and Venture Capital Trusts, PACEC, for Inland Revenue. 
109 Cowling M, Bates P, Jagger N, Murray G (2008) Study of the Impact of Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) and Venture Capital Trusts (VCT) on Company Performance. HM Revenue & Customs, Research 
Report 44. 
110 Also confirmed by Wiltbank, op cit 
50 
 
opportunities and entrepreneurs seeking finance in order to stimulate investment 
activity. Both business angel networks and economic development agencies have 
also supported capacity building programmes which help entrepreneurs to become 
investment ready and to raise the competence of investors.111  
 
It is clear, however, that despite this support business angels are unable to meet the 
scale of the demand for finance. An illustration of this mismatch from one of our 
consultees is that the London Business Angels estimates that they receive 1,000 
‘serious’ enquiries a year but only 5% go forward for presentation to investors. This is 
not atypical. With the emphasis of business angel markets on ‘investment pitches’ 
there are a finite number of slots available. Business angel investing is considered 
interpersonal and not amenable to being replaced by internet matching.112 
Research by NESTA and BBAA recognised the issue of business angel supply, and 
proposed a national awareness raising campaign and capacity building actions, 
which are both in the process of being undertaken. 113 
 
Comparison of the support that countries across Europe give to business angels 
(through tax breaks, financial support, co-investment funds, etc.) that is collected by 
EBAN (European Business Angels Network) suggests that other countries have caught 
up with the UK in terms of business angel support and in some cases, for example 
France, are now ahead. Indeed, one leading angel support organisation in the UK 
felt that on balance, other countries, such as France, were giving more financial 
support to the angel market, for instance large co-investment funds and better 
support networks, which were better equipped to engage business angels and 
entrepreneurs in investment ready training. In the UK most networks have to attract 
paying customers to deliver training and support, hence the current climate has 
reputedly seen London Business Angels (LBA) stop its angel training activities. 
 
4.4. Business Angels – Venture Capital Disconnect 
 
In the funding escalator model, business angels and venture capital funds have 
often been described as complementing one another.114 Indeed, the early stage 
venture capital market has often been described as a relay race in which ‘’angel 
investment runs the critical first leg of the race, passing the baton to [the] venture 
capital [fund] only after the company has begun to find its stride’’. However, this 
model appears to have broken down. An indication of the growing disconnect 
between angel groups and venture capitalists is exemplified by the trend that angel 
groups are increasingly only investing in deals that they can fund themselves to an 
exit. This has repercussions for the growth markets’ role in the funding ladder.  
 
There are three factors driving this disconnect. First, there are differing investment 
practices and philosophies between angels and venture capitalists (some venture 
                                                     
111 For a review of interventions to support the informal venture capital market, see C M Mason (2009) 
Public policy support for the informal venture capital market in Europe, International Small Business 
Journal, 27 (5) 536-556. 
112 The BBAA were not supportive of businesses signing up to private angel matching web-sites  
113 See Policy Measure 4, page 9 from ‘Siding with the Angels’, NESTA and BBAA, May 2009. 
114 Harrison, R T and Mason, C M (2000) ‘Venture capital market complementarities: the links between 
business angels and venture capital funds in the UK’, Venture Capital: An International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Finance, 2, 223-242. 
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capitalists would also add ‘professionalism’115). Angels provide not only financial 
support but also mentoring and advice. As such, the business angel invests not only 
finance but intellectual and emotional capital, guiding the SME through the early 
phases of growth. The result is that angels often have a stronger affiliation to the 
entrepreneur, whereas venture capitalists tend to be driven by a financial return. 
Angels are also more patient investors (prepared to work alongside the business for 
longer periods of time – up to 10 years) than venture capitalists (three to five years). 
Consultations with both groups indicate what appears to be an increasing 
divergence in philosophies and practices. Second, there is a lack of venture 
capitalists to undertake follow-on investing – as previously discussed. Third, the 
design of the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) requires angels to invest using 
ordinary shares116 to qualify for tax relief, whereas venture capitalists almost typically 
use preference shares and convertible loans117. This disadvantages Angels when 
negotiating joint investments or when a company with existing angel investment 
seeks further investment from venture capitalists. It also forces the premature 
valuation of a company. 
 
One implication of the disconnect is that the emergence of global businesses, which 
might require in excess of £20m in investment, will be compromised if they are 
unable to access the deep financial resources of venture capital funds. Instead, 
business angel investors might feel the need to seek a premature exit either via a 
trade sale or an IPO.118 In both cases the consequences for the company may be 
negative.  
 
The current rules for how to qualify for EIS tax relief, as mentioned above, are 
considered to be particularly negative to business angels, and merit further 
attention. Consultations with the BBAA and LINC Scotland corroborate recent 
research findings119 that the EIS stimulates investments in higher risk, early stage 
companies but that EIS rules disadvantage the business angel community in relation 
to venture capitalists. LINC Scotland has produced a note on the EIS tax structure 
and how it impacts upon informal investing.120 Text from the note, supported by 
consultations findings, underpins the following two paragraphs. 
 
LINC Scotland suggests that the current structure of EIS may ‘restrict the number of 
individuals committing to be serial entrepreneurs, reduce the amount of capital 
available for business angel investing (by locking it up in low growth companies), 
                                                     
115 Though venture capitalists consulted agree that angels now undertake more thorough valuation 
and due diligence research than previously. 
116 The most common form of share in the UK - also known as equity shares. 
117 Preference shares (prefs) are legally shares, but they are very different from ordinary shares. The 
economic effect of prefs is more like that of bonds. They are regarded as hybrids of debt and equity. By 
comparison, American and many European business angels invest through Cumulative Convertible 
Preference shares (CCPs), which are also favoured by venture capitalists, and indeed this is considered 
good practice.  
118 Consultations suggest that the public markets are typically perceived to have little relevance for 
angel groups as an exit route. The few examples of angel backed companies which were floated, that 
stakeholders consultations identified, indicated that angels sell immediately post flotation as price falls 
have been the norm.  
119 ‘Siding with the Angels’ (NESTA and BBAA research, May 2009) states that 82% of angel investors 
surveyed had used the EIS. 
120 ‘Note on UK tax structure and informal investing’: A response to the HMRC consultation on EIS 
(Nelson Gray of LINC Scotland, 2008) 
52 
 
and encourage angels to seek exits for their investee companies rather than seeking 
further development capital from venture capitalists. The result is that angels often 
suffer cram down by venture capitalists. Although the business angel may have 
supported the company through the earliest, and most risky, period of its 
development, the terms imposed by the venture capitalists mean that the angel 
receives a substantially reduced return as a result of the venture capitalists slicing off 
the majority of any early return. This may act as a disincentive for the business angel 
to encourage the company to seek venture capitalists development capital’ (p.1). 
The implication is that the EIS structure acts as a disincentive for the Angels who may 
favour an early exit rather than seek venture capitalists follow on financing. The 
proposition put forward by consultees is that business angel investors should be able 
to invest using preference shares and the EIS investment rules needs to be realigned 
to allow this.  
 
LINC Scotland also sets out how the current arrangements of EIS disadvantage very 
early stage investment by business angels. There is a wealth of evidence which 
illustrates the contribution business angel investors make to very early stage 
businesses through hands on personal assistance and guidance (e.g. development 
of viable business plans), as well as financial support (say up to £50,000).121 Over 
time, if it becomes apparent that the company is incapable of generating the level 
of return required to attract further investment, the angels’ initial investment will be 
locked in to a company and unable to provide a return on investment. The current 
structure of the EIS can therefore discourage angels from becoming involved in early 
stage companies and should be changed. Our research also supports the NESTA 
and BBAA proposed policy measure to increase EIS tax relief for business angel 
investors making very early stage investments in micro SMEs, in recognition of the 
significantly higher investment risks borne122. 
 
One consultation highlighted the success of a French annual tax on wealth, which 
allows investors to obtain an exemption if they invest in unquoted companies. 
According to a leading practitioner from the business angel sector, this tax has 
reportedly raised more than the UK’s Enterprise Investment Scheme in just a few 
years. To avoid issues of state aid rules, these investments are applicable to any 
location across Europe. Given the success of this tax, an assessment should be 
undertaken to consider the benefits of applying a similar tax in the UK.  
 
4.5. ‘Closed’ IPO Markets and Trade Sales 
 
The markets themselves actively influence the provision of pre-market equity 
finance. The performance of the markets impacts on the liquidity of listed 
companies and their capacity to undertake merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity. 
Markets also affect the wealth and psyche of business angels (if angels are getting 
cash and dividends from their stock market investments this raises morale, giving 
them disposable money to invest in angel deals). 
 
                                                     
121 Mason, C.M. (2006) Informal sources of venture finance, in S C Parker (ed) The Life Cycle of 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, New York: Springer: New York,  pp.259-299. 
122 ‘Siding with the Angels’ (NESTA and BBAA research, May 2009) states that 82% of angel investors 
surveyed had used the EIS. 
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The decision whether or not to seek an IPO is influenced by both generic and time-
specific considerations. There are two key generic influences. First, as noted in 
Chapter 3, because of the costs involved in obtaining and maintaining a listing it will 
be uneconomic for smaller businesses to seek an IPO. Second, investors may prefer a 
trade sale instead of an IPO because they are able to get cash immediately and so 
are not subject to a ‘lock-in’ or to the risk that the share price might fall (however, 
this only applies in the case of an all-cash purchase, and by no means all 
acquisitions of SMEs take this form). In addition, strategic buyers might be willing to 
pay a price premium. A case study in point is the recent decision by Venture Capital 
investors to sell Manchester-based biotechnology company DXS to Qiagen, a Dutch 
biotechnology company (see Case Study A).123 
 
Once an SME has floated on the market, the ease by which an investor can access 
their money is influenced by liquidity – that is the ease with which it is possible to 
trade. Markets with a large number of small and mid cap companies typically face 
an ongoing challenge to maintain appropriate levels of liquidity, and AIM and PLUS 
are no exception. The implication is that if there are low levels of liquidity, investors 
(business angels and venture capitalists) will find it harder to sell their shares. 
Consultations highlighted liquidity as a major concern which can deter investors 
from floating companies on the market. As such, low levels of liquidity can add to 
the view of a closed IPO market. We address the issue of liquidity further in Chapter 
5. 
 
In 2008 and 2009 the number of IPO and volume of further fundraising on AIM and 
PLUS fell significantly. The depressed nature of the IPO and further fund raising, with 
its knock-on effects on the M&A market, means that business angels and venture 
capital funds are unable to exit. This is a further factor which has required investors to 
reserve a higher proportion of their funds for follow-on investments and which, in 
turn, reduces their ability to make new investments. It also prevents them from 
returning funds to their limited partners. This discourages limited partners from making 
new investments in the venture capital asset class, which in turn reduces the number 
of new venture capital funds. More generally, if the negative aspects of flotation 
(such as risk of overvaluation leaving the investor company ‘locked-in’ due to share 
value falls post flotation) are perceived to outweigh the benefits then this will 
discourage companies and their backers from seeking a stock market listing.124 One 
AIM company commented that for its first rights issue after listing it had to give a 
discount on share prices to attract investors. One consequence may be to favour a 
trade sale over an IPO as a means of achieving an exit. 
 
One venture capital firm invested in UK SMEs with the specific intention of grooming 
the businesses for sale to American companies (such as Cisco or Microsoft, which 
have distribution channels and global market reach already in place). The 
implication here is that once sold, there will be great pressure for the business to 
become a US resident company. Trade sale to a foreign company may therefore 
translate as a loss to the UK economy in terms of economic opportunity (enterprise, 
                                                     
123 Case study sources: Interview with Fidelity Ventures, YFM and media reports 
124 However, it should be noted that despite the fall in share prices the majority of companies on AIM 
have no regrets. This suggests that AIM is fulfilling its function of providing companies with access to 
capital, liquidity, an exit for investors and facilitating acquisitions (AIM Annual Survey 2009) 
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employment, management training, innovation, productivity, taxation). It may also 
inhibit innovation potential of a firm as it is sucked into a larger organisation.  
 
Case study A: Venture Capital exit via M&A driven by strategic benefits 
 
 Investors in venture capital backed DXS had considered both trade sale and IPO 
options as exit routes. The decision to exit through a sale to Qiagen was made 
because the buyer was able to offer a better valuation because of its strategic 
significance. 
 
Manchester-based biotechnology company DXS, which calls itself ‘the 
personalised medicine company’, was bought by the Dutch biotechnology 
company Qiagen in a deal that could be worth $130m, generating a 13 fold 
return and IRR of 39% to NVM Private Equity which provided DXS with start-up 
capital of £1.25m in 2001 and led two further rounds in 2004 and 2006, which 
raised its total investment to £3m, and brought in YFM and Hygea as co-investors. 
The deal generated an 11-fold return for YFM which invested through its North 
West Investment Scheme and British Smaller Technology Companies VCT2. 
Qiagen will pay approximately $95m in cash to acquire the entire outstanding 
share capital of DXS and an additional $35m if specified commercial milestones 
are met. Qiagen, whose shares are traded on Nasdaq and Frankfurt, and has 
spent almost $1m on acquisitions since 2004, is issuing new shares to help fund the 
acquisition and for potential other acquisitions. Qiagen’s sales may pass $1 billion 
this year for the first time as a result of this expansion, one of just a handful of 
diagnostics companies with this level of sales. 
 
YFM originally invested in 2004 when the company had 13 staff, sales of £400,000 
and operated exclusively in North West England. It now employs 80 staff, 
forecasts sales of £20m and has operations across the USA. The deal was 
completed in September 2009. 
 
With this acquisition Qiagen has taken a strong leadership position in the new era 
of personalised healthcare. DXS brings to Qiagen a portfolio of molecular 
diagnostic assays that allow oncologists to predict patients’ responses to certain 
cancer treatments in order to make them more effective and safer, intellectual 
property, and a pipeline of active or planned companion diagnostic partnerships 
in oncology with several pharmaceutical companies. These assets complement 
Qiagen’s existing strong portfolio of personalised healthcare diagnostic solutions. 
All of DXS’s assays are suitable for use with Qiagen’s existing suite of instruments. 
Qiagen’s CEO Peer Schatz said that “the acquisition of DXS is strategically a 
highly important transaction for Qiagen. It is a key element in our strategy to lead 
in molecular diagnostic-based prevention, profiling and personalised 
healthcare.” In a statement to its shareholders Qiagen went on to say that “the 
acquisition creates an un-matched portfolio for personalised healthcare and 
builds a strong foundation for diagnostic solutions ... By merging our two 
operations, we create an independent companion diagnostics provider with a 
full set of global functions and expertise in molecular diagnostics, assay design 
and development, intellectual property, global and regional regulatory 
compliance and customer reach through strong, well established sales and 
marketing channels.” DXS’s founder and CEO, Stephen Little, commented that 
“Qiagen is the ideal partner for DXS to globally role out our assays, to take our 
partnerships to the next level and to take a leadership position in companion 
diagnosis.”  Continued overleaf… 
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Source: interview with BVCA, Yorkshire Fund Managers and media reports 
 
The argument for and against putting a company up for sale are complex. Venture 
capitalists tended to argue the negative case – that trade sale prompts a loss in the 
potential UK headquartered global companies, loss of management training 
ground, loss of future acquiring companies. While acquisition provides access to 
finance, management and distribution channels, the longer term economic impact 
is often negative. The new owners may not understand the business they have 
acquired as well as the entrepreneur and so do not exploit fully its real potential; the 
acquired company may be integrated into its new parent company in a way which 
limits its growth; the entrepreneurial flair and creativity of such companies is often 
stifled as part of a big organisation125; and where the acquiring company is foreign, it 
may seek to relocate the intellectual assets to its home country. In many cases the 
outcome in the medium to longer term is that the acquired company gets shut 
down (see Mason and Harrison for examples126).127 The contrary view to this 
argument is that of entrepreneurial recycling: entrepreneurs whose companies are 
sold will use the trade sale money to instigate other entrepreneurial activity, become 
serial entrepreneurs, act as business angels or even set up venture capital funds128 - 
that is, they recycle their entrepreneurial skills which benefits the UK economy. 
Moreover, if all the owner-managers act in this way these impacts are multiplied. In 
addition, it can be argued that if entrepreneurs are financially secure then they may 
be more ambitious with their next business venture. The biggest risks probably arise 
when a sale is premature. From the perspective of the SME business angel or venture 
capital investor, a trade sale provides liquidity to re-invest.129 
 
Whether a trade sale brings about economic loss or a gain, a complete funding 
escalator (without equity gaps) would provide more choice to investors and 
                                                     
125 ACOST (1990) The Enterprise Challenge: Overcoming Barriers To Growth in Small Firms, HMSO. 
126 Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2006) ‘After the exit: acquisitions, entrepreneurial recycling and 
regional economic development’, Regional Studies. 40, 55-73. 
127 One very topical example is the case of Award Ltd in Livingstone, Scotland. This company, which 
was formed in 1993, was based on an innovative process of manufacturing contact lenses so cheaply 
that they could be disposable. Having grown the company to 100 employees the founders sold out to 
the US healthcare company Bausch & Lomb in 1998. Under its new ownership the company quickly 
expanded to 1,400 employees. However, two years ago its workforce was reduced to 500 and in early 
September 2009 it was announced that the plant would be closed and production switched to one of 
the company’s other plants in Ireland. 
128 There are also a number of specialist early stage venture capital funds which have been established 
by former entrepreneurs, such as Pond, Celtic House, Passion Capital, Profounder. 
129 For a study of the entrepreneurial recycling process see Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2006) ‘After 
the exit: acquisitions, entrepreneurial recycling and regional economic development’, Regional 
Studies. 40, 55-73. 
Continued… 
 
DXS’s senior management will join Qiagen in leading roles in the company’s 
rapidly expanding personalised healthcare focus area, facilitating rapid 
integration and focus on further expansion of this key segment. To achieve this 
objective, Qiagen proposes to establish a Centre for Excellence in Phama 
Partnering at DXS’s Manchester HQ which should, as a consequence, grow in 
size.  
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entrepreneurs in growing their businesses, and bring more opportunities to the City 
and the financial and business services which support the markets. 
 
4.6. Summary 
 
Chapter 3 set out the funding escalator model to describe the idealised way in 
which growing businesses are financed at various stages in their development. This 
Chapter has introduced a reality check by highlighting several ways in which the 
funding escalator is operating inefficiently as a consequence of changes in the 
financial environment. 
 
First, new technology based firms, which need access to finance at the pre-revenue 
stage, often have difficulty proceeding onto the funding escalator because of the 
lack of seed capital, or are able to get onto the escalator by accessing public 
sector seed capital but are then unable to progress or even fall-off because they 
cannot raise follow-on finance.  
 
Second, the decline in the availability of early stage venture capital has put pressure 
on business angels to make more investments, bigger investments and more funding 
rounds. Co-investment funds and investing alongside hybrid funds has given them 
the liquidity to do so. Tax incentives available under the EIS have also been critical. 
However, EIS has not caught up with the significant changes in the nature of angel 
investing. Rules that were appropriate to the 1990s, when angels typically invested 
on their own and made small, one-off investments in new or early stage businesses, 
are now becoming restrictive as angles make bigger investments and follow-on 
investments.  
 
There are limits to the capacity of business angels to make bigger investments so 
they still need to be able to pass on their larger investments to venture capital funds. 
This is compromised by the requirement to invest in ordinary shares to qualify for EIS 
tax relief which puts angels at a disadvantage to venture capital funds in terms of 
valuation and returns.  
 
Government interventions have generally proved inadequate to fill the gaps in the 
funding escalator, mainly because of design flaws. The small size of funds and 
maximum limits on the amount they could invest in individual businesses meant that 
firms which raised funding from these funds often had to seek further funding from 
other sources to continue their growth. 
 
Finally, there is a disconnect between angel and venture capital investors and the 
public market. These investors typically seek an IPO as an exit route but as significant 
shareholders they are likely to be subject to a ‘lock in’ period during which time 
there is a risk that the share price might fall. Instead they often opt for a trade sale. 
This represents a potential loss to the public markets as well as having potentially 
negative effects for both the business and economy. The operation of the public 
market is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
The overall criticism that can be made is that the system of equity funding of SMEs 
prior to IPO is too fragmented. The small scale of public sector funds and restrictions 
on their size of investments limits their ability to make follow-on investments. The 
limited financial resources of business angels, notwithstanding the emergence of 
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business angel groups, and the structure of venture capital funds which focus on 
particular stages, rather than providing funding from ‘cradle to grave’ (or, more 
appropriately, from start-up to IPO), in contrast to the US, combine to create a 
system which ‘drip feeds’ finance to growing businesses. This wastes the time of 
management who have to engage in repeated searches for finance, taking their 
attention off their business, and reduces the potential returns of the investors in the 
earliest rounds who get diluted if they do not, or cannot, follow-on their initial 
investment. Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs), a variant of the US Small Business 
Investment Company (SBIC) model, are an initial attempt to meet this need for 
‘seemless’ investment. ECFs, which are able to make investments up to £2 million are 
privately managed funds that leverage private investment with public funds, ten 
funds have been launched since 2006.130 
 
These various disconnects are having consequences for the funding escalator. First, 
the lack of seed capital is creating difficulties for start-ups at the pre-revenue stage, 
preventing them from getting on, and then staying on the funding escalator. 
Second, it is changing the behaviour of some angel investors in favour of fast exits.131 
This takes advantage of the smaller amounts of money needed to start and grow a 
technology company so it can reach critical milestones quicker and with less 
investment. Meanwhile there are plenty of large technology companies with buy-to-
build strategies looking to buy young technology businesses with products that they 
can ‘bolt-on’ to their existing offerings (as illustrated in the DXS – Qiagen case study). 
This makes it possible for angels to fund a company to an exit without needing to 
raise follow-on funding from venture capital firms. It also encourages growing 
businesses to exit the funding ladder in favour of a trade sale. 
 
Third, for many companies the funding ladder is likely to end with a takeover rather 
than an IPO. This is likely to be increasingly typical not just of business angel 
investments but also venture capital backed companies. The acquisition of growing 
companies by larger companies raises the question whether it is desirable from the 
perspective of the UK economy. 
 
 
                                                     
130 We understand that there has been no evaluation yet undertaken on the ECF. 
131 See Peters, B (2009), Early Exits (First Choice Books, Canada) and http://www.basilpeters.com. Also 
"Super angels shake up venture capital", Business Week, 21 May 2009. 
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5. THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC MARKETS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with the role and effectiveness of AIM and PLUS as 
platforms for UK SMEs to raise equity finance. We first look at the characteristics of 
the markets, including the geographical and sector spread of businesses accessing 
AIM, trends in IPO and fundraising activity, and the impact of the recent economic 
downturn. Outside the UK, the fortunes of growth markets have been varied and we 
reflect briefly upon the factors that have contributed to the success of the UK 
growth markets. We discuss too the key challenges which face the markets, which 
impact upon their effectiveness, such as liquidity and regulation regimes, including 
the implications of wider EU legislation.  
 
As a more established market, we have been able to access more information 
pertaining to AIM than PLUS, and this is reflected in the discussion.132  
 
5.2. Market Characteristics  
 
Below we set out the characteristics of the markets by describing the distribution of 
SMEs quoted, by size, location and fund-raising activity. Through our analysis we 
highlight the role and effectiveness of the markets in supporting SMEs’ access to 
growth finance. 
 
5.2.1 Geographical Reach of AIM133 
 
To maximise their role as platforms for raising equity finance, growth markets need to 
attract all SMEs, irrespective of location, to list and raise funds. At the end of January 
2010 of the 1,277 companies on AIM, 1,038 were incorporated in the UK and 239 
overseas. Twenty-five per cent of the UK incorporated companies had their main 
operations overseas – and a small number of overseas incorporated AIM companies 
had their main operations in the UK. In all, 783 AIM companies had their main 
operations in the UK. Chart 5.1 shows the number of companies and the total market 
value of these UK companies by region. There are caveats to note however - the 
stated location of head office and operation can be different. For example, 
companies which have their head office in London and their operating facilities 
outside London may well be counted as London companies. Indeed many of the 
companies, such as pub chains, will have nationwide operations.  
 
London aside, the proportion of SMEs by region on AIM is broadly reflective of the 
proportion of SMEs per region, though the representation of companies from 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (which given the local financial hub in each 
region might be thought less likely to opt for a London head quarter) is low – a mere 
40 companies (5%) of the total.  
                                                     
132 During this study ongoing liaison took place with the London Stock Exchange with regards to 
obtaining relevant market data. Detailed discussions with senior members of both AIM and PLUS were 
held and, alongside a range of other market practitioners, have informed this Chapter. 
133 Geographical analysis of AIM companies is based on monthly statistics published by the London 
Stock Exchange. The statistics only provide detail of the regional location of each UK company’s head 
office and are therefore a limited representation of AIM’s geographical reach.  
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Chart 5.1:  Geographical distribution of AIM companies operating in the UK. 
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Source: London Stock Exchange published statistics 
 
The high proportion of London based SMEs is likely to be due to the large number of 
SMEs located in London (though as Chart 5.1 shows the number is in line with that of 
the South East, which is comparatively under-represented) and the strength of the 
UK financial community, which will positively influence access to the markets. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some advisers based outside London are 
reluctant to see their client companies floated on AIM / PLUS for fear of losing them 
to a London-based adviser. 
 
AIM demonstrates geographical coverage across the UK although in the future this 
could be enhanced to increase SME representation in certain UK regions. This 
highlights the need for markets to ensure marketing activities and awareness rising 
extend throughout the UK, and for particular effort to tackle any misperceptions 
held by the financial community and SMEs located outside London. 
 
5.2.2 Sector Distribution of AIM 
 
Growth markets are often seen as the forums for companies in newer industries, 
higher risk sectors and sectors where smaller companies are the norm. A sector 
analysis of AIM companies with UK operations is shown in Chart 5.2, which details the 
industry sectors with more than 20 constituent companies. 
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Chart 5.2: Industry distribution of AIM companies with UK operations 
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Note: The ‘other’ category includes over 20 sectors which have less than 20 companies represented on 
AIM. Sectors include, amongst others: aerospace and defence (2); alternative energy (10); beverages 
(4); chemicals (10); construction and materials (19); electricity (12) food producers (16); and mobile 
telecommunications (11).  
 
Source: London Stock Exchange published statistics 
 
AIM has been successful in providing a platform for companies from a range of 
sectors to raise finance, adding to the market’s cyclical resilience. Particularly well 
represented are Support Services (driven by the large number of start-ups 
consequent upon out-sourcing of functions) and Software and Computer Services 
companies. Media companies are also well-represented as are General Finance 
companies (including a large number of investment companies).  
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5.2.3 Market Size134 
 
AIM has been a considerable success for the London Stock Exchange. Since 
opening in 1995, AIM has grown steadily to the current position of 1,277 companies 
(1,038 of which are UK incorporated companies) with a market value exceeding 
£58bn. While the early 2000s saw tough trading conditions for growth markets which 
led to some closing (for example both the German and French growth markets have 
been abandoned – though subsequently reopening in different forms), AIM has 
grown135. Contributing to this success has been the regulatory framework, marketing 
activities of AIM successfully targeting a wide range of companies, rather than 
focusing on particular sectors such as high-technology (a sector that has suffered 
since the dotcom crash in 2000) and the London Stock Exchange brand. 
 
By size, companies trading on AIM are spread across a range of market values with 
the main concentration being in the band £10m - £25m. There are 140 companies 
trading on AIM with an equity market value of less than £2million (see Chart 5.3).  
 
Chart 5.3: Distribution of Companies by Equity Market Value 
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Source: London Stock Exchange, October 2009 Fact sheet 
 
There has been a growth in the admission of micro-caps on AIM and PLUS.136 Due to 
the disconnects in the funding escalator, according to market operators the 
likelihood of a business angel bringing an SME to float on the growth markets is now 
                                                     
134 Data as of October 2009 
135 AIM saw positive growth up to 2007, but then negative as the economic downturn took hold. 
136 There is no official definition for the market value of micro-caps. In this instance we refer to a 
company with a market value of under £10million. 
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stronger than at any other time.137 Growth markets are said to be playing the role of 
venture capitalists. Consultations with SMEs highlighted the benefits of the wider pool 
of capital that growth markets offer as well as the ability to raise further funds via 
issues post flotation, whereas venture capitalists may offer a staged payment tied to 
earn-out.138 It could be said that AIM is acting as ‘venture capital with a quote’.139  
 
PLUS-quoted is one of the capital market offerings of PLUS Markets, an independent 
small and mid-cap stock exchange which gained Recognised Investment Exchange 
status in 2007, giving it the same regulated status as the London Stock Exchange. 
PLUS’s SME entry criteria is described as clear, transparent and unequivocal – factors 
which have proved a positive in attracting SMEs to seek a listing with PLUS. PLUS has 
194 companies on its market with a total market value of £2,525m. The total market 
value is dominated by the top five companies which represent 62% of the total 
(these include RAK Real Estate, a UAE company developing a new financial centre, 
and Arsenal FC). More PLUS companies are smaller than most of those on AIM – a 
significant number of PLUS companies are worth less than £1m. The average 
quantity of money raised through IPO or further issues is very much smaller than the 
norm on AIM (see Table 5.1). It should be noted that PLUS does not position itself as a 
feeder market to AIM or the London Stock Exchange Main Market. 
 
Table 5. 1. AIM and PLUS Market Value, IPO and Further Issue Comparisons 
 
 AIM PLUS 
Average market value of 
admissions £42.9m 
All companies: £13m 
If top 5 largest excluded: £5m 
Average IPO value  
(Jan 2006 - Oct 2009) £26.4m £0.82m 
Average further issue value  
(Jan 2006 -Oct 2009) £6.7m £0.28m 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange, PLUS Markets 
 
5.2.4 Fundraising 
 
Since its inception in 1995 AIM has raised a significant amount of equity finance 
£65.9bn, of which £33bn was at admission. Of the total, £47.4bn was for UK 
incorporated companies, of which £24bn was at admission and £23.4bn through 
further issues. Of the companies admitted to AIM, 60% have been UK companies 
with an initial value of less than £25m. Of the companies that raised money through 
an IPO on AIM (many companies join by introduction i.e. not raising money) 40% 
have a market value at the time of the IPO of below £10m, and 84% had a value 
below £50m.  
 
                                                     
137 Admission to AIM typically costs upwards of £400,000. It is therefore only economically viable for SMEs 
with the ability to raise a certain size of investment to undertake an IPO. 
138 The acquiring company typically pays 60–80% of the purchase price up front with the remaining 20–
40% structured as an ‘earn-out’, paid out over time as the acquired company achieves certain levels of 
sales or profitability. 
139 Institutions stand by London’s junior market despite difficult year, Financial Times, 18 December 2009 
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PLUS has been in existence for a shorter time period but has still been very successful. 
In the period January 2006 to September 2009 PLUS issues raised a total of £88.6m, of 
which £23.9m was through 29 IPOs and £64.7m through 230 secondary offerings. 140  
 
The size of companies joining AIM clearly marks out the domain of AIM in 
comparison to the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market. Valuation at admission 
and market choice are strongly linked: companies valued up to £10m market at 
admission are almost certain to join AIM; companies valued between £10-50m are 
likely to join AIM; larger companies are most likely to opt for the Main Market, as 
illustrated in Chart 5.4. This is also reflected in the current valuation of companies on 
both markets. The median market value of an AIM company at 31 January 2010 was 
£14m compared to median market value of around £95m on the Main Market.  
 
In addition to a company’s size, a variety of factors impact a company’s choice of 
market, including its trading history, investor demand and ability to cover costs of 
being on a public market. Smaller companies are more likely to join AIM as it 
provides a regulatory framework tailored to them and a platform to increase their 
profile and visibility amongst similar-sized peers. Over time, as companies progress 
through their development cycle they may choose to move to the Main Market.  
 
Chart 5.4: New Companies by Market Value (AIM) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
£0-1m £1-5m £5-10m £10-50m £50-100m £100-
1000m
Over
£1000m
Range of money raised £m
N
um
be
r o
f c
om
pa
ni
es
AIM Main market
 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange statistics, author 
 
The following chart (5.5) shows the money raised for UK companies through AIM split 
between IPOs and further issues. The impact of the global economic downturn is 
clearly shown, but at over £2.5bn in 2008 the amount of equity raised remains 
substantial with some recovery to £3.4bn in the first 10 months of 2009. The Chart 
                                                     
140 Prior to 2006 PLUS was a different entity, operating under a different name and was not a full 
exchange so comparative data is not available 
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provides evidence that more recently further fundraisings on AIM have been much 
more buoyant than IPOs, suggesting that investors are keen to back AIM companies 
with which they are familiar.141  
 
Chart 5.5: Money Raised (Total Equity Value) by UK AIM Companies  
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Source: London Stock Exchange statistics  
 
A breakdown of IPOs by value on AIM and the Main Market, illustrated by Chart 5.6, 
re-emphasises the key role of AIM as a market for smaller companies. The vast 
majority of IPOs on AIM raise less than £10m while 55% of them have raised less than 
£5m. London Stock Exchange Main Market IPOs tend to be much larger with 80% of 
them being over £10m and 435 over £50m.  
 
                                                     
141 Signs of recovery seen after years of famine, Financial Times, 16 December 2009,  
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Chart 5.6: Money Raised by IPOs by Band for AIM and Main Market 
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Source: London Stock Exchange statistics, author 
 
Many of the smallest issues on both AIM and the Main Market tend to be related to 
share option schemes and similar arrangements142. As AIM companies are smaller 
and have fewer shareholders the size of their share option schemes is also smaller. 
The conclusion, therefore, is that while the issues by Main Market companies in the 
smaller bands are mainly share-option related with any money raised being 
incidental, for AIM companies many of these smaller issues are deliberately intended 
to raise money. The ability to issue small amounts of stock and raise small amounts of 
money is a key feature of AIM (see Chart 5.7). 
 
                                                     
142 Any kind of share incentive programme, which means there are a large number of small issues which 
are not primarily aimed at money raising. 
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Chart 5.7: Further Issues by Bank for AIM and Main Market 
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Source: AIM, author 
 
A more detailed analysis shows the sharp rise in money raising activity since 2002, 
after the effects of the tech crash. IPOs peaked in 2006 and further issues peaked in 
2007. The number of IPOs has since slumped along with the value but the number of 
money raising further issues has fallen much less indicating a shift towards smaller 
issues in difficult economic times (see Chart 5.8 and Chart 5.9). 
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Chart 5.8: Money Raised and Number: IPO by UK AIM Companies 
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Source: London Stock Exchange 
 
Chart 5.9: Money Raised and Number: Further Issues by UK AIM Companies 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
M
on
ey
 ra
is
ed
 £
m
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
N
um
be
r
Money raised £m Number
 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange 
 
Over time the shift has been towards larger issues. In 2000, 75% of AIM IPOs by UK 
companies raised less than £10m but by 2007 this had fallen to 55% with 11 IPOS 
raising over £100m. The trend in further issues was similar until 2007 with the proportion 
of further issues raising less than £1m falling from over 70% in 1999 to just over 40% in 
2007. Since then, the trend in further issues has reversed – though the number of 
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issues is so much smaller that it may not represent a true shift (see Chart 5.10 and 
Chart 5.11). 
 
Chart 5.10: Money Raised by AIM Companies through IPO, by Band 
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Source: London Stock Exchange 
 
Chart 5.11: Money Raised by AIM Companies through Further Issues, by Band 
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Source: London Stock Exchange  
 
5.2.5 Leavers 
 
Since its inception, AIM has admitted 3,098 companies, of which 2,580 have been UK 
companies. Chart 5.12 compares the number of joiners and leavers since the start of 
the market in 1995. The net inflow peaked in 2005 and since then the market has 
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seen a declining net inflow with almost no growth in 2007 and significant net attrition 
in 2008 and 2009. It is expected that the market will resume its upward growth when 
economic conditions improve. However, this will depend on the reasons for the high 
level of leavers (both recently and more generally). Companies have left the market 
for a number of reasons including takeovers and promotion to the Main Market143 as 
well as through financial difficulty and choosing to leave the market. Whilst some 
companies might leave AIM to join the Main Market, the movement has historically 
been the other way from the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market to AIM. It is 
important if AIM is to continue to fulfil the vital role in the SME financing ladder that 
companies leave AIM for positive rather than negative reasons – i.e. takeovers rather 
than failure. 
 
Chart 5.12: Number of UK Companies Joining and Leaving AIM 
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Source: London Stock Exchange, author 
 
The reasons for AIM companies leaving the market are many and complex and 
related to positive and negative factors. There is often a combination of reasons for 
a company cancelling from market, and it will typically state the one that is ‘least 
damaging’ for its ongoing business. In the boom years of 2006/7 about two thirds of 
AIM cancellations were due to positive M&A activity including reverse takeovers. In 
2009 about 41% of cancellations from AIM were due to companies choosing to 
leave the market compared to only 8% in 2007. Around 20% of these were 
international companies with dual listings in their home market. In the current climate 
an increased number of companies have left the market citing low valuations; in 
                                                     
143 A key function of AIM is to act as a platform for early-stage growth companies from which 
companies can then progress to the London Stock Exchange Main Market. 
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fact, of the 113 companies that chose to leave AIM in 2009 over 75% had a market 
value of under £10m immediately prior to cancellation.  As investor preference has 
moved towards larger companies due to the lower perceived risk of ownership, 
SMEs on AIM have experienced depressed share prices and lower levels of liquidity.  
 
Research into delistings by Trowers & Hamlins LLP and UHY Hacker Young published 
in July 2009 found that AIM delistings hit a peak of 81 in the fourth quarter of 2008, 
with fewer delistings in 2009. They suggest that improvements in the AIM index in 2009 
may have dissuaded some companies that were suffering from a very low market 
capitalisation from cancellation144. They find that the number of AIM companies that 
have cancelled because of financial stress or insolvency increased substantially in 
2009. The number of companies that cancelled because of the costs and expenses 
of maintaining an AIM listing fell significantly. The number of companies that said 
they are delisting because they do not have a Nomad also fell significantly during 
the first two quarters of 2009 (from 27 to 5). In a previous press release from the same 
team, Charles Wilson, Partner of Trowers & Hamlins stated that ‘There is the worry that 
Nomads may be deciding to resign because they see the legal, regulatory and 
reputational risks involved in continuing to advise that company as being too high. 
They worry that if a company they advise goes under, they may face the regulator’s 
and investors’ wrath’ … and that ‘The regulatory capital requirements and levies on 
small and medium sized Nomads also need to be kept at a sensible level so that 
firms are not driven out of the market.’ An alternative view to this could be that the 
‘Engagement Responsibilities’ introduced in the Nomad Rules in 2007 have resulted 
in more due diligence being undertaken by an incoming Nomad who is required to 
make an assessment of the appropriateness of a company for AIM on take-on – 
resulting in fewer companies regularly moving between Nomads. A small proportion 
of companies specifically blamed their delisting on their inability to raise new funds, 
though the number of companies which identified this as a issue increased in 
quarter two of 2009. As a result one commentator stated the need for tax breaks to 
be reintroduced for investing in AIM and other smaller companies (Laurence Sacker, 
Partner of UHY Hacker Young).  
 
However, while AIM focuses on potentially more risky stocks, insofar as the market 
attracts early-stage businesses and because it attracts companies in potentially 
more risky sectors, results suggests that risks are not disproportionately high. Research 
by the London School of Economics found that that the failure rate ‘is low, running 
at less than three per cent in the last four years’.145 Earlier research by the ICMA 
Centre at the University of Reading found that the perception of higher risk of AIM 
stocks compared to Main Market stocks was incorrect: ‘The main conclusion that 
comes out of this analysis is that the perception that AIM has higher volatility than 
the [Main Market] is perfectly understandable, but incorrect. Our simpler analyses 
generally found a large difference between volatility of AIM and Main Market 
stocks. However as we moved to more complex analyses differences in volatility 
between AIM and the Main Market are very small, usually not significant statistically 
and tend, if anything, to indicate a slightly lower volatility when on AIM.’146 
                                                     
144 AIM delistings driven by financial stress and insolvency up 183% (Trowers & Hamlins LLP and UHY 
Hacker Young; 14th July 2009) 
145 From Local to Global – The rise of AIM as a stock market for growing companies. By Sridhar Arcot, 
Julia Black and Geoffrey Owen London School of Economics, Sept 2007 
146 A False Perception? The relative riskiness of AIM and listed stocks; John board, Alfonso Dufour, 
Charles Sutcliffe, Stephen Wells, ICMA Centre, Univ. of Reading, Oct 2005 
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5.2.6 Impact of the Economic Downturn 
 
The growth markets have suffered heavily during 2008-9 with fundraisings falling 
sharply from the peak of the previous two years. Public markets throughout the world 
all experienced declines in fund-raising as market prices fell sharply and investors 
shifted to lower risk portfolios. The subsequent recovery of prices has, in the past, led 
to a flurry of money raising activity among existing listed companies on stock 
markets as companies seek to rebuild their balance sheets and investors seek 
opportunities to invest in value offers to offset their recent losses. Typically therefore 
the pattern has been for existing companies to make further issues followed some 
time later by new IPOs as recovery gains momentum. AIM figures for 2009 are 
consistent with this; 2009 saw some recovery of further issues as £4.8bn was raised 
with IPOs remaining depressed (£0.74bn raised). Whether this pattern will continue 
into 2010 will, of course, depend largely on the progress of the UK economy more 
generally. However, the wide sectoral distribution of companies on AIM has 
previously meant that it escaped the collapses that affected technology focussed 
exchanges overseas. 
 
The economy will not be the only factor, and whether AIM fully recovers and its role 
in capital-raising will depend upon structural factors in the market: 
 
• The data suggest that AIM companies are more likely to be in the 
London/Southeast region than elsewhere in the country. They are also highly 
likely to be engaged in business support services and finance related 
activities. Many companies in the southeast region and in these sectors have 
been directly or indirectly dependent upon the substantial finance sector in 
the UK economy. Any ‘rebalancing’ towards a smaller finance sector may 
affect the current constituency of AIM. Were this to happen it would be 
important – both for AIM and the economy generally – that the Nomads are 
able to change their focus to support the new growth sectors such as the 
alternative energy sector147.  
 
• Data also suggests that the size of capital-raisings on AIM and new 
companies joining AIM has been rising over the long term. Small cap 
institutions such as VCTs play a vital role in the provision of capital to SMEs. 
However, as previously illustrated in Table 4.6, the availability of this source of 
finance has significantly declined as a result of increasingly restrictive rules, 
which is a growing concern. 
 
5.3. Attributes of a Successful Market 
 
Many stock exchanges around the world have at various times set up markets for 
growth companies. Typically, these markets have been set up because small 
companies cannot, or find it difficult to, meet the main market’s entry standards – for 
instance, regulatory standards are set too high for smaller or newer companies (e.g. 
the requirement to have a minimum free float) or the costs of compliance with the 
regulatory standards of the main market being too expensive for smaller companies. 
                                                     
147 There are 102 Cleantech companies on AIM and 66 of the FTSE AIM Environmental Opportunities 
Index launched in conjunction with FTSE in June 2009.  
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Many small cap markets were set up, like AIM, in the 1990s but most did not long 
survive the collapse of tech stocks in 2000 – e.g. the German Neuer Market and the 
French Nouveau Marche. The 2000s saw a re-awakening of interest in growth 
markets and most of the 54 major exchanges that are members of the World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE) have set up such markets. In Europe, growth markets 
have been set up like AIM as exchange regulated markets rather than EU regulated 
markets allowing them to set regulatory standards that are appropriate to the local 
needs of the companies and investors. AIM is the largest growth market by a 
significant margin and arguably one of the most successful. Comparisons between 
AIM or PLUS and other international growth markets comparisons are difficult to 
make.  
 
It is worth considering the possible success factors underpinning growth markets. The 
key challenge faced by a growth market is to offer a structure that is sufficiently 
different to the main market to make it attractive to small companies without so 
compromising the regulation of the market that investors are deterred from buying 
the shares. A study by the ICMA Centre148 in 2006 identified key factors in the success 
of a growth market and assessed the features of AIM against those factors. The 
ICMA Centre paper suggests these key factors include: 
 
• The aspirational brand of the London Stock Exchange and attractiveness of 
the Main Market. AIM has been portrayed as the better market for growth 
companies compared to the Main Market – as demonstrated by the 
tendency to attract companies from the Main Market.  
 
• Regulatory requirements, which are favourable for SMEs. AIM has no size, 
track record or prescribed free float requirements; has lower shareholder 
approval requirements for major transactions; and, has no pre-vetting of 
documents. AIM delegates screening of companies for IPO to Nomads who 
suffer reputational risk if do not screen out weak companies. 
 
• Costs of IPO and fund raising on AIM are comparatively low. The Nomad 
system is designed to reduce the costs of admission for issuers. Costs tend to 
be fixed irrespective of amount raised, which benefit SMEs. 
 
• A lock-in period for directors gives confidence to investors that the shares are 
not being dumped in the IPO. AIM restricts sales by directors etc in companies 
without a revenue track record. 
 
AIM has many attributes which can be considered to be good practice. AIM was 
created with the vision for it to be an ‘aspirational brand’ that SMEs would want to 
belong to rather than, for example, a second division home for companies that 
could not make the Main Market. The success of AIM has seen the brand and model 
of London Stock Exchange AIM exported to Italy in the form of AIM Italia and Japan 
where Tokyo AIM - a joint venture partnership between the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and the London Stock Exchange – opened in June 2009, to provide a new market 
for growing companies.  
                                                     
148 International Capital Market Association, University of Reading 
73 
 
 
5.4. Liquidity 
 
A former Director of Policy at the London Stock Exchange, when asked what were 
the three most important attributes that it took to make a stock exchange 
successful, replied ‘Liquidity, liquidity and liquidity’. He was not mistaken. Liquidity is 
what drives the growth of stock markets. Liquidity can loosely be described as the 
ease with which it is possible to trade any given product. The Nasdaq Stock Market 
used to operate a mathematical formula that quantified the liquidity of any given 
stock. It was based on the number of securities that could be traded before the 
price of that security changed. If one trade in a stock moved the price then that 
stock was highly illiquid. Typically blue chip stocks (stock of a well-established 
company having stable earnings and no extensive liabilities) that are listed on a 
major stock exchange will have many thousands if not hundreds of thousands of 
their securities traded every day. Prices will rise or fall to a greater or lesser extent 
based upon a variety of factors, including the performance of that company’s 
business and probably the overall performance of the economy. However, it is rare 
that the price of a blue chip company will change more than a few percentage 
points on any given day. 
 
On a growth market however, totally different circumstances apply. Firstly it is likely 
that there will be a much smaller percentage of the stock of an SME in public hands, 
as the founders of the company will probably want to hold on to a significant stake 
in the ownership of the company. Secondly, once an SME has floated on a growth 
exchange it is quite likely that much of the initial tranche of shares floated will be 
held for a period of time by the initial investors (some of whom will be institutions) in 
the hope that there will be an appreciable growth in the price of those shares. 
Consequently, if the ‘free float’ (the percentage of a company’s shares that are 
tradable) is small then there are quite simply not many shares to buy, and if the 
company is performing well, why would those investors who own some shares want 
to sell? Therefore, almost by definition, shares of an SME traded on a growth market 
will almost certainly be considerably less liquid than those of blue chip companies 
traded on the main market. 
 
An issue to underline here relates to the size of the company. AIM has a relatively 
broad range of companies ranging from small UK start-ups to larger foreign 
companies.149 Similarly, there are smaller companies on the London Stock 
Exchange’s Main Market that have levels of liquidity comparable to some of the less 
liquid stocks on AIM. The liquidity of a stock is therefore related to the company 
rather than its exchange. The issue that a market like AIM faces is that if it has a large 
number of illiquid small cap stocks that will lead to a perception that the market itself 
is illiquid. 
 
The question is sometimes asked, often by the companies whose shares are traded 
on a growth market, ‘So what if my shares are illiquid? I only wanted to have a listing 
in order to raise some money. I have done that. I no longer care that it is difficult to 
trade my shares.’ In fact, they should care. The prices of severely illiquid stocks will 
                                                     
149 Many of these foreign issuers are either of a size where they would fall under the radar of many Main 
Market investors or are in sectors where AIM has a stronger peer group of both UK and international 
issuers. 
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tend to stagnate and eventually fall. No entrepreneur likes to see his or her venture 
sink in value. In some cases the value of a company measured by the share price 
can drop below its net asset value. When the time comes to raise additional capital 
the cost of raising that capital increases proportionately. In the worst cases the 
original owners of the company have to envisage a severe dilution of ownership 
because of the performance of their stock price.  
 
Exchanges the world over have wrestled with this issue over the decades, and they 
have come up with different solutions. In London, before the Big Bang, liquidity was 
encouraged by the existence of jobbers. Brokers seeking to buy or sell stocks would 
physically approach two or three and ask for a quote on a particular stock. He 
would be given a two-way price, usually in a certain size. (In other words the jobber 
would limit the size of the risk he was taking.) The broker would then choose the 
jobber who offered the best price and trade with him on behalf of his client. 
 
After Big Bang, the London Stock Exchange adopted the Nasdaq model, whereby 
jobbers on the floor of the exchange were replaced by market makers on a screen. 
These market makers would effectively fulfil the same role as the jobbers by quoting 
a two-way price in the stock. Exchanges were able to use this system to enhance 
liquidity by requiring all stocks to have at least two market makers. Therefore every 
stock listed on an exchange would always have at least two prices quoted. Clearly 
the more market makers there were (and the biggest companies would attract a 
large number of market makers) the more chance the stock would have of 
enhanced liquidity. 
 
The New York Stock Exchange operated a different system. It relied instead on 
Specialists. Specialists were firms that stood on the floor of the NYSE and handled 
trades in designated stocks. Each stock listed on the exchange had one designated 
Specialist and every morning it was the job of that monopoly specialist to assess the 
supply and demand for each of the stocks for which it was responsible and set an 
opening price based on that supply/demand equation. It was the contention of the 
NYSE that by giving the Specialist a monopoly in a particular stock it was obliging it 
to always make a market in that stock. Other exchanges encouraged liquidity by 
other means; commodity and derivatives exchanges tended to rely upon ‘locals’. 
These were individual traders who stood between orders coming into an exchange 
from brokers’ clients. Continental European exchanges usually operated systems 
whereby client orders matched other client orders, and where there were no 
matches the orders simply sat in the queue until a matching order came along. 
 
There is no magic solution to this problem. The simple fact is that some stocks are 
more highly desirable than others, and will always be so. The common function of an 
exchange is put into place a system that encourages as far as possible the trading 
of all the stocks listed on that exchange. The issue in relation to SMEs is whether the 
public markets in the UK have done enough to achieve that ambition. 
 
5.4.1 Challenges in Liquidity Provision for Small Cap Stocks 
 
So, how have AIM and PLUS responded to this challenge? As noted, running a 
trading facility designed to enhance the liquidity of smaller stocks is always a 
challenging task for a stock exchange and there is plenty of evidence that the 
illiquidity encountered by AIM and PLUS stocks, is very common in other markets. 
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Small cap stocks tend to be difficult to trade and relatively illiquid for a number of 
reasons including: 
 
• Their small size means there is less stock available to trade 
• Small size also means institutional holdings tend to be large, relative to the 
total stock available; and 
• Often the free-float150 is limited because of family, strategic and other non-
tradable holdings. 
 
The focus of this report is on stocks which are outside the large group where order 
driven trading is all that is required. At the other extreme a bulletin board is generally 
seen as a rather poor option by exchanges and companies – since it does not offer 
very much in the way of liquidity enhancement nor does it offer any regular price for 
benchmarking portfolios etc. For AIM and PLUS to tackle liquidity issues there is a 
need to focus on enhancing market making. 
 
AIM and its predecessors have continuously grappled with the challenge of liquidity 
– and AIM has largely been successful in ensuring market maker commitment in its 
stocks. However it has not been easy – a look down the list of market makers on AIM 
(and PLUS) demonstrates that there are a relatively small number of firms that are 
willing to take on the role of market maker in illiquid stocks. This has made the 
exchanges vulnerable to the possibility of withdrawal of one or more of those market 
makers and has, on occasions, made it difficult to get the right balance of privileges 
and obligations. 
 
Evidence of liquidity issues was illustrated by a company that floated on AIM several 
years ago. Following its IPO, the share price moved steadily over a period of a few 
years from £1 to a high of nearly £6. This increase in share price was driven in part by 
strong organic growth in the company’s sales and operating profit, and a number of 
successful acquisitions. However, over time the stock become largely illiquid. To 
tackle this, the company employed an additional broker with the aim of accessing 
a new set of investors. This did not help and the share price fell to its current levels of 
between 80p and £2. Institutional investors have indicated they might be prepared 
to invest in the company but only at a heavy discount to the existing share price. 
The company concluded that the combination of reduced debt finance from the 
banking sector and the structure of the markets, which should enable them to raise 
additional capital, was simply not working, and their future growth was seriously 
inhibited (see case study B). 
 
City stakeholders highlight concerns about the illiquidity levels of smaller cap stocks 
on both AIM and PLUS, although they recognise that this is a factor inherent to small 
cap markets. They noted that when an SME comes to market its main objective is to 
raise money but in many cases this money comes in the first instance from 
institutional investors whose objective is to hold on to that stock and see it generate 
significant capital gains. Buy and hold is a recipe for illiquidity. It considerably 
reduces the available free float. Stocks will only become liquid when there is a 
significant retail base and there is sufficient news in the market about developments 
within the company (hence the need for the company to keep the market informed 
                                                     
150 Free float is the percentage of stock that can be freely traded. It is often less than 20% on AIM. 
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of progress). The general view in the market place is that the market will become 
more liquid when there is more confidence in the economy as a whole. A number of 
consultees also remarked that the growth markets were much more liquid when 
there was venture capital trust activity. 
 
Stakeholders suggested that the creation of tax breaks for investing in SMEs was a 
way to enhance liquidity. This could be brought about by a recreation of Venture 
Capital Trust (VCT) schemes151, or by allowing AIM/PLUS stocks to be used for ISAs. 
There is a perception that no government will be able to afford these tax breaks in 
the short to medium term, but it is at least arguable that the government will 
generate more tax revenues from encouraging the stronger growth of SMEs by 
introducing these tax breaks than it will lose by allowing them in the first place. 
Furthermore, as stocks become more liquid the cost of capital for the SMEs becomes 
more manageable, which in turn encourages the further growth of SMEs. It is 
important to add that any tax incentive for investors on PLUS does not siphon off 
money that would otherwise be invested in EIS.  
 
The liberalisation of the markets brought on by MiFID152 gives exchanges the ability to 
compete with each other by trading the same stock. In the SME sector this has led to 
competition between AIM and PLUS for the trading of AIM stocks. Brokers are 
required by MiFID to trade ‘at best’. This means they have to be sure that if they 
trade a particular company’s stock on AIM, for example, there is not a better price 
to be had on PLUS. The lack of a single screen containing all the prices available for 
any given stock (known in the US as a ‘consolidated tape’) makes this process more 
complicated and has the potential to reduce liquidity. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the United States has imposed a requirement that a consolidated 
tape should exist in order to give investors the best information leading to them 
investing in the market that offers them the best price. Could such a mechanism 
exist in the UK? In fact with the attempt by MiFID to make the market in shares more 
truly European it could be argued that we need a European consolidated tape.  
 
Finally there is the question of what the listed companies themselves should do 
about enhancing the liquidity of their own stock. We spend a lot of time asking 
questions about whether or not the infrastructure that surrounds the capital raising 
needs of SMEs is fit for purpose, but we spend less time asking whether SMEs 
themselves are doing enough to harness the systems. 
 
It is by no means clear that the considerable effort that has been made by the 
public markets themselves to educate the listed companies on how they should 
manage their listing has had as great an impact as might have been expected. This 
is borne out by the views of those to whom we spoke in the market, many of whom 
felt that yet more needs to be done to educate SMEs in the processes that exist to 
assist them. For example SMEs coming to market for the first time put a great effort 
                                                     
151 Venture Capital Trust (VCT) scheme started on 6 April 1995 is designed to encourage individuals to 
invest indirectly in a range of small higher-risk trading companies whose shares and securities are not 
listed on a recognised stock exchange, by investing through VCTs. 
152 MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) is a European Union law that provides harmonised 
regulation for investment services. The main objectives of the Directive are to increase competition and 
consumer protection in investment services. It became effective as of 1st November 2007, replacing 
the Investment Services Directive. Venture Capital Trust (VCT) investors benefit from income tax and 
capital gains tax reliefs. 
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into the capital raising exercise but some of them spend less time thinking about 
what needs doing after their stock has been listed on AIM or PLUS. Being a public 
company requires an ongoing commitment to keeping the market informed 
beyond the regulatory requirements. There is also a responsibility for Nomads to assist 
with this process. The evidence suggests that while a number of Nomads do indeed 
assist with this process, others are less proactive. Some Nomads suggest that the 
frequent efforts they make to try and persuade companies of the need to keep a 
steady information flow to the market fall on deaf ears. All parties associated with a 
company’s listing on one of the public markets, whether brokers, Nomads, lawyers, 
accountants, non-executive directors, managing directors, have a responsibility to 
ensure that investors have regular access to news flows about the company. The 
stock exchanges can assist in this process by increasing their existing efforts to 
educate directors on how to be a public company.  
 
It is worth pointing out that there is another side to the argument. One AIM-listed 
company that we consulted accepted that after-listing activity was a necessary 
part of its responsibilities (see Case Study B). Its CEO had a background in running a 
bigger company, understood the needs of investors, and had devoted time to a 
very active marketing programme to shareholders. Notwithstanding these extensive 
efforts on his part there had been little impact on the overall liquidity of the 
company’s stock. This example illustrates that liquidity problems are not capable of 
an easy solution. They comprise a number of interconnected and fundamental 
issues. However, taking account of the specific issue relating to the efforts that 
should be undertaken by the companies themselves, we recommend that the 
exchanges should step up their efforts to educate company executive directors in 
the management of their listing. There can be little doubt that the more companies 
that make this effort, the more likely it will be that the many other steps that are 
taken to enhance liquidity will begin to have an effect. 
 
78 
 
Case Study B: Liquidity Issues on AIM 
 
 Company B has been listed on AIM since 2005. Becoming quoted on AIM has 
enabled the company to raise equity finance to pursue strong organic growth 
and fund acquisition activity to complement its existing market.  
 
When Company B (the company wished to remain anonymous) first listed on AIM 
it did so with a CEO who had previously been CEO of a much larger company. 
Consequently he knew the market well and had good contacts with the main 
institutional investors. During the listing process he spent a lot of time talking to 
these institutions and felt that they had a good understanding of what he was 
trying to achieve. 
 
At the same time as the company was raising money on AIM it also looked to 
raise debt capital. This latter exercise was less successful as the bank they were 
initially using was less than helpful. Six months later they switched banks, and 
have since then establish a better banking relationship. 
 
The initial listing process on AIM was considered to be a success. They were able 
to raise the money they needed and the share price moved encouragingly in 
the first few months. After listing at £1 the share price moved to a high of nearly 
£6. However, then AIM started to seize up as a result of which the company 
decided to take on an additional broker to see whether it would be possible to 
increase the liquidity of the stock. They had no major problems with their existing 
Nomads but they felt that by tapping into a new set of brokers contacts it might 
be possible to access a new set of investors. 
 
In fact this did not happen. The stock has now become largely illiquid. The share 
price has oscillated between 80p and £2. Institutional investors indicated they 
might be prepared to invest but only at a heavy discount to the existing share 
price. Company B has therefore failed to entice any new institutions into their 
market for at least the last two and a half years. From their perspective AIM is 
‘broken’ and they are now seriously considering their options. 
 
With regard to the support they have received from the market and their 
advisers, their view is that there has been very little assistance they have 
received. While they did not want specifically to criticise their Nomads they were 
of the view that there was nothing the Nomads could have done to help. There is 
simply no interest in their stock because of the small size of the company. They 
were of the view that institutions today were only interested in companies with a 
market cap of at least £100m. The only incentive for institutions to invest in 
companies like theirs would be if they were to see a rapid rise in the share price, 
to reflect the growth of the business. (In fact, Company B was growing well and 
a fair valuation would be nearer £60m than their existing £20m or so). 
 
Some companies listed on AIM had been criticised because of the lack of after-
listing activity. The company accepted that this was a necessary part of their 
responsibilities but their CEO said that coming from his background in running a 
bigger company he well understood the need for this and had devoted time to 
a very active marketing programme to shareholders. These efforts had little 
effect upon the liquidity of their stock, however. Continued overleaf… 
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5.4.2 Differentiation between Small and Micro Cap Stocks 
 
A view that became crystallised through the consultation process was that there 
were effectively two kinds of companies whose shares were traded on growth 
markets. There were the ‘true growth’ companies - those with a market cap of £10m 
upwards - whose home was quite clearly AIM; and there were the micro-cap stocks, 
with a market cap below £10m - and often down as low as £1m - whose home 
might be on a lower tier of AIM153 or on PLUS. Some stakeholders believe there ought 
to be a clear dividing line between the small cap and the micro cap stocks. As 
commercial enterprises, AIM and PLUS, together or in competition, will judge what is 
most appropriate for them. However, for the purposes of this study we have reached 
the following conclusions. 
 
• There is not a clear economic benefit to the UK economy for there to be two 
market places competing for the business of SMEs. Counter intuitive though it 
may sound, stock exchanges tend to thrive when they have a monopoly on 
the trading of a particular stock, because the liquidity of that stock is 
concentrated in one place. This may not be true at the level of highly liquid 
stocks where competition between exchanges tends to drive down the cost 
of trading but at the level of illiquid growth market stocks it is certainly true.  
                                                     
153 Some consultees suggested that lower tier smaller companies were damaging the brand of the 
London Stock Exchange. 
In discussion of the possibility of more government assistance for this sector the 
company expressed the view that it was not the job of the government to 
intervene artificially in this sector. There needs to be a free market in this sector 
just as in any other sector. It just so happened that the particular market they 
were involved with - AIM – was, from their perspective, broken. The company 
would have to make a decision within the next few months as to whether they 
should stay on AIM or try a different tack. As to what that might be, remained to 
be seen. From the company’s perspective, there was no question of moving to 
PLUS as that seemed to be in an even worse state than AIM and it had no track 
record of successfully raising capital. 
 
As far as the debt markets were concerned the company was unhappy with the 
way in which the government’s attempts to get the banks to increase their 
lending had failed to work. On the one hand the government was imploring 
banks to lend more, but on the other hand they were imposing higher capital 
adequacy standards on the banks which had the effect of reducing the money 
available for lending. 
 
In the short term the company had given up on the idea of using AIM to raise 
more capital. They needed to raise funds to generate growth on a 3 - 5 year 
basis. In present circumstances their only option was to use the debt markets, and 
for the reasons given here these were not particularly helpful for them at the 
moment. Their conclusion was that despite being in a position where they have 
successfully weathered the recent financial storm and have good growth 
prospects, the structure of the markets, which should enable them to raise 
additional capital, is simply not working, and this could seriously inhibit their future 
gro th  
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• PLUS has cast its target  market  in  the  same  realm  as  AIM  both  in  the  listing of
 small and micro cap stocks as well as larger foreign listings (the latest restructuring 
 at PLUS would suggest that foreign listings will take on even greater importance
 at PLUS).  
 
 Market participants also wonder whether it is appropriate for very small companies 
to admit to a public market. Regulatory rules and low costs on Aim and PLUS have 
allowed smaller companies to list and retail investors have been enthusiastic about 
exploiting the possibility of the high capital growth that these very small companies 
are capable of generating (at least in the earlier years of the growth of these 
markets). Though micro cap stocks impact on the perceived overall liquidity of the 
market, stakeholders agreed that there was no reason to reduce the choice of 
funding sources that is now available to SMEs: if companies do not perform well, the 
cost of being on the market will become too high and they will delist. This is reflected 
in recent trends in AIM cancellations. Seventy per cent of AIM companies that have 
chosen to leave market in the last two years had a market capitalisation of under 
£10m154.  
 
Stakeholders argued that it is difficult to agree on action on the issue. The Quoted 
Companies Alliance has resolved to prepare a guide for SMEs, indicating the likely 
profile of a listed company; this should support SMEs in understanding whether they 
are suitable for listing. 
 
It was also agreed that more education for SMEs management teams would help 
ensure that expectations of the market and the ongoing requirements of the market 
are clearly stated and used to inform a decision of whether to list or not. 
 
5.5. Regulation 
 
One of the most important issues regarding the operation of growth markets, 
designed in particular to appeal to SMEs seeking additional funding, is the regulation 
of those markets. Regulation in this context covers company legislation, taxation 
issues, investor protection legislation as well as the listing standards and ongoing 
regulations operated by the exchanges themselves. In the case of AIM, the effective 
compliance with the requirements of the regulation of the companies listed is 
delegated to Nomads.  
 
The level of regulation that is appropriate for blue chip mature companies is often 
not appropriate for small start-up companies. If the standards to be imposed on 
SMEs were similar to those on the Main Market then very few SMEs would be able to 
afford either the time or the resources to comply. Governments have an in-built and 
fully justified desire to ensure that the public who invest in shares do not lose money 
as a result of misdemeanours by the companies in which they are investing because 
of poor or ineffective regulation. By their very nature SMEs are perceived to be a 
riskier investment than blue chip companies –the majority of SMEs do not survive or 
                                                     
154 With any mature market, including the Main Market and the NASDAQ, there will be a tail of smaller 
companies (last June NYSE permanently reduced its minimum market cap requirement to £15m) and it 
is for market users to decide whether the cost of being on the market is justified. 
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realise their full market potential. However, for investors, SMEs represent an 
opportunity to derive greater returns – it is possible to double your money or better 
by investing in a successful SME far more easily than by investing in a mature blue 
chip company. The issue therefore is to strike the right balance between regulation 
and investor protection. 
 
We spoke to a range of practitioners - market operators, fund managers, nominated 
advisors/brokers, lawyers, accountants, and a leading financial journalist – about 
whether the balance is operating efficiently. Consultees focused on the role and 
effectiveness of Nomads on AIM, and the wider regulatory burden SMEs face. The 
markets operate within the wider EU regulatory and legislative context, and we 
discuss below the implications relating to the EU listings directives and legislation.  
 
5.5.1 Investor Protection and Regulation 
 
There is a strong view amongst practitioners that the regulations that surround the 
whole SME public market are still far too onerous. Consultees expressed concerns 
about the quantity of ‘red tape’ that SMEs endure in order to get a listing. What was 
less easy to define was whether this red tape was caused by UK company law, 
taxation issues, FSA (Financial Service Authority) legislation, EU legislation or rules of 
the market operators. When asked to specify the actual red tape that caused 
problems the answer was usually non-specific - ‘It’s the sheer amount that turns off 
the SMEs’.  The perception of the responsibilities of a public company is burdensome 
for entrepreneurs, experts in their respective fields but with limited financial markets 
experience. 
 
Following admission, SMEs suddenly find that going public entails a raft of 
responsibilities that they have not been exposed to while they remained private 
companies. These responsibilities extend far beyond the rules and regulations of the 
exchange itself and into the realm of government regulation as a whole. There is 
limited evidence that in drawing up company law successive governments have 
paid enough attention to the very special needs of SMEs. Yet, notwithstanding this 
level of burdensome regulation the fact remains that SMEs can raise capital on 
secondary markets. Indeed AIM companies raised £5.5 bn in 2009. 
 
However, the volume of criticism of the level of red tape faced by SMEs coming to 
the market cannot be ignored. Even if significant amounts of capital are raised on 
AIM we have to be conscious of the fact that there may be a real possibility of 
raising considerably more if a more efficient balance of regulation were struck. 
 
We therefore recommend that a detailed study be commissioned into the overall 
level of regulation that falls on the SMEs, the first time they come to market155. Such a 
study should take a holistic approach: rather than looking simply at the individual 
rules and regulations of the exchange the study should instead look at the overall 
objectives of company law, taxation issues, investor protection as well as the rules 
and regulations of the exchange, what these are trying to achieve and then draw 
up a much pared down version of what is actually essential rather than simply 
                                                     
155 On 12 October 2009, Christine Lagarde, the Economic Minister for France, announced a fifteen point 
plan to improve SME access to finance in France. She has also called for the need of a Small Business 
Act for the benefit of all European SMEs.  
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desirable. In doing this more attention should be paid to the needs of the overall 
economic desirability of encouraging the growth of SMEs than to protecting 
investors from investing in what is by definition a higher risk investment. The notion of 
Caveat Emptor (‘let the buyer beware’) may be more appropriate in a market of 
this nature. 
 
5.5.2 Regulation of Companies on AIM by Nomads 
 
The role of the Nomad on AIM is crucial and it has a number of differing 
responsibilities. Firstly it introduces the company to the market. Secondly it acts as 
the company’s adviser for the time it is admitted to the market (although a number 
of companies have chosen to have a broker who is different from their Nomad). 
Thirdly it acts as the regulator of the company for the duration of its listing. The partial 
delegation of the regulatory role to these Nomads has always been one of the more 
controversial characteristics of AIM (no such delegation takes place on PLUS). The 
London Stock Exchange first introduced the principle of delegating key aspects of 
regulation to a broker when it created its short-lived Third Market in the mid 1980s. 
This experiment failed in large part because of the reluctance of brokers to take on 
this responsibility. However, on balance the Nomad structure has worked quite well 
on AIM over the years. Criticism grew in 2005 and 2006 over the poor performance 
of some of the Nomads, which led to AIM introducing the Nomad Rules in 2007.  
 
The implementation of the Nomad rules in 2007 was the result of an internal review 
undertaken by the Exchange into the operation and regulation of AIM. The review 
provided positive confirmation that AIM’s regulatory structure and the Nomad 
system were key factors in AIM’s success. The changes included the publication of a 
new rulebook for Nominated Advisers and an enhanced disclosure regime for AIM 
companies. The rulebook provides guidance on the level of due diligence the 
Exchange expects Nomads to undertake in order to confirm the appropriateness of 
a company to AIM, and ensure it is able to comply with the AIM rules on an ongoing 
basis. The new rules of 2007 have certainly had an impact on the quality of 
companies coming to market. There has also been a reduction in the number of 
Nomads as a result of consolidation of firms, particularly in the current depressed IPO 
market, and resignations from the Nomad register. 
 
However, notwithstanding these improvements there continue to be mixed views 
about the efficiency of the current Nomad system that operates on AIM. The larger 
Nomads and lawyers consulted were generally satisfied with the way the system 
operates. However the quality of the Nomads is undoubtedly still variable. Larger 
firms usually have formal procedures to help fulfil their responsibilities under AIM rules. 
They may also have dedicated risk management teams to ensure the executives 
understand any reputational risks to the firm. Hence such Nomads take their role 
very seriously and conduct their relationships with their clients conscientiously. Some 
of the smaller Nomads are equally efficient. However, some small Nomads are 
perceived to be weak and provide little effective support or advice to their clients. A 
key reason to the introduction of AIM rules for Nomads in 2007 was to help AIM 
companies better understand the role of the Nomad. However, on the basis of 
conversations with some of the SMEs it is clear that they still have an imperfect grasp 
of the role of a Nomad. In their view they are paying out large sums of money (in 
relative terms for an SME) on an annual basis with very little in return. They often 
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seem to believe that the job of a Nomad is solely to provide the company with 
financial advice and they do not fully appreciate the regulatory role of the Nomad. 
 
In the current uncertain environment, SMEs are also concerned about changes in 
the wider regulatory environment that may bring additional costs and burden. One 
company complained that in the current climate with financial services regulation 
being so heavily in the spotlight they have found that all financial advisers no longer 
come to the company proffering advice. Instead they wait for the company to 
come to them seeking advice on compliance, tax and regulatory issues(see case 
study C).   
 
Any belief that the Nomad model is broken is an extreme view which we do not 
concur with. There is, however, some evidence that the very mixed qualities of the 
Nomads do generate an impression that the system is in need of further tightening 
up. There would be considerable benefit from a continued review of the way that 
Nomads are appointed in the first place and then supervised by the London Stock 
Exchange with a view to aligning the behaviour of Nomads to the standards that 
investors and SMEs expect, and to remove Nomads that are unable to meet these 
expectations. A programme of continuous training could be introduced for 
individual executives at Nomad firms responsible for interfacing with clients. This 
could complement the current activity AIM has regarding the appointment, 
monitoring or supervision of Nomads. 
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Case Study C: Listing on AIM to Gain Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company C (the company wished to remain anonymous) operates in a highly 
priced competitive sector and has been listed on AIM since 2004.  
 
Company C had a very specific objective from a listing on AIM. As a 
franchising operation they were not looking to raise money for growth 
purposes but rather to protect their profits. In order to generate more 
franchises, specifically in France, New Zealand and the United States, 
Company C had to create credibility. Having a listing on AIM, achieved this. 
The operations of AIM, therefore, have not really been of major concern. 
 
Since becoming quoted, Company C had little need to spend time with their 
Nomads. Their view is that the job of the Nomad is to make sure that they 
complied with the rules of AIM and were generally perceived to be run 
according to the best standards of the market. Achieving this would 
demonstrate to their franchisees that they were dealing with a good quality 
company.  
 
The company confirmed that their share price is illiquid and that they have 
very few institutional investors. Their major investors are now private client 
brokers and they see no prospect of any major new institutional investors. They 
doubt whether the Nomads could have improved the illiquidity of their stock, 
which they consider to be down to the fact that they are a very small 
company. 
 
As the company has been cash positive they have really paid little attention to 
the share performance. They pay regular dividends and they see the growth of 
the company coming organically rather than by needing to raise money for 
purposes of further investing in the growth of the company. With the creation 
of every new international subsidiary they generate increasing income from 
the new franchisees coming on board.  
 
The sector in which Company C works is hugely competitive. Due to the 
economic downturn a number of companies in this sector will have fallen by 
the wayside over the last 12 months. However, Company C feel they are well 
positioned to take advantage of the upturn in the economy to come. There is 
one business opportunity which might require the raising of additional capital 
and that is if they were to enter into joint ventures in new or expanding markets 
such as the US or France. This might require the addition of a further £5m - 
£10m. Plans are not advanced for such a move and they have not so far given 
any real consideration as to how they might raise this money, should it be 
required. They might use the debt markets or AIM. 
 
In terms of the support they received from their advisers they complained that 
in the current rather fraught atmosphere for financial services regulation they 
find that the advisers no longer come to the company proffering advice. 
Instead they wait for the company to come to them seeking advice on 
compliance, tax and regulatory issues. Advisers are very nervous indeed about 
regulation and are therefore tending to hang back. Continued overleaf… 
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5.5.3  EU Listing Directive: Premium/Standard listings 
 
The EU Prospectus Directive introduced in 2003, sets out the minimum disclosure 
standards for companies seeking to list on an EU regulated market. The UK Listing 
Authority (UKLA), a division of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), has a set of  
‘super-equivalent’ standards for UK companies listing on a UK regulated market such 
as the Main Market i.e. higher than the minimum set in the Prospectus Directive. This 
resulted in no provision under the UKLA rules for a standard EU minimum listing - the 
standards for the Main Market were higher and AIM and PLUS rules were lower. 
Following changes to the UKLA’s rules in October 2009, companies incorporated in 
the UK are now able to seek admission to the FSA’s Official List and the London Stock 
Exchange’s Main Market via a Standard Listing, i.e. in compliance with EU minimum 
listing standards. 
 
Given the reduced requirements under the Standard listing regime there is some 
concern that the introduction of the new regime will create confusion about the 
different standards and levels of investor protection applicable to companies listed 
in the UK. There seems at least a reasonable chance that the introduction of the 
Standard listing regime will indeed attract some companies from AIM, or result in 
some new companies coming to the market choosing a Standard listing rather than 
an AIM or PLUS quotation. What is less clear is what effect this will have on the overall 
positioning of AIM and PLUS. It might result in AIM becoming more clearly identified 
as a market for UK SMEs rather than for large foreign companies seeking a London 
listing at a lower level of regulation than the Premium market. The London Stock 
Exchange would probably argue that large foreign companies could always have 
chosen to use the Main Market had they so wished. If therefore AIM were to 
become more exclusively a market for SMEs then this might actually benefit the 
SMEs. On the other hand if it were to result in a reduction in the differentiation 
between the Main Market and AIM, then this would clearly not be to the advantage 
of SMEs. The London Stock Exchange will continue to monitor the impact of the 
regulation, so that it can respond appropriately should there be any negative 
effects. 
 
However, for the purposes of this study we wish to make some recommendations for 
the UK Listing Authority at the FSA. The various EU listing directives have been aimed 
at standardising the quality of companies entering the respective main markets of 
the EU member states. Little detailed thought has so far been given to the public 
market needs of SMEs. Without doubt these companies need a totally different 
regime from blue chip companies. The use by large blue chip companies from 
outside the EU of growth markets within the EU in order to gain a listing on a 
‘respectable’ market is really not what growth markets were set up to provide. The 
real danger of this trend is that markets like AIM, and to a lesser extent PLUS, as well 
as their advisers, become preoccupied by the large amounts of capital raised on 
these small markets by large companies (and concomitant fees for advisers) to the 
detriment of the needs of SMEs. London has always been an international market 
In conclusion the company feels that what they sought from an AIM listing was a 
‘seal of approval’ which would enable them to sell themselves to their potential 
clients. Notwithstanding the performance of their stock, AIM has helped them to 
achieve this target. 
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and there is no need to suggest that markets like AIM should be confined to UK 
SMEs. But there is an argument that large foreign companies simply seeking a lower 
level entry to a respectable market should not use these growth markets. We 
therefore recommend that the UK Listing Authority take steps to encourage large 
foreign companies that are perfectly capable of listing on the Main Market to be 
encouraged to do just that. 
 
5.5.4 EU Legislation 
 
In addition to the consequences of introducing Standard Listing  on the FSA’s Official 
List and the impediments in the way of allowing investments in AIM and PLUS stocks 
to be used for ISAs, there is a third major issue, relating to ensuring any regulatory 
changes at the European level do not adversely impact SMEs.  
 
EU changes that have taken place in the past have been handled relatively 
painlessly. For example AIM responded successfully to the move in 2004 to make it 
an exchange regulated market. Nevertheless, we conclude that any changes to EU 
directives need to take EU growth markets like AIM and PLUS into account in order to 
avoid damaging any steps taken in the UK alone to improve the environment for 
stimulating the growth of smaller companies. We would therefore endorse the 
approach taken by the QCA for the EU Commission to bring forward its reviews of 
the relevant directives and we hope that this approach will be endorsed by the 
British Government. 
 
5.6. Markets Support Other Financial and Business Services156 
 
To function, markets require the support of a range of financial and business services. 
Research by the London School of Economics charting the rise of the AIM identifies 
the importance of the market in providing ‘a considerable boost for the London-
based investment banks and brokers which specialise in small-capitalisation 
stocks’157. 
 
The research states that AIM’s growth has ‘reinforced the cluster of experience, 
resources and management skills which underpins the dynamism of the City. Our 
interviews with SMEs found evidence to suggest that there are strong, established 
links between finance professionals within London and also between London and 
other UK cities such as Manchester and Edinburgh who are very familiar with the 
growth markets operations. The strength of the London financial sector does mean 
that advisors located elsewhere can be sceptical about the benefits of AIM for their 
business: one Scottish-based entrepreneur stated that he felt that Scottish advisers 
were reluctant to recommend AIM to their clients for fear that they might lose them 
to London advisors. Markets must work with the financial community across all parts 
of the UK to ensure that any misconceptions which may exist, in particular any view 
that the markets are biased towards the financial community based in London, are 
tackled. 
 
                                                     
156 This section draws heavily upon work by the London School of Economics - ‘From local to global: the 
rise of AIM as a stock market for growing companies’ (London School of Economics, Sept. 2007) 
157 ibid 
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The London School of Economics research also argues that AIM has contributed to 
the internalisation of a part of the financial community which traditionally had been 
geared to UK clients. As such AIM has brought in significant fees arising from IPOs 
and further equity issues, which together with payments made to accountants, 
lawyers and other advisers, which in 2007 was estimated at approximately £1bn a 
year.  
 
An annual estimate of income generated by AIM is provided by the AIM Investor 
Survey. The survey definition of income includes listings, secondary fundraisings and 
fees for brokers and Nomads, and different to the London School of Economics 
research (so direction comparisons across research should not be made). The 2009 
survey illustrates how the economic downturn has impacted on commissions with 
total fees in 2008 are estimated at £268m down almost two thirds on 2007 levels 
(£746m) and 2009 commission levels expected to be similarly depressed. This is due 
to significant reductions in issues (new and further) and trading activity (institutional 
and retail). 158 
 
The London School of Economics highlights the importance of AIM in widening the 
opportunities the City has in capital-raising opportunities and enhanced the position 
of the London Stock Exchange among the world’s principal stock exchanges (AIM 
having grown at New York Stock Exchange’s expense – attributed to a regulatory 
system which is less prescriptive159). AIM has also been valuable in linking the London 
capital markets to fast-growing emerging markets such as India, China and Russia. It 
can be surmised that for companies based in countries whose stock markets are 
under-developed or poorly equipped to service smaller enterprises, AIM has proved 
to be a useful capital-raising mechanism. 
 
Some market participants are concerned that AIM and AIM intermediaries are too 
focused on attracting large foreign listings from China, Russia and elsewhere with 
too little time spent attracting UK SMEs and helping them access the market. One 
interlocutor said that AIM had become a market for large foreign companies that 
wanted a prestigious listing on a major international exchange without having to 
comply with onerous listing standards. Another consultee pointed to how foreign 
companies promoted their listing as ‘a London Stock Exchange market’, rarely 
referring to AIM. Despite these views, the consensus view was that foreign listings on 
AIM are welcome; indeed it has long been a tradition of the London Stock 
Exchange to welcome foreign listings.  
 
Diversity on AIM has in fact has contributed to its success, differentiating the market 
from other growth markets across Europe. Foreign companies coming to AIM have 
also attracted a wider pool of investors and analysts to the market and provided UK 
companies the opportunity to be compared to sector peers on an international 
basis. The problem is essentially not that AIM has attracted too many foreign listings 
but rather too many large companies (many of which are foreign), thus undermining 
the raison d’être of AIM as a market for small cap stocks. Market participants feel 
that the main objective for AIM should continue to be to provide SMEs with an 
efficient public market place. If the size of the market was increased by the 
                                                     
158 Arbuthnot Securities AIM Investor Survey 2009: The road to recovery (Arbuthnot Securities) 
159 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increased the costs and complexity of public flotations, and 
accentuated the differences in between London and New York’s philosophy of regulation.  
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presence of other foreign SMEs, so much the better. But growing the market with 
large foreign companies clearly capable of listing on the main market tends to 
distort the perception of AIM. We have recommended that that the UK Listing 
Authority should encourage large foreign companies capable of listing on the main 
market to do just that (section 5.5.4). We also recommend that the London Stock 
Exchange and all those advisers associated with AIM should be careful to ensure a 
better balance of devoting their resources between SMEs and large foreign listings. 
There is no reason to stop promoting AIM abroad, but more should be done to 
ensure that AIM remains primarily a market for SMEs.  
 
As with AIM, by pitching themselves as direct competitors to AIM, PLUS has ended up 
offer to UK SMEs. Recent changes at the top of PLUS suggest that this trend is likely to 
increase. Whilst the direction PLUS takes will be guided by business strategy, one way 
to differentiate themselves from AIM would be by concentrating on smaller UK SMEs 
(see section 5.4.3). Foreign companies seeking a listing in London are more likely to 
choose AIM because of the link with the London Stock Exchange brand although 
other factors will play a key part, such as transaction costs and liquidity. It might be 
easier to sell the PLUS offering to the smaller UK SMEs than to foreign companies and 
they would then provide SMEs with a stronger alternative to AIM than is currently the 
case. 
 
5.7. Summary 
 
AIM and PLUS play a critical role in enabling UK SMEs to access early stage equity 
finance. AIM has successfully attracted SMEs from across the UK and from a broad 
spread of sectors, though there is bias towards London and South East companies 
and the finance and professional business services. There are clearly still 
opportunities for AIM (and PLUS also) to attract companies from other parts of the UK 
and broaden SME sector interest in floating on AIM.  
 
Both geography and sector have contributed to a more diverse base of quoted 
companies, and have added to the economic resilience of the market. That is not 
to say AIM has been spared from the economic downturn. The number of and 
volume of money raising through IPO saw a substantial fall in 2008 with little or no 
return in 2009. However, there was more resilience in the volume of money raised via 
further issues on AIM. Clearly 2010 will be an important year for the market as the UK 
economy picks up, business confidence returns, lending from banks is relaxed and 
restructuring of companies takes place. AIM and PLUS has attracted micro 
businesses over the past few years.  
 
AIM’s regulatory structure, the Nomad system and the relatively low costs of flotation 
and maintaining a listing are key factors in the markets success. AIM took steps in 
2007 to build on the quality and integrity of the market through the publication of a 
rulebook for Nomads and an enhanced disclosure regime for AIM companies. It is 
imperative that AIM continues to assess the appointment and supervision of Nomads 
to ensure appropriate standards are maintained.  
 
AIM and PLUS have attracted micro stock caps. This has been driven by the 
favourable regulation and admission costs, which compared to the Main Market do 
not impose regulatory or financial barriers to entry for SMEs, and the withdrawal of 
seeking foreign listings, some would suggest to the detriment of the market they 
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venture capital investment from early stage funding which has exacerbated a 
finance gap of £2m to £10m (as discussed in Chapter 4) and meant that growing 
companies are more likely to seek admission to the growth markets earlier. In this 
respect, growth markets are taking the place of venture capital investment on the 
funding escalator. There is evidence too of a direct relationship being between 
business angels and growth markets. SMEs seeking access to growth market earlier in 
their business growth will typically raise smaller amounts of equity finance – that is 
they are micro stock caps. Micro stock caps can impact negatively on perceived 
liquidity of the market and higher rates of delisting (as the cost of maintaining a 
listing are comparatively large). However, there is no reason to reduce the choice of 
funding sources that is now available to SMEs by discouraging micro stock caps, and 
instead the debate among the financial community should be whether there ought 
to be a clearer dividing line between the small cap and the micro cap stocks in 
terms of AIM and PLUS operations. 
 
The ongoing success of AIM and PLUS, and their relationship with the wider funding 
ladder (upwards and downwards), is dependent on how they respond to the 
particular challenges they both face: the outcome of the debate on EU legislation 
and the recent FSA listing authority decision on premium/standard listings; illiquidity 
levels, which impact on the perception and willingness of business angels and 
venture capitalists to take SMEs to IPO, and the ability of SMEs to fund-raise; 
enhancements required to internal market regulation (i.e. Nomads on AIM); and 
awareness raising amongst the SMEs community of how the markets can best serve 
their needs. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter considers the key findings of the research and their implications, and 
sets out a number of key messages. Recommendations arising from the findings are 
set out in the next chapter. 
 
6.2. Conclusions 
 
Entrepreneurship and small firm formation are important drivers of the UK’s economy. 
The SME sector has become increasingly important since the 1970’s, driven by socio-
economic factors, such as cultural attitudes toward entrepreneurship, ICT 
technology, and the privatisation and deregulation of markets so that, arguably, the 
sector is now more important to the UK than ever before. Many of the conditions 
which brought about the revival and resurgence of the SME sector still underpin the 
sector today. The strength of the SME sector will therefore continue to be a vital 
component of the UK economy. 
 
The UK SME sector has grown since the early 1970s so that by number the vast 
majority of businesses in the UK are SMEs. Of the 4.8 million enterprises in the UK, 
99.5% are micro, small or medium in size. The majority of these are one person 
businesses and micro firms (less than 10 employees). SMEs are shown to be important 
to all regions of the UK and are well represented across many sectors of the 
economy. They contribute significantly to the UK employment profile, drive 
innovation and productivity, and bring wider societal benefits to the UK. There is 
strong evidence that economic growth is positively associated with entrepreneurship 
and in expanding and transforming the productive potential of regional economies. 
The Government has recognised the importance of SMEs, but the impact of small 
business policy intervention has been somewhat limited. One comment suggests 
that not all SMEs have the same growth potential (in fact a high proportion of SMEs 
fail and few exhibit growth), so rather than distributing SME support resources widely 
with interventions small in scale, support needs to be focused on those SMEs with 
high growth potential. 
 
The main economic impact of the SME sector in fact derives from firms which 
achieve rapid growth over a relatively short time period. However, though the UK 
has a higher proportion of micro firms than in the US, the UK has been less successful 
than the US in generating high growth firms. The reason for this has been attributed 
to less efficient financial markets.  
 
Public markets are only one component of the SME funding escalator, however. The 
funding escalator concept suggests that growing SMEs will use these different 
sources of finance at different stages in their development. The model is an inter-
dependent system, so that gaps in one part of the ladder have potential knock-on 
effects, either forward or backward. The funding escalator is impacted by changes 
in the economic and financial environment and is therefore in a constant state of 
evolution. As such the effectiveness of the public markets is not only determined by 
the financial and economic climate, but also by the provision and access to pre-
market equity finance. Understanding SME funding requirements therefore demands 
a holistic view of the funding escalator. 
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Our research finds that the equity funding escalator is operating sub-optimally at a 
number of points. There is a lack of seed capital funding preventing new technology 
based firms from accessing the escalator, and also a lack of follow on funding. As a 
result SMEs cannot raise the right levels of equity finance. The inability to access seed 
capital and raise early stage follow funding has implications for the growth of high 
technology enterprises in the UK, which rely upon equity funding to bridge the gap 
between early adoption and mainstream market, and through pre-revenue 
generation. This implication could have knock-on effects on UK innovation and 
productivity gains.  
 
A second issue is the re-emergence of an equity gap in early stage venture capital 
between £2m and £10m. This is primarily due to the preference of venture capital 
investors to later stage, larger transactions, which carry lower risks. The decline in the 
availability of early stage venture capital has put pressure on business angels to 
make more investments, bigger investments and more funding rounds. Early stage 
equity gaps mean that fewer SMEs are able to access the appropriate type and 
volume of funds required for growth and their economic potential remains 
unfulfilled. The economic downturn of 2008, which saw poor stock market 
performance, exacerbated the lack of early stage equity finance for business 
angels, and venture capital investors had less equity to fund SME growth.  
 
There is also evidence of growing disconnects between business angel, venture 
capital investors and the public market. The funding escalator model suggests high 
growth SMEs will ultimately seek to raise equity finance via a public market listing. 
However, investors (business angels and venture capital investors) have concerns 
that their stock value will fall during the lock-in period following IPO and hold 
negative views on perceived liquidity levels of growth markets. The growth of micro 
stocks caps on AIM and PLUS has added to this view of perceived liquidity issues. 
There is evidence too of how the EIS investment rules require business angels to invest 
in ordinary shares to qualify for EIS tax relief, which puts angels at a disadvantage to 
venture capital funds in terms of valuation and returns. The EIS therefore adds to the 
angel – venture capital disconnect. 
 
The implication of these disconnects is that some investors are favouring fast exits 
over IPO – that is they are encouraging growing businesses to exit the funding ladder 
before IPO in favour of a trade sale. Trade sales are often made to larger companies 
that have established channel for distribution, often to foreign companies. The 
debate of who trade sale benefits is complex, as captured in the discussion 
between entrepreneurial recycling vis-à-vis the loss of high growth SMEs, and with it 
knowledge, skills, etc. from the UK economy. Trade sale also means that the public 
markets themselves lose a potential opportunity to support and SME through 
admission and fund raising.  
 
Despite these finance gaps and disconnects, AIM and PLUS, in their own right, are 
successful platforms for growing SMEs to raise equity finance. Both markets have 
grown in size during a period when many other growth markets from other European 
did not survive. AIM has attracted a broad geographical and sectoral spread of 
SMEs which has provided a certain resilience to the economic downturn. Both 
markets too have been able to attracting SME listings from foreign countries. As 
successful markets, it can be said that AIM and PLUS display many characteristics 
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which can be considered good practice. Key factors in AIM’s success have been 
regulatory structure, the Nomad system and the relatively low costs of flotation and 
maintaining a listing. AIM is acutely aware of the importance of maintaining the 
quality and integrity of the market and took steps in 2007 to strength the market 
operations further through the publication of a rulebook for Nomads and an 
enhanced disclosure regime for AIM companies. These have proved to be 
beneficial to enhancing regulation, but there are indications that more needs to be 
done. However, the favourable regulatory conditions and low costs of market 
admission also means that some SMEs may have prematurely sought a listing on the 
public markets. This has contributed to perceived liquidity issues and some members 
of the financial community feel that micro stock caps are damaging the 
performance and brand of AIM. 
 
The success of AIM and PLUS has had a positive influence on the wider UK financial 
community. The services associated with SME and foreign companies listings and 
fundraising, has strengthened the UK financial and business services, by reinforcing 
the cluster of experience, resources and management skills, and bringing jobs 
creation, fees and income for HM Treasury.  
 
There are challenges for the AIM and PLUS in the year ahead, as the UK emerges 
from recession. The economic downturn has impacted on performance, and as 
businesses both markets will be looking to attract IPOs, raise levels of further issues 
and retain stock, in order to generate fees. There are the ongoing issues of raising 
liquidity among small caps stock, which lowers the performance of the market and 
lead to companies delisting following IPO, if they cannot raise further funds. Year 
2010 is likely to see M&A activity pick up and consolidations of micro cap stock, 
which could be beneficial for the market’s daily liquidity. The debates on the 
Prospectus Directive, Market Abuse and Transparency Directive reviews could 
impact on the environment for stimulating the growth of smaller companies. 
 
Through the right provision of support for SMEs, the UK economy can continue to 
harness significant economic gains from the SME sector. We suggest that, in 
recognition of the importance of the funding escalator, and specifically the 
interrelationships between angels, venture capitalist firms and the growth markets in 
supporting SME growth, policy responses takes a holistic view. That is, it is imperative 
that policy measures are based on the funding escalator and take a joined up 
approach, involving policy makers at all stages of the ladder. 
 
6.3. Key Research Messages 
 
There are a number of key messages arising from the research: 
 
1. Entrepreneurship and small firm formation are important drivers of the UK’s 
economy. SMEs contribute significantly to UK employment, prosperity, 
innovation, productivity and provide a number of benefits to society. 
 
2. High growth SMEs have the propensity to generate significant economic 
benefits. Though they represent a small minority of all SMEs, they make a large 
contribution to the UK economy. It is these high growth SMEs, which require 
access to appropriate sources and levels of equity finance. 
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3. The funding escalator model suggests high growth SMEs will use different 
sources of finance at various stages of their development. The escalator is an 
inter-dependent system so that any gaps in the provision of finance will have 
potential knock-on effects, either forward or backward, on other parts of the 
escalator. The demand for public market listings is therefore dependent on 
the provision of and access to equity finance lower down the escalator, in 
particular public sector venture capital, business angels and venture capital 
investors. 
 
4. At present, the operation of the SME funding escalator could be improved. 
Several parts of the escalator appear to be operating sub-optimally due to: 
 
• The reduction in the supply of early stage venture capital funds (£2m to 
£10m), which means that SMEs are becoming more reliant on business 
angels to meet their equity finance needs.  
• An investment relationship disconnection between business angels 
and venture capital firms, which means that business angels are now 
tending to fund SMEs for an exit, as opposed to seek ongoing 
investment or a market listing. 
• A depressed Initial Public Offering (IPO) market, which means that 
business angels and venture capital funds are unable to exit from 
investments to raise funds. 
 
5. AIM is the largest growth market in the world. Success factors include the 
favourable regulatory rules; comparatively low costs for admission, fundraising 
and transactions; the strong wider UK financial and business community; and 
its positioning as an aspirational brand. 
 
6. AIM and PLUS have enhanced the capital-raising opportunities of UK financial 
services. These opportunities have reinforced the cluster of experience, 
resources and management skills which underpins the dynamism of the City. 
The operation of AIM has enhanced the position of the London Stock 
Exchange among the world’s principal stock exchanges. 
 
7. AIM and PLUS provide the platform for SMEs to raise equity to finance growth. 
Though a substantial proportion of the UK’s financial services are based in 
London, the markets support SMEs from all regions of the UK. Both AIM and 
PLUS have also been successful in attracting foreign based SMEs. 
 
8. Levels of daily liquidity are a major and recurrent issue for markets with large 
volumes of small capitalisation stocks. This is true for both AIM and PLUS. Low 
daily liquidity can act as a deterrent to investment in small cap stocks, making 
it harder for investors to access funds. 
 
9. The economic downturn has made it harder for SMEs to raise external finance. 
Rejection rates have risen, with term loans more affected than overdrafts but 
the banks have not stopped lending. Firms most affected are those with low 
assets (lack of collateral), high credit demands, poor credit ratings and low 
business experience (start-ups).  
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10. Though AIM tends to attract early-stage businesses and businesses from high-
risk sectors, the risks are not considered too high.  
 
11. 2010 brings new opportunities for both AIM and PLUS to support high growth 
SMEs in accessing equity finance. Mergers and acquisitions are expected to 
pick up in early 2010, which could lead to consolidation of small cap stock 
and enhanced levels of liquidity among smaller stock bands. In particular, the 
trends in fundraising on AIM through rights issues are rebounding following the 
effects of the global economic downturn. 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Our research has identified a number of recommendations designed to enhance 
the effectiveness of the SME funding escalator and the public equity markets in 
meeting the equity financing needs of UK SMEs. These recommendations address 
the key research questions by proposing action focused solutions to: enhance the 
operation of the SME funding ladder by addressing equity finance gaps; improve the 
effectiveness and contribution of the public equity growth markets in catering for 
the needs of SMEs across the UK SMEs. 
 
7.2. Recommendations: The Pre-Market Funding Escalator 
 
7.2.1 Seed Capital 
 
Issue: Lack of seed capital to fund the pre-start up phase in technology companies, 
which is a constraint on the emergence and growth of university spin-out companies 
and other new technology based firms. 
 
Recommendation: An investigation into the financial requirements of technology 
firms, particularly at the commercialisation, start-up and early growth stages which 
will (i) identify and work-up new investment mechanisms, investment instruments 
and investment models to provide seed capital and other forms of support and (ii) 
assess how the business environment can be made more conducive for the 
emergence and growth of technology-based firms. 
 
Our research indicates that companies seeking to commercialise scientific and 
technology knowledge often find difficulties in either getting onto the funding 
escalator or quickly falling off. For example, there has been a disappointing lack of 
success in the number of high growth university spin-off companies that have been 
created. Such companies are of critical importance to the UK economy on account 
of their contribution to innovation and potential for growth. It has proved difficult to 
obtain commercial returns from seed capital investments hence most of the funding 
for commercialisation is provided through the public sector. However, these 
schemes have provided to be ineffective. The ‘Innovation Nation’ White Paper 
proposes “an escalator of financial support for innovative businesses at different 
stages of their growth”. However, it may be that a venture capital based approach 
is inappropriate for funding the commercialisation stage of technology based firms 
as some commentators have recently suggested,160 and that a mix of different 
financial instruments is required. A more holistic approach might also include 
adoption of the US SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research Program) and public 
procurement-based innovation contracts. 
 
We therefore note the need for an investigation into the financial requirements of 
technology firms particularly at the commercialisation, start-up and growth stages. 
 
                                                     
160 Sharpe, S, Cosh, A, Connell, D and Parnell, H (2009) Start-up Finance: The role of Micro Funds in the 
financing of new technology-based firms, NESTA: London. 
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7.2.2 The Business Angel Market 
 
Issue: The focus of venture capital firms is moving to providing later stage funding to 
businesses. As a consequence business angels are being relied upon to a greater 
extent for provision of larger volumes of equity finance over longer periods of time 
and greater levels of more business support to SMEs. 
 
Recommendation:  Government needs to enhance its support for the business angel 
market, by increasing the financial support, to support business angel networks, 
extending coverage of co-investment funds, retaining the Enterprise Investment 
Scheme and increasing the tax incentives, and changing various rules which have 
become restrictive as angels have been required to make larger investments and 
support their investee businesses for longer. 
 
There has been a long term trend for private venture capital funds to withdraw from 
making small scale early stage investments. The minimum venture capital investment 
has risen from around £250,000 in the 1980s to around £2m now, with the Rowlands 
Commission even suggesting a funding gap from £2m to £10m. The consequence is 
that business angels have become much more significant in the lower part of the 
funding escalator. The demand for angel funding has fundamentally changed in 
two key respects. First there are more companies seeking angel finance as they 
become the only funding option. Second, with businesses now having to be 
significantly larger before they approach venture capital funds, business angels 
have to make larger amounts available to their investee companies and finance 
them through a series of funding rounds over a longer time period. Many business 
angels have responded by forming syndicates which have the financial strength to 
meet this changing demand.  
 
Government therefore needs to take a series of measures to support and expand 
the business angel market. First, it needs to provide more generous core financial 
support, to fund business angel networks which have significant positive effects on 
market efficiency (enabling investors and entrepreneurs seeking finance to more 
easily locate one another), capacity building (through training and education 
activities focused on raising the competence of novice and inexperienced angels, 
and enabling entrepreneur to become investment ready) and building angel 
syndicates. The UK’s Business Angel Network system is static at best whereas it is 
growing in many other European countries. Second, Co-Investment Funds have 
been critical in increasing the investment capacity of business angels. However, their 
availability is patchy across the UK. Moreover, there is no consensus on the most 
appropriate model for such funds. Government therefore need to ensure that 
investors and businesses across the country have access to co-investment funds. 
There is also need for research to evaluate the effectiveness of the various forms of 
co-investment schemes that currently exist across the UK. Third, tax is the biggest 
influence on the amount that they allocate from their investment portfolio for 
investment in unquoted companies. Government must therefore appreciate that 
raising the top marginal rate of tax and capital gains tax is likely to depress levels of 
angel investment. Given this sensitivity of tax it is not surprising that the angel 
community values the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), which has played a 
critical role in stimulating angel investment in early stage, growth oriented 
businesses. As a minimum this must be retained in its present form. However, given 
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the particular funding issues in the seed capital market there is a strong case for 
raising the tax relief on such investments. This would also have the advantage of 
discouraging ‘investment drift’ in the angel market. In addition, there is a strong case 
for raising the tax write off from 20% to 30% for seed investments (this change needs 
to be accompanied by the change in ordinary shares discussed below). In addition, 
because of the way in which angel investing has changed in recent years some of 
the Scheme’s rules need to be modified: 
 
• The trend towards larger investments by angels means that the 30% maximum 
shareholding is becoming a constraint 
• For similar reasons the restriction of investment relief to companies with less 
than 50 employees is becoming restrictive 
• The requirement to invest in Ordinary shares runs against good practice in 
angel investing which advocates convertible instruments. Ordinary shares are 
particularly inappropriate for seed funding and forces the premature 
valuation of businesses which often proves to be inappropriate and as a result 
may deter subsequent investors or de unfair to the entrepreneur. It would be 
more appropriate to allow angel investors to provide convertible loan funding 
to a company which becomes convertible to equity at a more appropriate 
point in a company’s development, without losing EIS relief. Relief would start 
from the conversion from loan to equity which would have to occur within a 
time limit – perhaps 24 months. 
 
We therefore recommend the emphasis to government of the critical and growing 
importance that business angels play in financing growing business, lobbies BIS for 
increased core funding for Business Angel Networks, and lobbies The Treasury and 
HMRC to amend rules of the EIS which have become a constraint to investment on 
account of the changing nature of angel investing.  
 
7.2.3 The Business Angel-Venture Capital Disconnect 
 
Issue: The Enterprise Investment Scheme is contributing to an investment disconnect 
between business angels and venture capital firms. 
 
Recommendation: Enterprise Investment Scheme rules are amended to enable 
business angel investors to convert their investment to the same terms as venture 
capitalists without losing their tax relief. 
 
The funding escalator model sees business angels and venture capital funds as 
being complementary to one another. In early stage equity financing fast growing 
SME companies tend to be initially supported by business angel who provide 
finance, guidance and mentoring and then by venture capital firms which enable 
growing SMEs to access larger volumes of equity finance (to a point where they may 
be in a position to access the stock market). Our research suggests this model is in a 
danger of being compromised with a growing disconnect between the investment 
relationship of business angels and venture capitalists. The main driving force is the 
increase in the minimum size of investment by venture capital funds, which is forcing 
business angel groups increasingly to only invest in deals that they are able to fund 
themselves for an exit. However, there are also differences in investment 
philosophies and objectives between angels and venture capital funds. A further 
reason for this disconnect is the design of the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) 
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which misaligns the interests of business angels and venture capital funds because 
of the requirement that business angels to invest using ordinary shares with no 
preferential rights to qualify for tax relief. Venture capitalists on the other hand 
typically invest using convertible instruments, such as a loan with conversion rights 
which are only exercised if the company is successful. This requirement misaligns the 
interests of business angels and venture capitalists when negotiating joint 
investments or when a company with existing angel investment seeks further 
investment from venture capital firms. One consequence is that angels often suffer 
‘cram down’ by venture capitalists. Even though the angel may have supported the 
company from the it’s early, and most risky, stage in its development the terms 
imposed by the venture capital fund mean that the angel receives a substantially 
reduced return. This may act as a disincentive for angels to encourage their investee 
companies to raise venture capital, and either limit the firm’s further growth or seek 
an early exit. 
 
We therefore recommend representation to HMRC to make this change to the 
Enterprise Investment Scheme rules. 
 
7.2.4 The Pre-Market Funding Escalator 
 
Issue: The system of equity funding of SMEs prior to IPO is too fragmented. 
 
Recommendation: That research is undertaken to examine why the UK venture 
capital industry is segmented by stage and how start-up to IPO funds might be 
encouraged. 
 
The funding escalator has created too fragmented a system of funding for growing 
SMEs. It starts with the small scale of public sector funds and restrictions on their size 
of investments which combine to limit their ability to make follow-on investments. 
Business angels have limited financial resources, notwithstanding the emergence of 
angel groups, and have upper limits on the amounts that they can commit to a 
single business. Venture capital funds are set up to focus on particular stages, rather 
than funding a company from start-up through to an IPO.  The consequence of this 
series of vertical markets is a system which ‘drip feeds’ finance to growing 
businesses. This requires management time to engage in repeated searches for 
finance which may detract from their business, and reduces the potential returns of 
the investors in the earliest rounds who get diluted if they do not, or cannot, follow-
on their initial investment. This, in turn, makes early stage investing unattractive. This 
contrasts with the situation in the US where venture capital funds invest across all 
stages and do follow-on the investments that they make in start-up companies.  
 
We recommend research to investigate how the UK venture capital system might 
become less fragmented and move closer towards the US model. Government 
accepts that the funds that it has created have been too small and the current 
discussion about the UK Innovation Investment Fund161 appears to recognise the 
                                                     
161 The UK Innovation Investment Fund was announced by Government on 29June to drive economic growth and 
create highly skilled jobs by investing in businesses where there are significant global opportunities. The Government 
has committed £150m with the aim of attracting significant private sector investment into a fund of funds, to invest 
into underlying specialist technology venture capital funds. 
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need to create funds of scale. This research should also assess the likelihood that this 
outcome will be achieved.  
 
7.2.5 Trade sales amongst growing SMEs 
 
Issue: Clarifying the benefits and costs to the UK economy of an SME trade sale on 
the public equity markets. 
 
Recommendation: Research into the economic cost / benefit to the UK economy of 
SMEs undertaking trade sales. 
 
We have noted that many growing firms opt to sell to another, usually larger, 
company rather than complete the funding escalator with an IPO. This is often 
instigated by venture capital funds that prefer a trade sale to an IPO as an exit 
route. Whether an SME trade sale is beneficial to the company – and hence to the 
UK economy – is complex. On the one hand, the acquired company may gain 
access to financial, managerial and strategic resources to enable it to continue to 
grow. In addition, the entrepreneurs who sell off their companies typically use the 
funds from the trade sale to instigate other entrepreneurial activity, act as business 
angels or even set up venture capital funds. This process of recycling their 
experience and finance clearly benefits the UK economy. On the other hand, it 
prevents fast growing firms – ‘gazelles’ – from becoming ‘gorillas’ – globally 
significant companies and so reduces the management pool with experience of 
growing global companies. Moreover, there is evidence that trade sales can be 
detrimental to the growth of an SME as the acquired company may be integrated 
into its new parent company in a way which limits its growth and limits 
entrepreneurial flair and innovation. In some cases the acquisition is mismanaged, 
resulting in the destruction of value. In addition, where the sale of a growing SME is 
to a foreign company the consequence may be that economic benefits to the UK 
economy, such as intellectual property, skills, the creation of UK headquartered 
global companies and future acquiring companies, may be lost. 
 
We make two recommendations. First, further research would be valuable on the 
economic benefits and costs of trade sales of growing SMEs to the UK economy, 
and if found to be detrimental to make appropriate recommendations which 
reduce or remove the factors which encourage growing SMEs to seek a trade sale 
rather than an IPO. Second, we recommend that further research be undertaken 
which involves the London Stock Exchange and also engages in wider dialogue with 
the BVCA and its members and the venture capital community at large to explore 
what changes could be made to reverse the current preference for exit through 
trade sale, rather than an IPO, and to make appropriate recommendations to the 
relevant parties. 
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7.3. Recommendations: Operation of Growth Markets 
 
7.3.1 Responsibilities of a Company Quoted on the Public Markets 
 
Issue: Understanding the responsibilities of being a listed company. 
 
Recommendation: Raising awareness amongst SMES and their advisors of good 
practice / methods in operating as a publicly quoted company on AIM / PLUS. 
 
Following the success of an SME being admitted to AIM or PLUS, our research 
suggests businesses tend to underestimate the required commitment to investor 
relations associated with being a quoted company. Once part of a public market it 
is important that an SME provides company news and related price sensitive 
information on an ongoing basis to the market, investors and other stakeholders to 
keep all aware of the progress of the company. Without a regular flow of such 
information the inherent illiquidity of the market will be deepened to the detriment of 
the company. 
 
Raising awareness among SMEs and advisors of good practice in operating on an 
exchange is important. We suggest the following could be undertaken to achieve 
this, building on the existing mechanisms in place:  
 
• Literature highlighting examples of good practice in operating as an SME on 
the markets provided on AIM and PLUS websites; and  
• Provision of training seminars to SMEs which have been admitted to the AIM 
and PLUS, and their advisors. SMEs currently operating on the exchange could 
be invited to help facilitate these seminars and share their experiences.  
 
7.3.2 Improving Daily Liquidity  
 
Issue: Low levels of daily liquidity on AIM and PLUS are impacting on SME valuations 
and fundraising activity. 
 
Recommendation: Research is undertaken that considers how issues around low 
levels of liquidity should be tackled. 
 
Levels of daily liquidity, particularly at the lower end of the market, are a major and 
recurrent issue for both AIM and PLUS. An illiquid share impacts the cost of capital of 
an SME and hence its ability to grow and fundraise. In particular it: 
 
• Results in an unrealistic share price (often lower than Net Asset Value of the 
company)and in turn 
• Implies a serious dilution of ownership in subsequent fund raising exercises 
• Dissuades both retail and institutional investors from making further 
investments in the company; 
 
Our research suggested there are methods through which liquidity could be 
enhanced, for example:  
 
• Use of tax breaks for people investing in SMEs through an enhancement of 
the Venture Capital Trust (VCT) schemes; and 
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• increasing the retail investor base by, for instance, allowing AIM/PLUS stocks to 
be used for ISAs. 
 
We recommend further research is undertaken that looks at how issues around low 
levels of liquidity can be tackled. This research would include further investigation of 
the ideas referred to above. The research should involve liaison with SMEs, the 
markets and wider investment community to establish the reasons for low daily 
liquidity and potential ways in which these problems could be mitigated. 
 
7.3.3 Improving Further the Quality of Nomads 
 
Issue: Importance of maintaining ongoing monitoring of Nomads. 
 
Recommendation: AIM continues to monitor Nomads and an annual survey should 
be conducted to assess the performance of Nomads operating on AIM. 
 
Nomads are used by SMEs to advise on the admission process to AIM and the rules 
and regulations regarding its operation. As such Nomads are a key pillar of the AIM 
regulatory framework. AIM recognises the importance of thorough procedures in the 
appointment and supervision of Nomad activity. Since 2007, AIM has undertaken an 
enhanced programme of ongoing monitoring of both the appointment and 
activities of Nomads with a view to improving standards and, where necessary 
disciplining those whose performance is not up to sufficient standards required by 
investors and SMEs. 
 
Notwithstanding this increased surveillance of Nomads it remains the case that there 
are some Nomads of mixed quality. It is important that the ongoing monitoring of 
Nomads is maintained to ensure a high level of service is provided to clients. We 
recommend that ongoing monitoring of Nomads continues but that this is 
supplemented by an annual SME survey that assesses the performance of Nomads 
operating on AIM. This survey could be undertaken by a reputable research 
organisation or a major financial newspaper/journal on an annual basis and is likely 
to include covering areas such as satisfaction levels of working with Nomads, 
strengths, gaps in provision and areas for improvement. 
 
7.3.4 Potential Impact of UK and EU legislation  
 
Issue: Changes in EU legislation when implemented in the UK market may adversely 
impact UK SMEs. For example, the recent introduction by the FSA of the EU minimum 
listing route could have an impact on other UK market offerings including AIM and 
PLUS. 
 
Recommendation: The City of London, AIM and PLUS to ensure that they remain 
central to the debates on changes to EU legislation which may affect the ability of 
SMEs to raise capital cost-effectively. The UK Treasury and UKLA take steps to 
encourage as far as possible the use of growth markets in the UK to genuine SMEs 
and feed into policy decisions at the European level to improve SME access to 
finance. . 
 
The EU is currently holding debates on the Prospectus Directive, Market Abuse and 
Transparency Directive reviews. The extension of these existing EU directives to 
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smaller companies could have the potential to impact on the UK’s aim to improve 
the environment for stimulating the growth of smaller companies.  
 
We endorse the approach taken by the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) for the 
EU Commission to bring forward its reviews of the relevant directives and 
recommend that the City of London, AIM and PLUS continue to participate 
energetically in these debates, and also monitor any future changes to these 
Directives to establish if there could be potential impacts that will affect AIM and 
PLUS. This is an area worthy of further in-depth analysis and we recommend that a 
detailed piece of research be undertaken into the potential impact these proposed 
legislative measures may have upon growth markets. 
 
For example, there are concerns in the market that the new Standard listing route 
introduced by the UKLA may confuse investors and companies and erode the 
differences between the different market offerings in the UK.  
 
We recommend the London Stock Exchange continues to monitor the impact of this 
decision by the FSA so to respond appropriately should there be an adverse impact 
on the different market offerings. To mitigate the risks of differentiation of the UK 
market offerings, the UKLA should ensure that investors, companies and market 
participants fully understand the benefits of each available route to a public 
quotation in the UK.  
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7.4. Recommendations: Understanding SME Funding Issues  
 
7.4.1 SME Funding Needs 
 
Issue: A regular publication is required providing information and a greater 
understanding of SME funding issues. 
 
Recommendation: To bring together a consortium of interested partners to make the 
case for or commission an annual ‘state of SME finance’ report. 
 
Issue: There is a gap in information and understanding of SME financing issues since 
the Bank of England ceased publication of its annual publication Finance for Small 
Firms which stopped in 2004, following the decision of the Bank to step back from 
work on small firms. However, the commissioning of this report and the recent 
publication of other reports on SME finance (e.g. ‘Shifting Sands: The Changing 
Nature of the Early-Stage Venture Capital Market in the UK’, ‘From Funding Gaps to 
Thin Markets’ and others reports by NESTA, the ‘Provision of Growth Capital to UK 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises’ by Chris Rowlands) underlines the need for a 
regular, comprehensive and authoritative report on SME finance which provides a 
commentary and interpretation of the available statistics and other information. 
 
Contact with former Bank staff previously involved in the annual publication Finance 
for Small Firms, estimated that it would have involved three to four person months 
(for someone familiar with SME financing issues) which could equate to £50-£60k per. 
 
We suggest that a consortium of interested partners (for example, BBAA, BBA, BVCA, 
BIS, HMT, HMRC) commission an annual ‘state of SME finance’ report. 162 
                                                     
162 Contact with former Bank of England staff involved in the Finance for Small Firms report indicates 
that the time input was in the order of three to four months, excluding special topics which were 
undertaken separately. 
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ACRONYMS 
 
3 F  Founder, family, friends 
AIM Alternative Investment Market 
BBAA British Business Angel Association 
BES Business Expansion Scheme 
BVCA British Venture Capital Association 
EBAN European Business Angel Network 
ECF Enterprise Capital Funds 
EFG Enterprise Finance Guarantee 
EGF Early Growth Funds  
EIB European Investment Bank  
EIS Enterprise Investment Scheme 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
GEM Global Entrepreneurship Monitor  
HGF High Growth Firms 
HMRC HM Revenue & Customs  
IDBR Inter Departmental Business Register 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IRR Internal rate of return 
JEREMIE Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises 
M&A Merger and acquisition 
MBI Management buy-in 
MBO Management buy-out 
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
NESTA National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts 
Nomad Nominated Advisor 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONS Office of National Statistics  
PLUS PLUS Markets 
QCA Quoted Companies Alliance  
R&D Research and Development 
RDA Regional Development Agency 
RVCF Regional Venture Capital Fund 
SBIC Small Business Investment Company 
SBS Small Business Survey  
SFLGS Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme 
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
SPI Swiss Performance Index  
UCSF University Challenge Seed Funds  
VC Venture Capital 
VCT Venture Capital Trust 
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